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THE ORIGINS OF THE BUDGET CRISIS 
-1974-1983 
Cities are the creatures of economics. They survive as communities if 
they can· cope with the vagaries of economic change. Once economic 
decline sets in, every aspect of their life is threatened. Liverpool is the 
perfect illustration of that process, for decline has eaten into the city's 
economy, society and politics. The story began with the port. It made 
the city great and in the 19th century gave it more millionaires than any 
other provincial city in Britain. But the port's decline left Liverpool with 
a legacy that now makes economic survival, let alone recovery, 
problematic at best. Its fall began with the impact of the 1930s depression 
upon world trade. But since 1945, changes in the national and 
international economy have dramatically speeded up the process. And 
the city has never really recovered its balance. 
For a brief period during the 1960s, government policies to 
strengthen its economy promised to arrest the process. But it proved to 
be a false dawn. Since then, decline has turned into collapse and 
Liverpool threatens to become the first deindustrialised city in the nation. 
In the 1980s, the city is economically marooned: it is in the wrong place, 
based on the wrong kind of economic activity with an outdated 
infrastructure and an underqualified labour force. It is increasingly a 
'branch plant economy' which has become peripheral to the mainstream 
international capitalist economy. And economic failure has produced a 
range of social problems in the city as intense and intractable as any in 
Western Europe. In 1981 tear gas had to be used by police for the first 
time on the British mainland to put down 'a poor people's revolt' in its 
inner city. 
Until quite recently, the city's economic misfortunes did not have a 
major direct impact upon the health of the municipal economy itself, 
because high levels of public expenditure and a relatively generous 
government grant system protected the local authority from the most 
1 
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severe financial effects of structural decline. Economic privation was 
experienced primarily by vulnerable individuals and groups in the 
community. But cuts in central government support since the mid-
1970s, but especially under the Conservatives in the 1980s, have changed 
that. The decline in local economic resources has become a much more 
serious problem for the city because they now have to make a larger 
contribution to the local authority's income to compensate for the drop 
in national support. When the Conservatives took power in 1979 central 
government was providing 62 per cent of the city's net income and the 
rates over 37 per cent. By 1983 the Government's contribution had 
dropped to 44 per cent and the rates had risen to over 55 per cent. By the 
mid-1980s cuts in government financial support had turned economic 
failure into fiscal crisis and brought Liverpool to the edge of municipal 
bankruptcy. And this all spilt over into the city's political life as a 
Militant-led Labour party used its budget crisis to challenge the authority 
of a free market Conservative Government. Liverpool now stands at the 
centre of the economic, social and ideological forces facing British cities. 
It is a test case of how the country responds politically to long-term 
urban decline. 
From economic collapse to financial crisis 
The port dominated Liverpool's economy after the first dock was built in 
the early part of the 18th century. But in the second half of the century, 
trade exploded. The slave trade played a major part in the boom- by the 
end of the century Liverpool supplied three quarters of the country's 
slaving ships, which in peak years carried 50,000 slaves. But human 
beings were not the only goods in which Liverpool traded as it became a 
vast importer of raw materials as well as a major exporter. Throughout 
the 19th century Liverpool flourished ~ven further. Trade trebled 
between 1830 and 1860 and again between 1860 and the outbreak of the 
first world war. By 1914, the port was second only to London, with one 
third of all British exports and one quarter of all imports going through 
Liverpool. 
The port also dominated the labour market, with some serious 
long-term consequences. Outside the commercial sector, jobs were 
mainly semi- and unskilled, casual, irregular and poorly paid. Unlike 
other cities, a core of skilled workers did not develop, because 
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manufacturing never took off in Liverpool. This overdependence on the 
port, and the relative absence of an industrial base, always worried the 
city's leaders. But the unbalanced character of its economy did not seem 
important until the collapse of the international economy and the 
depression after the first world war. Liverpool has been in decline ever 
since as nothing else has replaced the port. By the early 1930s 
unemployment in Liverpool reached a peak of 28 per cent and 
throughout the decade was always at least one and a half times the 
national average. In the late 1940s unemployment actually rose to two 
and a half times the national average. Government policies in the 1950s 
did bring some new manufacturing jobs to the Merseyside area, but 
other factory closures and the continuing loss of jobs in the port cancelled 
them out. And the city's unfavourable industrial structure remained 
unchanged. 
The 1960s initially promised better things for Liverpool as govern-
ment policy to redistribute industry appeared to break the pattern of 
long-term decline. The sticks and carrots of regional policy led to the 
important, if reluctant, establishment of a branch of the British car 
industry on Merseyside, with an investment programme of £m65 which 
created 25,000 jobs. For the first time in its history, in the early 1960s 
manufacturing became a growth sector in Merseyside. And by the end of 
the decade, despite some reservations, there was a feeling that the place 
was on the road to recovery. But the brief flirtation with manufacturing 
did not continue and the gains of the 1960s were not sustained. Between 
1966 and 1977 350 plants closed or transferred production elsewhere with 
the loss of 40,000 jobs. At the same time the port continued its decline. 
Its share of total imports and exports was almost halved from 15 to 8 per 
cent, and the workforce reduced to 3,000 from 25,000 in 1945. Again 
between 1966 and 1976, employment in Merseyside fell by 14 per cent, 
much more than either the national or regional average. By the late 
1970s, Liverpool's manufacturing economy seemed on the verge of 
collapse. 
The crucial problem of Liverpool's manufacturing economy is the 
pattern of ownership. Far more than in other cities, its manufacturing is 
dominated by a small number of very large absentee employers. At the 
beginning of the 1980s,for example, 57 per cent of manufacturing jobs 
were in plants employing over 1,000 workers. By contrast the national 
12 I THE ORIGINS OF THE BUDGET CRISIS 
figure was only 29 per cent. In 1979, less than 1 per cent of the city's 
firms provided nearly 40 per cent of total employment. By 1985, seven 
large firms controlled almost half of all the 47,000 manufacturing jobs in 
the city. And between 1981 and 1985 these seven firms had shed 30 per 
cent of their jobs. 
With few exceptions, these very large firms which were frequently 
although not always established as a result of regional policy during the 
1950s and 1960s, are externally, not locally, controlled. And this 
dependence upon externally controlled firms is increasing. In 1965, 51 
per cent ofLiverpool's manufacturing firms were non-locally controlled. 
By 1975 this had risen to 70 per cent. In the 1980s only one of the twenty 
largest manufacturing companies on Merseyside is actually locally 
controlled. The problem is that such firms tend to be branch plants of 
national or multi-national corporations who make investment and 
disinvestment decisions in terms of national and international, not local, 
markets. They have no particular commitment to the people or the place 
of Liverpool. Their plants are particularly vulnerable to the loss of jobs as 
these companies rationalise and restructure production during a reces-
sion. Production in Liverpool tends to be cut back first. And when 
factories do close the job losses inevitably wipe out any marginal- and 
often painfully achieved - gains, by the small firm sector of the 
economy. Between 1979 and 1984 almost half its manufacturing jobs, 
40,000, were lost in this way as Liverpool became known as the 
Bermuda Triangle of British capitalism. In the mid 1980s, the city had 
lost control of its economic destiny. 
The decline of manufacturing has been aggravated by the failure of 
the service sector to bring new growth to Liverpool, in contrast to other 
places. Although services not manufacturing have traditionally domin-
ated Liverpool's economy, the bulk of those jobs have been in the 
'blue-collar' sector - nationalised industries, transport, retailing and dis-
tribution. Liverpool did not develop a significant white-collar service 
sector. And even though the sector did grow in the 1970s it lagged 
behind the national trends. Most important, jobs in the prestigious and 
growing insurance, banking, finance, business, professional and scien-
tific services, actually declined in Liverpool, while they grew nationally. 
The only white collar growth that did take place in the 1970s was in the 
public sector - in central government, local authorities, the health 
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service. And by 1981 even this sector was already in decline from the 
peak year of 1977 as public expenditure cuts had begun to have their 
impact. Between 1976 and 1979, for example, the number of Liverpool 
city council jobs fell by 7 per cent. 
From 1971 to 1985 total employment in the city fell by 33 per cent in 
contrast to the national figure of only 3 per cent. And this brought heavy 
rates of unemployment. In fact, Merseyside has had the highest rate of 
unemployment of any English conurbation in every decade since the 
1950s. But the position worsened considerably during the 1970s as the 
rate of unemployment in Liverpool quadrupled from 5 per cent to 20 per 
cent. By 1985 it was 27 per cent, double the national average. 
Unemployment also lasts longer in Liverpool than elsewhere. In 1979, 
37 per cent of registered unemployed people in Liverpool had been out of 
work for more than a year compared with only 24 per cent nationally. 
By 1985 the national figure was 39 per cent, but Liverpool's was 53 per 
cent. This is crucial since after one year, people go off unemployment 
benefit on to social security and the money they get and can spend drops 
significantly, depressing the local economy further. Although national 
figures show the same underlying trend in the 1980s, Liverpool's 
economic problems are still more serious than any other city's. The 
Parliamentary select committee on the environment said so in 1983. And 
this Conservative Government has admitted it as well. The Director of 
the Government's special Merseyside Task Force, Eric Sorenson, was 
asked by that select committee why so much attention had been paid to 
Liverpool's problems in recent years. He replied simply 'Because they 
are worse.' 
This is why public sector employment has become so crucial in 
Liverpool. In the late 1970s, close to 70 per cent of all jobs in the city 
were in the service sector. About half of them were actually public sector 
jobs. The city council itself accounted for one third of all public sector 
jobs. By 1985, decline in other parts of the public sector meant that the 
council employed almost 40 per cent of people in public sector jobs, 
making it even more important as an employer in the city. Because of the 
peculiar structure of its economy, Liverpool depends more on public 
spending for jobs than other cities. This has dramatically affected its 
politics. Arguments about cuts in public spending and job losses 
dominated local political debate in the past decade, and became central to 
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the conflict between the city and the Government in the 1980s. The 
Conservative Government's view was that public employment increased 
taxes which drove out the private sector. The Labour party argued that 
the private sector had abandoned the city anyway, and that public 
employment was not part of the problem, but part of the solution to it. 
In 1984, the Labour council seized upon the scale of economic decline 
and the very high levels of unemployment in the city, to mount an 
ideological attack upon the Conservative Government's policies for 
Liverpool. It argued that its cuts in spending were threatening the city's 
remaining jobs, by depressing one of the few viable parts of the local 
economy, the public sector. But it did not need a political party to make 
these arguments. They had been very well known for a very long time. 
The significance of these economic trends, and their dangers for the city, 
had been pointed out several years before Labour took control of the 
council, by the city's chief planning officer. His 1981 report entitled 
Local Economic Trends And Future Prospects, emphasised that the 
consequences of economic decline and unemployment had extended far 
beyond the individuals, families and communities into the municipal 
economy itself. It had set in motion a cycle of decline which included 
increases in vacant and derelict land and buildings; a continuing loss of 
population; declining levels of personal income and expenditure; a loss of 
revenue to the local authority; a loss of taxation and an increase in social 
security expenditure. 
His report estimated that between 197 4 and 1979, at a time when the 
city's economic problems were worsening, and the need for public sector 
action to ameliorate their effects had risen, the level of the city's 
economic activity in real money terms had declined. As for the city 
council, total income fell by 18 per cent; rate income fell by 25 per cent; 
and total real net expenditure fell by 14 per cent from its peak level of 
1975/76. This in turn had affected the local economy, by reducing 
demand for locally-produced goods and services. On top of that the city 
council was faced with the prospect of substantial rate rises if it wanted to 
maintain existing expenditure and income levels, as the Government 
reduced financial support to it through the grant system. In other words, 
the city's economic failure had been turned into serious financial strain 
for the local authority. And the social and political consequences were 
likely to be bleak. In the planning officer's view, the extreme variations 
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within the city itself- of unemployment rates, job prospects and income 
levels- would only have 'a detrimental and lasting effect on its social and 
economic fabric.' That is, as it entered the 1980s, the city was in danger 
of becoming socially and economically polarised, with quite unpredict-
able consequences. 
Urban protest and Government responses 
That report proved prophetic. Several months later, in July 1981, a 
furious bout of rioting, looting and arson broke out in the inner city area 
of Toxteth, the home of some of the poorest black and white people in 
the city. At the end of two weeks sporadic violence, a young man was 
dead, hundreds of police and unknown numbers of civilians had been 
injured, and £m11 of damage had been unleashed upon the neighbour-
hood's public buildings, homes and shops. Police were drafted in from 
many parts of the country and tear gas was used to control some of the 
worst pitched battles between hundreds of residents and the police. 
Initially the riots had been sparked off by an incident in which police 
attempted to arrest a local black youth. This set alight simmering 
resentments and conflicts between the local black community and police. 
And it opened up much larger questions about race relations in the city, 
and the serious degree of unacknowledged racism in Liverpool that in 
fact none of the political parties has ever admitted or dealt with. But the 
insurrection also spread to local whites, as the dispossessed of the inner 
city rose into 'a poor people's revolt' against authority. And a 
Government had been frightened. 
As Michael Heseltine's 'secret' 'It took a riot' memo to the Cabinet 
pointed out, the Government only began to take seriously the problems 
of economic and social deprivation in the poorest city in Britain, when 
they threatened public order. And after the tear gas had dispersed the 
rioters and the smoke had settled, a bevy of senior Ministers toured the 
riot zone to witness the extent of the damage, and search for a credible 
Government response to the 'Liverpool problem.' It came up with a new 
initiative, a special Minister for Merseyside, Michael Heseltine, sup-
ported by a new administrative unit, the Merseyside Task Force, 
consisting of civil servants from three government Departments and 
secondees from the much vaunted private sector. The new team was 
supposed to devise innovative strategies and projects which would make 
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an impact upon Liverpool's long-term problems, especially unemploy-
ment and housing. But four years later in 1985, their failure to change the 
dimensions of those problems had left the public sceptical of, and the 
local authority more hostile to, Government attempts to help the city. 
The fact is that, despite the novelty of the administrative arrange-
ments, Task Force stood firmly in a well-established tradition of'special' 
government initiatives for inner Liverpool during the past twenty years. 
Since the 1960s, the city has been the recipient, or victim, of every urban 
experiment invented, including Tony Crosland's educational priority 
areas, Jim Callaghan's traditional urban programme, Roy Jenkin's 
community development projects, the Home Office's Brunswick 
neighbourhood project, Peter Walker's inner area studies, Peter Shore's 
inner city partnerships, Geoffrey Howe's enterprise zones and Michael 
Heseltine's urban development corporations. Two decades' experience 
of those policies had not substantially improved the city's problems. But 
it had fundamentally coloured local people's perceptions, and made them 
intensely sceptical of what would be done for Liverpool through 'special 
initiatives'. 
The initiatives failed for a variety of familiar reasons. Partly it was a 
problem of analysis and definition. Many of the earlier ones especially 
focused on the social symptoms of Liverpool's decline, but failed to 
identify or deal with the underlying structural problem, the economic 
decline of the city. Partly it was a question of resources. The amount of 
money involved was relatively trivial in relation either to the scale of the 
problems or even to the resources that go into conventional government 
programmes. Also they tended to be ad hoc experiments, which 
concentrated on specific problems or too narrowly defined areas or 
communities in the city. And they often remained divorced from 
mainstream government programmes, such as industrial, regional or 
housing policy, which pulled in different directions from inner city 
initiatives. They rarely succeeded in getting all the government 
Departments which had an impact upon the inner city to play a part, and 
as a result the policies frequently lacked coherence. 
But more than that, the experience of such initiatives led many local 
politicians and officials to conclude that central government was not 
seriously committed to trying to solve the city's problems. In part this 
was because the inner city went up and down on the national political 
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agenda, not primarily in relation to real need but rather to narrow 
political opportunism, such as recapturing the inner city Labour vote or 
keeping the lid on social protest. Programmes often stopped just as they 
got going. Or the direction changed part way through the policy, often 
when the government itself changed hands. Local politicians and officials 
frequently felt that central government imposed the policies upon them 
without consulting them but expected them to make them work 
anyway. Most of these criticisms would apply to Labour Governments. 
But they pale into insignificance in comparison with local criticism levied 
at the central government since the Conservatives took control. With 
Labour Governments, Liverpool's politicians and officials felt that the 
urban programme, if ineffectual, was at least benign in intent. But under 
the Conservatives, the feeling in Liverpool has grown that policy is 
malign. Partly it is because Government money has been moving away 
from the authority, even if the special initiatives and the urban 
programme resources themselves have actually gone up. The Govern-
ment has taken away more with one hand than it has given back with the 
other. Partly it is the ideological thrust of urban policy under the 
Conservatives, which replaces public sector spending with private-sector 
led urban regeneration. 
But most importantly it is the pervasive feeling among many local 
politicians that Liverpool has no place in the Conservatives' scheme of 
things, who simply do not care about its people or its problems. In local 
eyes, Liverpool is redundant, economically and politically, to the 
Conservatives. And there are certainly very few Conservative votes left 
in Liverpool. As the Conservative party has flourished in the country at 
large, Liverpool has rejected it, getting rid of every MP and leaving just a 
dozen or so councillors. For whatever reason, relations between 
Liverpool and the Government were slowly worsening during the 1970s, 
as the city's economic decline continued and national responses were 
unable to cope with it. The place clearly needed help but felt 
Government was not prepared to give it. And this increased political 
distrust. 
By the early 1980s the Conservative Government reciprocated these 
feelings. It regarded the city as expensive, inefficient and badly run -
incapable of responding adequately, politically or administratively, to 
the scale of the problems it faced. Even though it can be argued that 
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central government was equally responsible for recent failures of urban 
policy, the Government thought Liverpool missed the opportunity it 
was given to help itself, classically blaming the victims for their 
misfortunes. But most crucially, by the mid 1980s the Conservatives saw 
Liverpool as the power base of the Militant Tendency. And they wanted 
to defeat it. The scene was set for a political confrontation. 
Parties and politics in Liverpool 
The peculiarities of Liverpool politics during the past decade directly 
contributed to rising tensions between the city and Government. For 
specific historical reasons, party politics in Liverpool are unlike those in 
any other city. The casual and relatively unskilled nature of the 
workforce with its absence of skilled craft unions, compounded by 
religious conflicts between the immigrant Irish Catholic and working 
class Protestant communities, meant that the Labour party took a very 
long time to establish its natural electoral majority in the most 
proletarian of English cities. The divisions within the working class vote, 
and the strength of Protestantism, prevented Labour taking power in 
Liverpool until 1955, thirty years after many other northern industrial 
towns had been captured. And between the mid-1950s and early 1970s, 
Labour had to share control of the city with the Conservatives. 
The importance of Catholicism meant Labour always had a very 
powerful right-wing presence, which guaranteed continuing ideological 
conflict within the party. It also contributed to a politics of personality, 
patronage, corruption and bossism in the Liverpool Labour party which 
reached its acme under the Braddocks who ran the city in the 1950s and 
early 1960s, and has never been completely eliminated. Labour has also 
had a long tradition of appointing right-wing MPs who spent much of 
their career locked in conflict with their more left-wing constituency 
parties. Indeed in the late 1970s three of them defected to the Social 
Democratic Party either before or after being deselected. The classic case 
was Sir Arthur Irvine, the right-wing absentee MP for Edgehill, who 
had been Solicitcr-General in Wilson's Cabinet and survived many 
attempted coups b·~fore finally dying in office. But his inadequate tenure 
of office had laid the ground for the Liberals and David Alton to take 
over the constituency. 
The combination of these factors meant that Labour's electoral grip 
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of the city was always tenuous and vulnerable in the 1960s and 1970s. 
But it was broken in the early 1970s by an extraordinary phenomenon 
which has never been repeated in any other large English city - the 
emergence of a Liberal party which took seats and votes from both major 
parties and controlled the city for most of a decade. In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, the Liberal party had barely any organisation, supporters or 
councillors. But in 1973, elections were held for the new Liverpool 
district council which was to come into office in 1974, and the Liberals 
scored a shattering victory, taking many former seats from Labour and 
decimating the Conservatives. With this began the most unusual decade 
of municipal politics in Liverpool. Between 1973 and 1983 no party had 
an overall majority, there were constant hung councils, minority and 
coalition administrations and confusion. The resulting failure of any 
administration to deal with many of the city's most pressing issues 
during this period contributed directly to the current crisis as the city's 
services, in many respects became inefficient and expensive. 
The extraordinary success of the Liberals in the 1970s rested partly on 
their own virtues, but also on their opponents' vices. The Labour party 
in particular was beset with problems. Its greatest millstone was that 
during the 1960s it had presided over a massive urban renewal and slum 
clearance programme, which had brutally transformed the city centre 
and broken up natural working class inner city communities, sending 
thousands of people to the high rise flats in the overspill estates on the 
perimeter of the city. The dramatic failure of that policy, and the tenants' 
rejection of it, turned many voters against Labour. Allied to that, the 
repairs and maintenance service given by the authority's workforce was 
extremely bad and Labour suffered for its failure to improve its 
performance. The city had virtually become a 'slumlord'. Also at this 
time in the late 1960s, Labour was a typical inner city party machine -
organisationally and politically bankrupt. It was short of money, 
members and organisation. Many of its sitting councillors were old, 
patronising and out of touch with their constituents. As a former 
councillor admitted, the party should have got rid of many of them but 
didn't. So the electorate did it for them. 
Labour's vices were the Liberals' virtues. They were young, 
energetic, hardworking and they seemed to care about people. And they 
were transformed by a future leader, Trevor Jones, into a phenomenally 
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successful electoral machine. The Liberals persuaded many people in 
Liverpool who voted Labour nationally to vote Liberal locally. And the 
Liberals did well where the turnout was high. With a variety of highly 
successful campaigning techniques the Liberals got out their voters and 
won their seats. The Liberal's theme was community politics - giving 
the voters what they wanted. And in this they were especially able to 
exploit Labour's achilles heel - the condition of the city's housing -
paying detailed attention to tenants' complaints and making sure officials 
did something about them. The Liberals took many Labour voters. But 
they took even more Conservative voters, many of whom were 
members of the skilled working class who, in other cities, where religion 
did not play such a part in political affiliation, might have been typical 
Labour voters. 
Coalitions, politics and policies: the lost decade 
But the Liberals' success imposed a price on the city because they were in 
many ways a party of protest who, when in office, had difficulty 
delivering a coherent set of policies for the whole city. Partly they did 
not want to. Under Trevor Jones the Liberals set about securing 
themselves a permanent social and political base in the city. They did it 
essentially by capturing votes where the other two parties were weakest. 
Labour voters lived in the inner city and council house ghettoes. The 
Conservatives lived in the upmarket, suburban home owners belt. The 
Liberals voters lived in the ring of Edwardian and Victorian terraced 
houses in the areas between those two. Housing became the key to 
politics in the city, as the Liberals identified as their power base the 
private renters, and the new and would-be home owners - the skilled 
working classes and lower middle classes. 
The Liberals were given a perfect weapon in the 1974 Housing Act. 
Urban renewal and slum clearance were out, rehabilitation was in. And 
government money was available to pay for it. As one official remarked, 
Trevor Jones and the 1974 Act were made for each other. And he used it 
perfectly, developing a private sector renewal strategy which concen-
trated resources in an elaborate set ofhousing action areas with a massive 
improvement grant programme, a municipal build-for-sale programme, 
with housing associations and later housing cooperatives being given a 
major role. And much of the property lay in actual or potential Liberal 
wards. 
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Much of this was done at the expense of the public sector, especially 
the post-war high rise flats, which had few Liberal voters and was 
starved of funds. The 1930s cottage estates, which were rapidly 
upgraded, were an exception. These were frequently sold off in the 
major council house sales programme and again proved fertile territory 
for Liberal votes. But council house rents were allowed to rise as the 
Liberals subsidised them by the minimum amount from the rates. The 
municipal house building programme and the tenement rehousing 
programme were gradually abandoned. A huge backlog of repairs 
developed. The housing strategy was one-legged only. The local 
authority officers who had developed the private sector renewal strategy 
never intended that it would operate at the expense of the public sector. 
But party politics guaranteed that it was. As Labour did before them, and 
would do after them, the Liberals used housing policy partly to meet 
genuine housing need and diversify the housing stock, but partly with an 
eye on the votes. As the in-joke went, the Liberals only had one housing 
strategy- to build houses for sale in Labour wards and houses for rent in 
Tory wards. 
This became crucial to Labour's battle with the Government later 
in the 1980s. Ideological disputes about housing policy divided the 
parties in the city and they were to divide the city and the Government as 
well. Labour's attachment to municipal housing, and its rejection of the 
mixed-economy approach, contributed directly to its estrangement from 
the Liberals in the 1970s but, more importantly, from the Conservative 
Government in the 1980s. And it fed the growing ideological dispute 
between them. 
This was equally true of the other main plank of the Liberals' 
programme in the 1970s, its attempts to hold down the rates at the cost 
of expenditure on local services, primarily in an effort to capture the 
Liberals' constituency of small businesses, shopkeepers and the new 
property owning classes. The record of the Liberal party in limiting rate 
rises caused enormous, if unintended, financial difficulties for the city in 
the 1980s, when under the Conservative Government's new grant 
system, the city's spending record in the 1970s became the basis of cuts in 
fmancial support. Local ideological conflict over housing and spending in 
the 1970s sowed the seeds of a national confrontation in the 1980s. 
In a different way, this was also true of another feature of coalition 
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politics in the 1970s. The Liberals were successful in the two areas of 
housing and the rates because they were pursuing policies that were 
broadly attractive to the rump Conservative party on the council. And 
they could count on their votes to provide an informal, if imperfect, 
coalition. But the coalition worked far less well in other areas. The 
problem was, that between 197 4 and 1983 no single party had an absolute 
majority on the council. And in four of those years when they were the 
largest party, Labour refused to take control of the council because it was 
unwilling to be a minority administration (see table 1). The decade was 
dominated by minority administrations, primarily Liberal, who could 
never be sure of getting sustained support for any of their policies. There 
was never any certainty about who would rule the city, which policies 
would be consistently pursued or which political deals would stick. This 
political uncertainty created bureaucratic uncertainty, and local officials 
Table 1: Party Composition and Control of Liverpool 
City Council1973-1984 
Labour Liberal Conservative Party control 
1973* 42 48 9 
1974 42 47 10 Liberal 
1975 42 43 14 Liberal 
1976 42 40 17 tLabour 
1977 42 40 17 tLabour (no election) 
1978 40 35 24 tLiberal 
1979 46 30 23 tLabour 
1980 40 38 21 tLiberal 
1981 40 38 21 tLiberal (no election) 
1982 42 36 21 tLiberal 
1983 51 30 18 tLabour 
1984 58 28 13 tLabour 
* The new council started in 1974, but the first elections to it were held in 1973. 
t Labour the largest single party. 
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found it virtually impossible to carry out medium-term planning with 
any guarantee of finding political support. It was a recipe for confusion, 
delay and drift. 
The price of this failure was that many major problems were never 
faced. The secondary school system was never reorganised because the 
three parties could never agree to a single plan. And until 1985 the 
secondary sector remained a patchwork of selective, comprehensive and 
church schools which provided thousands more places than required, 
and was terribly expensive to run. Also the primary school system was 
not rationalised because no party was willing to take the electoral risk of 
closing down popular, but inefficient, small local schools. This was 
especially true of the Liberals, whose community politics philosophy 
made it dangerous for them to alienate voters in marginal wards by 
shutting schools. The polytechnic system is too expensive because it is 
on a split site, spread all over the city. But again the parties could never 
agree on a single site. Further education has too many separate colleges 
which no administration could or would close. Large tracts ofland in the 
city centre were left empty because the parties could not agree whether to 
develop them for industry, commerce or housing. 
Equally, the council failed to face up to problems in the services 
which were delivered by blue collar unions. The Liberals were never able 
to reorganise the inefficient and poorly managed direct labour organisa-
tion which maintains the council houses, because Labour would ally with 
the unions and exploit it electorally. Council house tenants suffered the 
consequences of rotten services. Similarly, the Liberals were unable to 
reorganise the expensive and inefficient refuse collection service because 
of union opposition and lack of party support. The failure to achieve 
reorganisation finally led the Liberals to attempt privatisation of the 
service in 1982, but they could not get this passed either. Labour was 
prevented from tackling the problems by their ties with the unions. 
The city's failure to rationalise these services, means that many now 
cost more and are worse than those in other cities which have had long 
periods of Labour control, like Manchester or Sheffield. In the 
Government's view, this lies at the heart of the Liverpool's current 
financial problems. Whether this is entirely true is another matter, as we 
shall see. But the demoralising impact of ten years' paralysis upon the 
politicians and officers cannot be understated. It was a crucial lost decade 
24/ THE ORIGINS OF THE BUDGET CRISIS 
for the city. The council's inability to get a coherent strategy for the city 
as it was undergoing massive social change and economic decline and the 
unwillingness to take the difficult decisions necessary to provide reduced 
services for a declining population, left an extraordinarily difficult legacy 
for any party running the city in the mid-1980s. Decline would have 
been difficult to manage if the city had had enlightened leadership. That 
it had to endure such political incoherence instead seemed a cruel stroke 
of fate. 
Labour and the new militancy 
The final piece in the jigsaw was the Liverpool Labour party itself. 
During the past ten years the ideological centre of gravity of the party has 
been shifting from the centre to the far left. By 1985 Liverpool has 
become the jewel in the crown of the Militant Tendency, even though 
the Tendency does not have an actual majority in the Labour party. The 
shift is partly a matter of generational change. The membership of the 
party is different in the 1980s to what was in the 1970s. And their politics 
are different. 
Throughout the 1970s, the old guard, right-wing Catholic faction 
were a powerful minority force in the Labour group. Even as late as 1978 
they were able to stage a brief coup and depose the existing old left 
leader, John Hamilton, and replace him with their own candidate, Eddie 
Roderick. But the party activists in the city immediately revolted against 
the group and forced them to overturn the policy and reinstate 
Hamilton. That was the last gasp of the right and marked the rise of the 
new left. And it also marked a shift of power away from the council 
group to the district Labour party in the city. The eventual complete 
control that the district Labour party and its executive committee took 
over the Labour council group in the 1980s, was critical when the final 
confrontation with the Conservative government came in 1985. 
In fact, the Liverpool Labour party had been edging to the left since 
the early 1970s. In 1972 the ruling Labour group had split, with 21 
Labour councillors refusing to support the Labour leadership's decision 
to capitulate on the Conservative Government's Housing Act and raise 
the council rents. However, the centre right, with Bill Sefton leading, 
got the rises through. But the event traumatised Labour and made many 
decide that in future the council group had to be made much more 
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responsible to the party activists and the unions in the city. Also through 
the 1970s the failures of the party - the poverty of its organisation, the 
poor quality of many of its councillors, its lack of contact with the 
community, the demoralisation of being replaced by the young Liberals, 
and especially its failure to develop a coherent response to the rapid 
economic decline of the city - began to catch up with it. 
From the late 1970s, a new breed of activist began to join the 
Liverpool Labour party, filling the vacuum left by a generation of 
inadequate representatives. They were younger, more willing to work 
hard, more committed, more ideological and often, although not 
always, members of the Militant Tendency. The process of change was 
encouraged by other factors. Many were moving into the party from the 
trade union movement as they realised that isolated economic struggles 
over factory closures and redundancies in the 1970s were insufficient, and 
a broader political strategy was needed. Many were moving to the left in 
dissatisfaction with the failures of the Labour Government in the late 
1970s. Others were reacting against the right and Thatcherism after 
1979. 
At the same time there was an important shift in the power of the 
unions within the Labour party. As the traditional industries - the car 
factories, the docks, transportation - declined, their unions lost ground 
and with it some power in the party. By contrast, the local authority 
public sector unions, representing the only growth sector in the city's 
economy in the mid 1970s, began to assume greater significance. The 
white-collar union, the National & Local Government Officers Associa-
tion, for example, became more important politically. And so did the Milit-
ant dominated General, Municipal, Boilermakers & Allied Trades Union, 
which represented many blue collar, manual workers in the local 
authority. These two largest local authority unions played a crucial role 
in the city's confrontation with the Government over its budget in the 
1980s. Their pressure to protect jobs made it extremely difficult for the 
Labour council to back down when faced by the most severe sanctions 
the Government and the law could impose. 
These changes revitalised the Labour party and, in particular, made 
the local authority, both as an employer and as an institution which 
should be responding to local economic decline, much more central 
politically to Labour. And they were underwritten by the rise to 
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prominence of the Militant Tendency within the party. Although it had 
been around for a long time on Merseyside, Militant with its full-time 
workers and legions of voluntary workers and 'readers', assumed 
increasing importance in the late 1970s. Militant is powerful in many 
wards and constituencies and in the district Labour party. In 1985 it 
almost won a majority on the executive committee of the district Labour 
party. It has about a dozen councillors in the group. And it has the 
deputy leader of the group in Derek Hatton. 
Militant's virtues of organisation, hard work and participation, 
although they restricted debate within the Labour party and have many 
hostile critics, also galvanised the party. Membership has increased. 
Attendances are much higher in the wards and in the district party. 
Political debate has been revived, even if much of it is vitriolic and 
fratricidal. Militant has reinforced the reawakening of the Labour party 
both by bringing in many of its own members and many who are 
opposed to them. In fact Militant remains a minority in the party and 
could not get its policies through unless it got the support of the other 
members of the non-Militant left in the district Labour party and on the 
council. But it usually gets it. The power of Militant, with its 
commitment to revolutionary struggle, its search for a base for a workers 
insurrection, also encouraged the confrontation that was to come. 
The power of Militant and the support it gets from the broad left has 
become particularly apparent since 1980 in the Labour group itself. 
Although the group leader remains John Hamilton, the vast majority of 
the group have no real connection with the politics of the 1970s, having 
in the main been elected since then. And they are much more on the left 
of the party. A major local election defeat in 1980 eliminated many of the 
old guard right-wingers. De-selection since then has confirmed the 
trend. The emergence of the Social Democratic Party attracted more of 
the right wing, including several former MPs, one of whom, Dick 
Crawshaw, was recently given a life peerage. And all five Labour MPs 
are now very much on the left, even though only one, Terry Fields, is 
actually Militant. 
With this has also come a much closer connection between the left in 
the district Labour party and the left on the council group. The district 
Labour party has got in the 1980s what it never had in the 1970s: the 
power to actually determine the council group's policy. When adopted as 
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candidates, members have to agree to follow district Labour party policy 
if elected. If they do not agree, they do not become candidates. The 
group does what the district Labour party tells it to do. That is why the 
council group remained so solidly behind the district Labour party's 'no 
cuts and no rate rises' policy in the 1980s. But that is no real constraint on 
many of the council group because as activists in the district Labour party 
since the 1970s, in many cases they were actually the original authors of 
the policy that the group should carry out the district party line. These 
ideological and organisational changes since the late 1970s strengthened 
the left in the Labour party and sharpened its appetite for, and capacity to 
mount, a sustained challenge to the Conservative Government in the 
1980s. This can be seen nowhere more clearly than in the rising tide of 
budgetary militancy in recent years. 
Politics and budgets, 1974-83 
These basic features of Liverpool's politics di.tring the 1970s- the Liberal 
attempts to build a new power base for themselves, the vagaries of 
coalition politics and the growing militancy of the Labour party - are 
perfectly illustrated by the politics of the budgetary process during the 
decade. Labour's stand in 1984 and 1985 can only be understood in the 
context of the increasingly bitter arguments about the city's finances 
which dominated the earlier period. 
The delays, conflicts and uncertainties which characterised the 1984 
and 1985 budget crises were familiar features of the previous ten years, as 
all parties tried to squeeze maximum political capital from the lack of a 
clear majority on the council. Agreed budget recommendations from the 
policy and finance committee were frequently rejected by the full 
council. Budget meetings were often abandoned without any agreement. 
Emergency council meetings had to be held to get any budget set. There 
were routine calls for fmancial responsibility, for the city to be taken away 
from politicians and given to officers, so they could produce comprom-
ise, 'save-the-city' budgets. The city came very close to entering a new 
financial year apparently outside the law, without having agreed a 
budget of any kind. If 1984 was a prelude to a troubled future, it was also 
the reflection of a very complicated past. 
Throughout the decade the Labour party constantly argued that the 
Liberals were holding down the rates and underfunding the city's services 
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to please their target voters, and their protests grew more strident over 
the years. Labour opposed the Liberals' refusal to spend up to the levels 
suggested by government grant guidelines. It opposed Liberal policy of 
raising council house rents above guidelines. It constantly tried to get the 
Liberals to increase their contributions from the rates to the housing 
revenue account to hold down rents. As early as 1976, Labour was 
attacking the Liberals' plans to pay for repairs to council housing by 
'capitalising' them, that is using its capital housing allowance to pay for 
them and borrowing the money long term, rather than paying for them 
at the time by raising the rates. Labour's argument was that this helped to 
keep down the rates in the short term, but it would increase the 
long-term debt of the city which future generations would have to repay. 
And it also limited the amount of new housing the city could build. This 
became a crucial issue in the confrontation in 1984 and 1985. 
The classic example of this policy was the controversial Liberals' 
1975/76 budget, which has assumed intense symbolic significance in 
Liverpool's politics ever since. At that time, the Labour Government 
shifted the bias of the rate support grant towards the large urban 
authorities to allow them to provide increased services to cope with their 
special needs without having to substantially increase their rates. It 
brought an extra £m21 in government grant to Liverpool. But the 
Liberals used some of the extra money to actually cut the rates, by a 
penny in the pound. This provoked tremendous hostility from the 
Labour party and in the budget meeting its protests were so heated that it 
finally had to be suspended to restore order. The Liberal budget was 
finally carried with the support of the Conservatives after the meeting 
dragged on for many hours with 27 amendments being considered. This 
symbolic cut in the rates set the tone for Liberal financial policies, and 
Labour opposition to them, for the 1970s. 
The conflict over budgets became particularly acute in 1977, and 
continued for the following two years. For example, in the previous 
election in May 1976 the Labour party had won the largest number of 
seats, but not an absolute majority on the council, and it had governed 
the city that year on the Liberals' budget, even though it had argued 
when it was passed that it was inadequate. When budget time came in 
April1977, Labour tried to increase expenditure substantially and to raise 
the rates by over 40 per cent. Particularly significant was its plan to spend 
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£m8.6 from the rates to reduce council house rents. But the Liberals and 
Conservatives allied against the minority Labour administration, as they 
always did, to throw out its budget. They then imposed their own 
budget upon Labour, cutting the rate increase down to 20 per cent. 
Exactly the same thing happened the following year in 1978. And 
Labour was left in April facing the prospect of running the city for the 
third year in succession with a budget it had argued was inadequate for 
the needs of the city. But in the May elections, Labour lost two seats on the 
council and, although it was still the largest party decided not to take 
minority control of the city again because it had not got its own budget 
and it was not likely to get its other policies through against the 
combined opposition of Liberals and Conservatives. 
'No cuts in jobs and services' 
But if the late 1970s marked Labour's growing disenchantment with the 
way the city finances were being run, the 1980/81 budget was a turning 
point which marked the appearance of Labour's strategy for the 1980s. 
At the same time as the Conservatives were sweeping away the Labour 
Government in the 1979 general election, Labour won parliamentary 
seats and made major gains on the Liverpool council, taking five seats 
from the Liberals and one from the Conservatives. Their forty-six seats 
on the council were an historic peak at that time. For the first six months 
of that year, Labour refused to take control of the council, because the 
other two parties would not allow Labour to have a majority on the 
committees. But eventually Labour did take control and ran the city for 
the rest of the year on the budget inherited from the Liberal party. 
When Labour came to present its own budget the following April for 
the financial year 1980/81, however, the Conservative Government's 
cutbacks in public expenditure had begun to bite, and the city was 
starting to feel the effect of grant losses on its own finances. Labour was 
put in the position of having to raise the rates substantially, simply to 
compensate for the loss of Government grant and to maintain services at 
existing levels, quite apart from any plans they might have for 
introducing their own policies and expanding provision. Its budget 
needed a rate rise of over 50 per cent. 
But the crucial feature of the budget debate was that the first 
amendment to the Labour budget was not moved in the usual way by the 
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oppositiOn parties but by a member of the Labour group itself, the 
Militant councillor, Derek Hatton. To the obvious consternation of the 
Labour leaders on his front benches, and the delight of the opposition 
parties, Hatton moved an amendment which changed the face of politics 
in Liverpool. It accepted the need for increased council spending but 
argued that it should not be paid for by a large rate increase because 'the 
responsibility for the plight of the city lies squarely in the lap of the 
Government.' The rates should be increased not by 50 per cent but by 13 
per cent only, which would cover the cost of inflation and the costs of the 
new services Labour was planning. But there should be 'no cuts in jobs 
and services'. Instead, the council should unite with the Labour and trade 
union movement 'to fight for the money needed from the Government.' 
Hatton's move caused anger on the Labour benches and the amendment, 
which was seconded by another Militant councillor, was defeated. Only 
nine Labour councillors voted for it. The Liberals abstained. But there 
was to be no going back. That Militant 'statement of principle' would 
reappear to shape all of Labour's future behaviour. 
The Liberals naturally attempted to make political capital out of 
Labour's discomfort, as well as attacking the swingeing rate rise. But the 
fact was that Government policy had created the problem by cutting the 
financial support it was giving to local authorities. Even the Liberal 
alternative budget, without any of Labour's new spending proposals 
would have needed a 42 per cent rate increase just to maintain services at 
existing levels. The impact of Government reductions can be seen by 
comparing that rise with the previous five Liberal budgets. Between 
1974 and 1979 the Liberals had actually reduced the rates by 2 per cent 
one year and raised them by 4 per cent, 20 per cent, 6 per cent and 23 per 
cent respectively in succeeding years. A new phase in Liverpool's 
budgetary politics had begun. 
This was also true of the way in which Labour finally got its budget 
passed. Liberal and Conservative opposition to the 50 per cent rate rise 
was bitter and after nine hours of argument, the first council meeting 
broke up in disarra"/ without any rate being set as the opposition voted 
down Labour's budget. An emergency full council meeting was held the 
following week. Labour proposed the same budget, which the opposi-
tion tried to cut back to a 37 per cent rate rise. But they could not agree 
between themselves how to do it. In particular the Liberals were not 
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willing to support the Conservative plan to cut the rate nse by 
substantially increasing council house rents. 
As deadlock again occurred, Labour tried to postpone making a rate 
until after the forthcoming council elections in May, when the financial 
year would already be in its second month. But the opposition vetoed 
that idea. The meeting was then suspended while the various coalitions 
tried to get some agreement. In the end the Liberals simply split on 
Labour's budget. Eleven of them voted with the Conservatives against 
it. But the Liberal leadership abstained on the vote and allowed Labour's 
50 per cent rate rise to carry. 
Although they had the combined votes to defeat Labour, the Liberals 
were not willing to agree to the Conservative proposals for large rent 
rises, because it would have damaged them when they were fighting 
Labour in council house wards. In the final analysis Trevor Jones gave in 
to Labour because he was not willing to see the city without a budget 
which, as he said, would mean it would be: 'without resources, its 
supplies cut, the banks withholding money and eventually leading to an 
even higher rate.' In 1980 interpretations of the legality of entering a 
financial year without setting a rate set were clearly different than in 
1984. And the Labour party got its first budget for the city through the 
council. 
But as the Militant councillors had warned, the party was punished 
by the electorate the following month for this massive rate rise. Labour 
lost six seats, the largest loss ever sustained by the two major parties at 
that time. And Militant were never to forget the election disaster 
because of that large rate rise. Even in 1985 faced with municipal and 
personal bankruptcy, the memory was too powerful to let them change 
their stance. And this 1980 defeat marked another turning point. Derek 
Hatton took the Militant strategy to the district Labour party later that 
year to get it endorsed as group policy. By this time Militant was 
powerful enough in the district party to make sure that provocative 
slogan became official Labour policy from 1981 onwards. Its commit-
ment to 'no cuts in jobs and services and no rent and rate rises to 
compensate for Tory cuts' guaranteed there would be some kind of 
confrontation between Liverpool and the Government. 
Labour would not risk election defeat again by raising the rates to run 
the city, and allowed the Liberals to run it for the next three years. Each 
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year Labour proposed some variation of its argument that in an area of 
high unemployment, the council should not make cuts in services or 
increase rates but should mobilise the local authority trade unions to 
prepare for 'the inevitable confrontation with the Government that will 
arise from these proposals and prepare a mass publicity campaign 
explaining to the people of Liverpool why this line of action is 
necessary.' Of course, each year the proposal got defeated. But each year 
the language became more strident as Liberal-Conservative coalitions, in 
Labour's eyes, competed with each other to produce the smallest rate 
rises to impress the voters, but at the same time to do the national Tories' 
dirty work and make the people of Liverpool pay for the Government 
cuts with increased rates. All this time Labour's resentment of the 
Government's policies, and their opponents' willingness to cooperate, 
was growing and making the confrontation more likely. 
The final act of the Liberal Conservative coalition was the 1983/84 
budget, which the Labour party inherited when it took control of the city 
after its council election victory in May 1983. Once more it had been 
difficult to get that budget passed, because the Liberals and Conserva-
tives could not agree how to cut the Liberals' proposed spending. The 
original budget meeting again had to be abandoned after eight hours of 
squabbling between the two. A second emergency council meeting was 
called a week later. After much tactical voting and manoeuvring, the 
Conservatives finally managed to force down the Liberals' proposed 
expenditure to £m218. But the Government had set a spending limit for 
that year of £m212. In order to avoid losing grant by spending beyond 
that figure, the Liberals later in April 1983 simply said that they would 
get expenditure down to that figure of £m212 by making £m6 worth of 
savings during the financial year. But they did not say how that would be 
done. In fact, after Labour won the council election in May it ran the city 
on the Liberal budget during 1983/84. But spending ran far beyond 
£m212 and caused a large deficit at the end of the financial year. And that 
became the point of departure for Labour's confrontation with the 
Government in 1984 and afterwards. 
The convoluted politics of the decade had contributed to Labour's 
growing militancy over the city's financial problems. Despite controlling 
the city on four occasions between 1974 and 1983, Labour had only been 
able to set one of the ten budgets, and that only with some Liberal help. 
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The rest had been inherited from or imposed upon them, by the Liberal-
Conservative coalition. In four of the ten years, Labour had given up 
control of the city because it could not get its budget passed. All the other 
nine budgets had been set by the Liberals with Conservative support. 
The two parties competed for the electorate's vote by trying to keep the 
rates down. But they always voted together in the end. 
The real difference between them was that the Conservatives, who 
could not hope to win wards with large numbers of council house 
tenants, were always willing to balance the books by raising council 
rents. The Liberals, who hoped to compete for the council tenants' vote, 
were always reluctant to raise the rents at budget time just before the 
elections, even though they frequently raised them afterwards. Through-
out the decade, Labour became increasingly frustrated at the Liberals' 
refusal to spend on services. After 1979, when the Conservatives' new 
grant system trapped the city because of its historically low levels of 
spending under the Liberals, Labour's anger could not be contained. And 
the increasing power of Militant in the party in the late 1970s helped to 
focus that anger almost exclusively on the budget issue. 
The actors 
By 1983 the personalities who were to dominate the budget crisis had 
already emerged. On the Labour side, although the policy had been 
determined by an increasingly powerful and Militant district Labour 
party after 1980, the two key figures who made the running were Derek 
Hatton and Tony Byrne. The two could not be more different. Hatton 
was the flamboyant and controversial deputy-leader of the Labour 
group, a prominent member of the Militant Tendency who was 
acquiring an increasing national audience and who had ambitions to a 
Parliamentary career. Hatton was something of a public orator who 
closely identified with the miners' leader, Arthur Scargill, and saw many 
parallels between the miners' and Liverpool's struggle against Thatcher-
Ism. 
Hatton had first sponsored the Militant 'no cuts in jobs and services' 
strategy through the Labour party. But his strength in the Labour party 
rested on his ability to fire up the party faithful and the manual trade 
unions, as well as aggravate the opposition parties, rather than on any 
understanding or grip he had of financial policy. Hatton also enjoyed an 
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extravagant life style which constantly earned him the attacks of the 
Liberal party, and which at one point led to an investigation by the 
district auditor of his council expenses, as well as to enquiries by the 
police into allegations made by David Alton, the Liberal MP, in 
Parliament, about the details of a planning decision in the local enterprise 
zone. But the investigations never revealed anything untoward. 
The policy leadership of the Labour party had essentially been taken 
over by another councillor, Tony Byrne. Byrne had only been elected to 
the council in 1980, but had rapidly risen to a position of virtual 
dominance in the group. Byrne's personal life style was austere and he 
was not interested in publicity or personal glory. He was a classic Jesuit 
trained Liverpudlian, whose style was to apply his logic to a problem 
and, having reached a solution, to refuse to be moved from it. He did not 
enjoy, and would not tolerate, dissenting opinions. And he could be 
ruthless and dogmatic. This made him a difficult ally and a more difficult 
opponent, as Patrick Jenkin was to discover. In three years on the council 
Byrne had rapidly mastered the complexities of finance, housing and the 
urban programme- the heart of a Labour authority's concerns. And he 
had written almost single-handedly the strategy of the Labour adminis-
tration in these areas when it took control of the council in 1983. 
At heart Byrne believed in centralised municipal solutions to deal 
with working class deprivation, and this made him as unpopular with 
many in the soft left in the Labour party, the community and the private 
sector, as he was to become with the Government. In two years of office 
his concentration of resources in the public sector alienated many groups 
and agencies which had been accustomed to much more generous 
support from the council under the Liberal regime, as well as many who 
wanted a more decentralised and popular style of decision-making. 
Byrne entered the confrontation with the Government with a clearly 
defined set of political goals which he had decided were more important 
than his personal position. He had no fears about the consequences of his 
actions. His view was that at the end of the day, if it all went wrong, all 
the Government could do was bankrupt him and then pay him his social 
security! He was quite willing to take that risk to get the housing and 
physical environment that he believed the working class in Liverpool 
deserved. He was certainly willing to try to blackmail a Tory 
Government to do it. Byrne was not a Militant and had few larger 
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political ambitions outside Liverpool. He was not primarily interested in 
confrontation for its own sake. Ifhe could get what he wanted out of the 
Government without a struggle, that would suit him just as well. He 
knew what he wanted and was clever in getting it. He played his cards 
very close to his chest and shared his views reluctantly. 
The senior officers advising the Labour leadership were the chief 
executive, Alfred Stocks, and the treasurer, Michael Reddington. 
Reddington was relatively new to the job and was thrust into the deep 
end of the confrontation. Throughout, he believed the city had a very 
good case against the Government and was always disappointed that his 
peers in the Department of the Environment simply refused to 
acknowledge, as fellow professionals, the problems which the grant 
system had caused for Liverpool. The pressures of the confrontation and 
sailing so close to illegality weighed heavily upon him. 
Stocks was an older hand who was highly respected in the local 
authority world. He had been in the authority since the 1950s, the chief 
executive since 1973, and was long accustomed to the ways of Liverpool 
politics. He had spent most of his tenure of office trying to give some 
administrative leadership to a highly fragmented local authority in the 
difficult era of coalition politics. The experience of working with a 
majority administration with very fixed views and a determination to 
challenge the Government was a novel one. But he also believed the city 
had had a raw deal, and occasionally despaired of the way the 
Government was proceeding. But when professional colleagues sym-
pathised with his troubles in Liverpool, he always replied that it was the 
most interesting job in local government. Like many others, he could not 
resist the pleasures and perversities of Liverpool politics. 
By 1983, the Government had a very visible presence in Liverpool. 
Since the Toxteth riots in 1981, there had been a Minister for Merseyside 
who regularly visited the city. And he had his Task Force of about 40 
civil servants and private sector managers who had learned a lot about 
the city. In fact, the Government was better informed about Liverpool 
and more intimately involved in its politics and policies, than any other 
city in the country outside London. And despite considerable local 
scepticism about the value of the Task Force, it had attracted to 
Liverpool especially under the first Minister for Merseyside, Michael 
Heseltine, a number of high quality civil servants. Its director, Eric 
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Sorenson, was a key player in 1984. Sorenson was one of the rising stars 
in the Department of the Environment, the youngest civil servant ever to 
reach the rank of Under-Secretary. Like many who were achieving 
prominence in the Department at the time, Sorenson was intellectually 
and emotionally attuned to the free market philosophy of the Govern-
ment and unsympathetic to many of the failings oflocal authorities. But 
like Michael Heseltine himself, he was fascinated by Liverpool's politics, 
read the situation well and provided London with a stream of informed 
analysis of the moving target of the budget crisis. 
But he was in some ways advising a rather clumsy Minister. Patrick 
Jenkin was essentially a legalist with little feel for the nuances of politics 
in Liverpool, who frequently handed propaganda victories to his 
opponents. He let matters drift early on when clever Ministerial action 
might possibly have diverted the course of the crisis before it got under 
way. The feeling persisted that Michael Heseltine, the first Minister for 
Merseyside, would have behaved differently. Unlike Jenkin, Heseltine 
had a good feel for Liverpool politics and politicians and a high 
reputation. An astute politician himself, Heseltine would have attempted 
a deal earlier on with the Labour leaders, by promising them enough 
money to make them at least want to play the game and preventing the 
financial crisis going so far. But whether even he could have done it, 
given the political forces in Liverpool, was unlikely. 
Throughout t,he lost decade a series of pressures pushed Liverpool 
towards the crisis. The collapse of its economy as the large private firms 
abandoned the city ensured that unemployment and jobs - especially 
public sector jobs - became the central theme of its political life. The 
election of a Conservative Government with few political votes in 
Liverpool, little sympathy for declining northern cities, an ideological 
destation of the public sector and commitment to the private sector, 
increased the prospect of some form of conflict. The combination of 
intense local ideological disputes and chaotic responses to decline 
worsened the picture. The Conservative's introduction of a complicated 
and controversial grant system brought the city to the edge of the 
precipice. And the re-emergence of a 'hard left' Labour party, supported 
by powerful local authority unions, threatened to push the city over it. 
Liverpool's budget crisis was like a Greek tragedy. Its fate was 
determined as the play opened. The actors merely made sure it met it. 
THE OPENING ROUND: LIVERPOOL AGAINST WHITEHALL 
- May 1983 ·September 1984 
The roots of the confrontation between Liverpool and the Government 
lay deep in the politics and policies of the 1970s. But it became inevitable 
after the Liverpool Labour party won its victory in the local elections in 
May 1983. This gave a clear majority to one party on the city council for 
the first time in a decade. And the Labour-controlled council was now in 
a position to carry its attack to the Conservative Government. All the 
next year, Liverpool's politics and its relations with the Government 
were dominated by a single issue, the state of the city's finances. Labour 
ran the city on the budget the Liberal party had left them. But as it had 
promised, it spent the whole period running a campaign to convince its 
workforce, the electorate, other Labour authorities, the national Labour 
leadership and the Conservative Government that its finances were 
unmanageable. Although there were a number of possible interpretations 
of the city's position, Labour finally persuaded many people that its was 
right. The Government never believed it. But in 1984, at least, 
threatened by municipal bankruptcy, it eventually conceded some 
ground to Liverpool's argument. The Labour council turned the conflict 
into a poker game in which the stakes became too high for the 
Government. It had other battles to fight in 1984, and in the end this was 
crucial. 
The Labour council's case 
The Labour council's argument was its financial problems could not be 
seen in isolation from the overall economic decline of the city and 
especially the Conservative Government's failure to help it. That 
economic decline, its aggravation by cuts in Government spending and 
the alleged irresponsibility of previous Liberal regimes, were Labour's 
justification for its political challenge to the Government. And it claimed 
it had got a mandate from the local electorate in May 1983 to defend 
2 
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existing council jobs and services, build council houses for rent, end the 
threat of privatisation of council services and refuse to cut local services 
or impose increases in rates and rents to compensate for Government 
cuts. 
This had been Labour policy for several years. The difference now 
was that it argued that the combination of a large deficit caused by the 
inadequate Liberal budget it had inherited in May 1983, and the impact of 
an increasingly harsh Government grant system, meant that the city's 
finances were unmanageable without making 'massive' cuts in local 
services, or a reduction ofS,OOO counciljobs or a rate increase of170 per 
cent. In other words, a legal, balanced budget could not be made without 
seriously damaging the city's economy further or worsening its social 
problems. Since Labour had not been elected to make the people of 
Liverpool pay for the Government's cuts in this way, it would not 
balance the city's books. 
The Labour council's plan was alarmingly simple. It intended to 
make a deficit budget for 1984/85. This would pay for existing services 
plus its own new programmes, for which it claimed it had got a 
mandate. But it planned to raise the rates by only 9 per cent. The 
council's income inevitably would be far less than its expenditure and 
there would be a huge illegal deficit at the end of the financial year, 
assuming the city could keep running that long. Even if Labour dropped 
its new spending plans, and simply ran the services at existing levels in a 
'stand still' budget, with a 9 per cent rise the city would still run out of 
money. 
But in Labour's eyes the responsibility was not theirs, but the 
Government's, who by consistently cutting financial support to Liver-
pool since 1979 had 'stolen' £m270 from the city in four years. Labour's 
plan was to blackmail the Government into giving back £m30 of that 
money so it could balance its books. If it refused, Labour would simply 
bankrupt the city and allow it to collapse. The employees would lose 
their jobs. The schools, colleges, libraries and nurseries would be closed. 
The old people's and children's homes would be without staff, heating or 
food. Rubbish would pile up all over the city. No housing repairs would 
be done. The dead might not even be buried. 
The city's argument with the Conservatives was part of a larger one 
that has been going on between national and local government since 
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1979. The strains that were apparent during the later years of the Labour 
Government in the 1970s became ruptures in the 1980s, as the 
Conservatives led a demoralising attack on local government and public 
expenditure. And with the Government's new philosophy of privatism, 
wealth creation and capital investment became the primary goal of urban 
policy at the expense of traditional social welfare policies. The concern to 
revive inner city economies had been an element of the Labour 
Government's urban programme in the mid-1970s. But it became central 
to the Conservatives. The private sector was once seen as part of the 
problem of the declining cities. In the 1980s it was to be part of the 
solution. 
The problem with this analysis was that the private sector was 
abandoning Liverpool, as we have seen, at an accelerating rate; since 1979 
at least 40,000 jobs had been lost. As the Labour council constantly 
pointed out, there was no evidence that Government measures to 
stimulate the private sector had done anything to slow down the city's 
decline. This was why the dispute about public expenditure became so 
bitter in Liverpool, because the second leg of the Conservative argument 
was that, as the private sector grew, the public sector should contract. 
Labour argued that since market forces were already undermining 
Liverpool's precarious economic base, it made no sense to cut back its 
public sector as well. In particular, it made no sense to limit the local 
authority's spending, when that would inevitably mean cuts in the 
workforce and higher unemployment in the city. 
The Labour council was bound to reject a policy which would 
increase unemployment in Liverpool by a contraction of the public 
sector. It saw local authority services both as a necessary social support 
system for an increasingly impoverished community, and a valuable 
source of jobs which kept people from their only likely alternative - the 
dole. In its mind, the Liverpool Labour party was not in business to 
implement major cuts in services demanded by a Conservative Govern-
ment. It had either to resist or resign. The Government of course had a 
quite different view: in the patronising words which Patrick Jenkin 
constantly repeated, the local authority was not 'a system of outdoor 
relief. If unemployment was the price of economic growth, it would 
have to be paid. 
But as Labour replied, the price would have to be paid twice. First the 
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workers and their families would suffer probably lengthy unemploy-
ment, and whatever contribution they made to the social welfare would 
be lost. But the Government would pay a price as well. There would be 
the usual costs of keeping people unemployed- the loss of revenue from 
income tax and national insurance payments, plus all the unemployment 
benefits it would have to pay- which might add up to two-thirds of the 
cost of the original wages. But the added irony of the Government's 
grant system was that if the city cut its workforce, it would also get back 
more than twice the amount saved in Government grant. As Liverpool 
reduced its wages bill and got closer to the expenditure target given to it 
by the Government, the money that would have been taken away in 
grant penalties for spending over its set limit would be given back to it. 
This would mean Liverpool's rates could be held down. But the 
Government and the taxpayer would be heavily subsidising them. It 
would cost them more to keep people unemployed, than it did for the 
local authority to keep them in work. The Government replied that the 
respective contribution of taxpayers and the ratepayers was not an issue 
in this particular argument. But this was a narrow form of social 
accounting at best. And the Labour council would not accept it. It 
believed the Government's policy was flawed and vulnerable to a direct 
political attack. And it spent its first year in office carrying one out. 
Selling the argument to the workforce 
Labour knew that to take its argument beyond the city and challenge the 
Government, it needed the support of its own workforce and the voters 
in Liverpool. In fact, persuading the local workforce and their unions 
proved a simple task. The experience of Liberal control of the council in 
the 1970s had forced them into the arms of Labour. Throughout their 
decade of power, in order to hold down spending and limit rate rises, the 
Liberals had cut the authority's workforce by about 4,000 down to about 
30,000. But they had done this not with a redundancy, but with a natural 
wastage, policy. And this inevitably had arbitrary and disruptive impacts 
upon staffing levels in different local authority departments. Through 
the late 1970s this policy had created rising frustrations and tensions 
between the council and the unions. The election of the Thatcher 
Government in 1979 only increased local union fears that the national 
trend would reinforce Liberal practices and that year they formed a 
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powerful joint shop stewards committee from all local authority unions 
to resist further pressures for job losses. 
Matters came to a head for the Liberals during the 1980s in conflicts 
with two major unions, the white collar National & Local Government 
Officers Association and the blue collar General, Municipal, Boilermak-
ers & Allied Trades Union. These two unions had different, conflicting 
political traditions. NALGO was a traditionally conservative 'bosses' 
union which, despite its radicalisation at national level over public 
expenditure cuts, and its left wing leadership in Liverpool, was always 
regarded as an uncertain ally by the Labour council. The 'General and 
Municipal', by contrast, was an old fashioned, manual workers' local 
authority union. It had strong Militant leadership in key branches and at 
shop steward level and was very powerful in the district Labour party. 
But in their later years in office the Liberals managed to alienate both 
these unions. In 1978 there had been a prolonged social workers' strike 
over salary structures, which had both radicalised union members and 
left bitter memories of the Liberals as employers. In 1982 a dispute over 
regrading policy for secretarial staff, which would effectively have held 
down wages, provoked a typists' strike which lasted over nine months. 
The strike disrupted much of the work of the authority and caused 
tremendous bitterness. And with Derek Hatton playing a very visible 
part in the dispute, Labour was able to build on the conflict, to break 
NALGO's weakening links with the Liberals and bring it over to 
Labour's side. 
At the same time that the typists' dispute was radicalising the white 
collar workers, the Liberals were having union difficulties elsewhere. 
They were trying to save money by privatising the notoriously 
expensive and inefficient refuse collection service. This provoked 
another traumatic dispute with 'General and Muncipal' members, the 
binmen. Their union mounted a major campaign to resist privatisation 
and the plan eventually had to be postponed by the Liberals. But the 
attempt made a key group of manual workers sensitive to any threat of 
job loss. Labour's election campaign in 1983 in defence of 'jobs and 
services', and its attacks on the Liberals, struck an immediate chord with 
these two largest and most powerful local authority unions and probably 
helped them to gain control of the council. And their leadership, with 
encouragement from the Labour party, played a crucial part in the 
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elaborate campaign the following year to get the council's message about 
the budget crisis across to shop stewards and workers. 
And Labour's year long campaign with its workforce and unions 
worked. When the time came to support the council in the spring of 
1984, nearly all the major unions delivered substantial majorities in 
favour of Labour's plan for a deficit budget. The National Union of 
Teachers was the only one to oppose it. But even this normally 
conservative union was evenly split; at a mass meeting of2,000 teachers, 
the union rejected Labour's stand by just over a hundred votes. The 
Government also regarded the unions as a key group and the most 
vulnerable one in the triumvirate of party, voters and workers. Its own 
propaganda campaign constantly tried to dislodge them from Labour's 
side by emphasising the price the workforce would have to pay if the 
council finally refused to raise enough money to keep the city running. 
But the triumvirate held. 
Persuading the voters 
Labour also began a major propaganda effort to convince the Liverpool 
public at the end of 1983. Before then most people knew little about the 
issue. The council had focused its attention on the workforce. Anyway 
stories of impending industrial and financial disasters were familiar on 
depressed Merseyside. The preliminary skirmishes between the parties 
on the council had made little public impact either. Much to the anger of 
the opposition parties, who claimed it was a Militant Tendency 
propaganda machine paid for by the rates, Labour set up a central 
support unit to orchestrate the presentation of its case. 
The unit started its campaign with a 'Merseyside in Crisis' 
demonstration at which leaders of Labour's left including Tony Benn 
and David Blunkett addressed 20,000 people. It staged elaborate sets of 
forty public meetings, in April and June 1984, which were attended by 
over 5,000 people. It ran a rally on the eve of the meeting attended by 
over a thousand activists and a mass demonstration of over 25,000 people 
on the day of the budget meeting in April 1984. It ran a petition in 
support of the city, which got 20,000 signatures during the spring. And 
it ran the election campaign in April 1984, which focused almost 
exclusively on the budget. And again the campaign worked, with a 
turnout of 51 per cent, and another Labour victory. 
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Labour's campaign successfully politicised the budget crisis, turning a 
complicated, financial argument into a simple choice between the 
Government's version of the story and their own. It tied together the 
interests of the council workers, the consumers of local services, and of 
the domestic and commercial ratepayers. And it won the propaganda 
battle for Labour. The campaign persuaded enough people that the 
Labour council was right and that major cuts in services and jobs or large 
rate rises were the only options. And it deflected attention away from the 
argument the Government wanted to make - that the city was expensive 
and inefficient and could easily provide existing services for less money 
without major financial problems. Just as the unions supported the 
Labour party when it most needed it, in the spring of 1984 the voters did 
so, with crucial effect. The extent of local electoral support Labour got 
for its stand in 1984 played a major part in getting an eventual resolution. 
Ironically, in view of the common criticism of the secretiveness of 
Liverpool's Labour party, it made a major effort to publicise its own 
case. But it is less clear whether the campaign ever sought to present the 
budget problem as a series of options between which the public might 
choose. Every effort was made to put Labour's side. But little was made 
to explore the alternatives between rate rises of 170 per cent, 5,000 
redundancies or a deficit budget. The Labour leadership decided to 
dramatise the city's position and present stark alternatives rather than to 
cloud the political issues by discussing different ways in which the 
budget might be balanced. Labour had good political grounds for 
rejecting any intermediate positions. But they were still given little 
public exposure. 
Indeed a key feature of this confrontation was that, despite the 
publicity campaign, very few people in the Labour group - let alone the 
opposition parties, the workforce, or the public- actually knew the city's 
exact financial position and the options open to it. Partly, this was 
inevitable. Local government finance and budgets are complicated and 
have become increasingly esoteric in the 1980s. But also it was 
intentional. The detailed information necessary to make a judgement was 
never released but carefully held in the hands of Labour's finance chief, 
Tony Byrne, precisely so that alternative strategies could not emerge. 
This allowed Byrne to choose the ground for the confrontation with the 
Government just as he saw fit. 
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By the early part of 1984, the Liverpool Labour party had begun to 
successfully mobilise its workforce and other people in the city. And it 
seemed that they would have their support for some kind of confronta-
tion with the Government about the city's finances. But if it was to get 
anywhere with its argument it knew it would also have to persuade 
people outside Liverpool that it had a case - especially the national 
Labour Party and later the Conservative Government. And they might 
both see things differently from the Labour council and its supporters. 
Selling the argument nationally 
At the beginning of1984 Liverpool's strategy was not very well-known 
outside the city. The Government was not paying very much attention 
to it. Nor was the national Labour Party, which was more concerned 
with devising a strategic response to the Government's planned 
rate-capping legislation in 1985, designed to limit the money which 
selected high-spending Labour authorities could spend. But in the end, 
Liverpool embarrassed both of them and forced them to shift their 
ground. Through the spring and summer of 1984, the Liverpool Labour 
party's campaign inside and outside the city, guaranteed that Liverpool 
dominated discussion oflocal politics in Parliament and the media, as the 
twists and turns of the tale led the players into constitutionally uncharted 
waters. 
Labour was convinced that in the end the Government would not risk 
the political consequences of the collapse of the city's economy and 
services. They had no other plan than to press the argument as far as 
possible and see where it led them. They had no alternative strategies and 
no apparent fallback position. Many Labour politicians outside Liverpool 
regarded this as a high-risk strategy at best, and at worst as 'revolution-
ary defeatism.' But a potent combination of analysis and rhetoric, fuelled 
by the adrenalin of the mass campaign, got the Labour group into a 
position from which it could not retreat without personal or political 
humiliation. The Quaker Labour leader, John Hamilton, for example, 
confessed that, despite his· worst fears, he could live with bankruptcy 
more easily than he could with the charge of treachery which would 
inevitably follow if Labour gave in. Liverpool simply had to keep going 
forward with the struggle. It did not know what else to do. 
In fact, getting people outside the city to accept their argument was 
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much tougher for the Labour council. Their campaign opened with a 
letter from Derek Hatton to all Labour MPs in November 1983 claiming 
that Liverpool could not be left to fight the Government on its own but 
that there must be 'a common strategy and campaign involving all the 
Labour councils.' During the following months, Liverpool spokesmen 
carried that argument around many local authorities and local Labour 
parties trying to get support for their stand. They also took it to the 
Party's important local government conference at Nottingham in 
February 1984. But their plan for illegality met with resistance at that 
conference, even from those who were sympathetic to Liverpool's 
problems as well as to the idea of a campaign of direct action on local 
government finance. 
Labour's national leader, Neil Kinnock, was especially alarmed by the 
prospect of a Militant-led Liverpool locked into an illegal battle with the 
Conservative Government. He reminded a divided conference that 
official Party policy was that councillors should stay in office and try to 
minimise the effect of any cuts. John Cunningham, the Party's national 
spokesman on local government, also emphasised the need for Labour 
authorities to stay within the law, warning Liverpool it could not expect 
the automatic support of the national Party. 'We should not become 
obsessed with Liverpool' he said. 'Many other councils are also in 
difficulty. Trying to bring about confrontation is not the way forward. 
We will not give Liverpool a blank cheque for what they want to do 
without telling all of their financial details first. So far they have not 
given us the financial information we have asked for.' John Cunningham 
clearly did not believe Liverpool's specific argument about its budget 
problems, let alone in the general principle of law breaking. 
Nor were other important local leaders at the conference much more 
impressed. Despite the call of the London leader, Ken Livingston, for 
defiance of rate-capping, the chairman of the conference, David 
Blunkett, argued that the time was not ripe for law-breaking and that the 
public had first to be persuaded that the law was bad. He was also 
sceptical of Liverpool's claim that other local authorities should support 
them in their stand. Liverpool would be heard but, 'we don't want to 
pretend we can be of help if we can't. There will be a great deal of 
sympathy for Liverpool. But the other left-wing authorities are not in 
the same position as Liverpool so there is no way they can take the same 
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stand. We're not going to stab them in the back, but we'll have to tell 
them that if they can stick with us then they should.' 
At the beginning of 1984, Liverpool was not getting whole-hearted 
support from the Labour movement which was worried that the city's 
strident, illegal strategy would completely backfire and damage the more 
carefully planned, national campaign against rate-capping in 1985. 
Labour's national leadership was growing distinctly uneasy about the 
political impact of such a confrontation. Some senior members of the 
national executive committee, including the party chairman and Liver-
pool MP Eric Heffer, were anxious to defy the leadership by declaring 
sympathy for Liverpool's stand. But Kinnock stood firm against 
illegality which he thought a great threat to the national party's election 
Image. 
Privately, John Hamilton believed Kinnock and the national lead-
ership were completely out of touch with the mood in Liverpool. 
Wrecked by the general election disaster of 1983, lagging behind the 
Social Democratic Party in much of the south, trying to reconstruct 
Party unity as well as its organisational machine, the national Party 
simply could not understand Labour's position in Liverpool. It was fresh 
from local and national election success, not failure, in 1983 and anxious 
to press on aggressively with its opposition to Conservative policies 
which had hit the city so badly. The national leadership, in turn, thought 
that Liverpool was recklessly endangering the national Party's chances of 
ever mobilising support against the Conservative Government. 
The national leadership's failure to support Liverpool, indeed 
Kinnock's refusal to even visit the city, drove a wedge between the 
national and local party that never closed. The national leadership found 
Liverpool's behaviour almost as incomprehensible and as difficult to deal 
with as the Conservative Government did. The political sub-culture of 
the Liverpool Labour party with its aggressive, Militant and 'workerist' 
overtones made it different from many other local parties. And just as the 
city played little part on the larger national economic stage, Liverpool 
had little status in the traditional hierarchy of national Labour Party 
politics. Only one of them, Eric Heffer, had a major role. 
Politically, and economically, Liverpool was estranged from the 
national mainstream. That sense of isolation and the resulting frustra-
tion, which was a product of the city's decline, fuelled the Labour 
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council's struggle. It was not only an attack on the Government. It was 
also Liverpool's stand against the larger world outside. And national 
elites did not quite know how to handle it. But later in February 1984, 
the council managed to get Labour's junior spokesman on the environ-
ment, Jack Straw, to come to Liverpool and look at the financial 
position. And they partly persuaded him. Straw left to report back to 
Kinnock agreeing 'The picture that I was given of the inheritance left to 
Labour last May by the previous Liberal-Tory administration was worse 
than I had expected.' A window of opportunity had opened for 
Liverpool. The local party had begun to get the national leadership at 
least to take its problems seriously. 
Persuading the Government 
At the same time, in early 1984 Liverpool opened its campaign to 
persuade the Government. The day after Straw had visited them, at their 
own request, Hatton, Byrne and Hamilton led a small group to meet 
Patrick Jenkin in London to argue that the Government should find 
£m30 to cover the city's intended budget deficit. Patrick Jenkin was not 
as understanding as Jack Straw. He flatly refused to discuss the 
possibility of more money for Liverpool. His reply in February 1984, 
was the one he consistently made until later in July. Liverpool was not 
unique in facing tough political choices. The principles of the grant 
system applied to all authorities. He had no power to make special rules 
for the city. In fact Liverpool's grant reduction was less than some other 
authorities that year. Labour had inherited a tight budgetary position in 
1983 from the Liberals. But they had aggravated their problems by not 
merely failing to make the savings on which that budget was based, but 
by actually increasing expenditure. 
Equally, he argued, Liverpool's claims were incompatible with its 
own national leadership's view that a standstill budget could be financed 
by a 60 per cent rate increase. And he suggested they make that kind of 
rate rise. He admitted the city did have 'exceptional social problems' but 
the Government had recognised these with a variety of special 
programmes for Liverpool. Its rate support grant was certainly 
declining, but it was Government policy to reduce the proportion of 
local spending supported by the national taxpayer. This applied to all 
authorities, not just Liverpool. The bottom line was that the council was 
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'proposing to spend money it hasn't got and is asking us to go outside the 
rules to make it up. That is not acceptable. We must apply the same rules 
evenhandedly to all authorities'. Labour returned empty-handed on the 
train to Liverpool. The next day Tony Byrne described Jenkin as 'a very 
bad man'. It was going to be a long struggle for Labour to get what it 
wanted out of the Government. But it was prepared for it. 
But the failure of this first meeting with Jenkin in February 1984 
intensified national criticism of Liverpool's stance and the fears about its 
consequences. Those fears were compounded when the claim gradually 
leaked out that at the meeting, Derek Hatton had threatened violence on 
the streets of Liverpool and outside Patrick Jenkin's own home, if the 
Government did not give the city its extra money. Despite Liverpool's 
protestations, these threats allowed Jenkin to claim 'the whole thing is 
designed to create confrontation with the Government and overthrow 
the Thatcher administration. They have never made any secret of that'. 
The Prime Minister herself condemned Hatton in Parliament. 'The 
threats of violence will not help Liverpool, indeed will do Liverpool 
great damage.' she said. 'I hope nothing further will be heard about them 
and nothing further will be done.' Whatever Derek Hatton had said to 
Patrick Jenkin, it gave the Government a flavour of the Labour 
leadership's style. It raised the temperature of the argument and made a 
future compromise a little less likely. 
Labour's defections and increased uncertainty 
By the spring of1984, the significance and risks ofLiverpool's plan were 
becoming increasingly obvious. Local people were by now well aware of 
the problem. But national elites had also begun to see where it might 
lead. And neither the Conservative nor the Labour Party leadership liked 
the look of the way things were developing. For different reasons, they 
were both very suspicious of Liverpool's argument and its plan. They 
did not believe that the city's financial position was as bad as the local 
politicians were claiming. And they certainly did not think that 
threatening to bankrupt the city was the right way of dealing with it. 
And neither national party wanted the political embarrassment this 
potential local suicide would cause them. On the other hand, they were 
not sure at this point whether Liverpool Labour actually had the nerve, 
or the votes, to carry out its threat. 
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But national attention once again. focused on Liverpool itself as 29 
March, budget day, loomed nearer and with it the prospect of municipal 
bankruptcy and the breakdown of all local services. The position inside 
the Labour group was obviously crucial. Labour only had a slender 
majority of three on the council and there were well-known political 
divisions between the old guard right wing of the group and the broad 
left and Militant councillors. As the legal, political and financial pressures 
on individual councillors mounted, it was obvious that self-interest or 
ideology could produce enough defections for Labour to lose its 
majority. There had been rumours to that effect in the city for weeks. 
Indeed, there was tacit agreement amongst the party's critics - the 
Government, the national Labour leadership, the local opposition parties 
- that it was only pursuing the confrontation because it knew that 
defections doomed it to eventual failure, while guaranteeing Liverpool 
the reputation of having resisted the Tory Government to the last. 
The long predicted split finally came on 7 March when six 
right-wingers announced their defections in the local press, leaving the 
enraged Labour group to discover the fact on the front page of the 
Liverpool Echo, as they sat in a full council meeting, listening to the 
taunts of their opponents. The six rebels were not prepared to support a 
deficit budget which jeopardised the livelihood of council employees 
when none of them had ever been shown any official figures about the 
city's financial position. A furious Derek Hatton threatened that the 
rebels would be 'dealt with by the party, they will be dealt with by the 
trade union movement and the vast majority of people in this city'. They 
would become 'political lepers'. But the leading rebel, Eddie Roderick, 
replied 'Labour have taken on the Government and they have lost. I am 
not going to be intimidated by threats from people I see as extremists'. 
Labour's national spokesman, John Cunningham, with obvious relief 
praised the rebels for being 'brave and sensible'. The local opposition 
parties insisted the Labour council was equally relieved because it could 
now blame 'the enemy within' for saving it from a fate which it did not 
in fact want. 
Many people now believed that Labour's bluff had been called and 
that it would settle down to produce some kind oflegal budget. The split 
in the group seemed to have saved Liverpool from the immediate crisis. 
But people soon realised that longer-term problems remained as bad as 
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ever. If, for example, Labour did not budge and the 'sensible six' would 
not support the opposition parties' budget proposals, the danger was that 
there would be no majority for anything in the council and the city 
would drift into the new financial year in April 1984 without any budget 
at all. If the city could survive until May, the annual council elections 
were due. But no one knew whether they would produce a clear 
majority for legality, another hung council or an increased majority for 
Labour, which would guarantee the passage of the deficit budget. 
The prospect of an illegal or no budget raised all kinds of financial and 
legal issues and caused some panic amongst city and Government 
officials. As the senior civil servant in the city, Eric Sorenson, put it, 'We 
are in completely new territory. No local authority has ever sought to do 
anything like this before.' And no one had a clue how it would unravel. 
It was not legally necessary that a rate be fixed before the beginning of 
the financial year. But in practical terms, if the city set no rate, or an 
illegally low rate, it was not clear how long it would be able to continue 
to borrow the money in the private market that it needed to pay its debts. 
That would depend on the attitude of private investors towards the risk 
involved. 
It also depended on the reserves available to the treasurer and the 
city's need to borrow. It not only had to borrow short term on its 
revenue account to pay various bills, as it waited for income to come in 
from rates, grants and rents. It also had accumulated long-term debts in 
the region of £m700 from its building programmes over the years. Each 
year the city had to borrow about £m190 to pay off part of those 
outstanding debts. This was almost as large as the total annual revenue 
budget. If the city could not borrow more money to pay these long term 
capital debts as they became due, it would have to use revenue income. If 
that happened, the city would run out of money very quickly indeed, 
and would be unable to pay any of its bills or staff. 
The Government believed that initially it would have to continue to 
pay Liverpool its rate support grant. This would in turn encourage the 
Public Works Loan Board, the public lender of last resort, to continue 
lending to Liverpool. And the city had over 60 per cent of its loans with 
the Board. But it was not certain what the Board's own position would 
be in the longer term if the authority had no rate income, the only 
guarantee of any local authority's credit worthiness. The city would 
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continue to receive income from council house tenants who paid rents 
and rates jointly. But these would not keep the city afloat permanently 
without a rate being set. Uncertainty about all these factors left both city 
and Government officials unsure whether the city would run out of 
money in a matter of weeks, or whether it could hang on for months. 
The real danger was that the city might slither into bankruptcy almost by 
default, with no one particularly intending it. That prospect began to 
alarm many people. But throughout, Tony Byrne stayed calm telling 
officials and councillors that they had to keep their nerve. He felt sure he 
would get Liverpool through. 
There was equal uncertainty about the legal position, partly because 
the issues had not been tested. Under the 1967 General Rate Act any 
ratepayer, city stockholder or creditor could challenge the council in the 
High Court. The court could quash the rate and instruct councillors to 
fix a legal one. If they did not do so they could be fined for unlimited 
amounts of money and eventually imprisoned for contempt of court for 
up to two years. Abstention on crucial illegal votes would not absolve 
individual councillors from the court's judgement. Each councillor 
would have had to vote in favour of a legal rate. This would obviously 
affect the liability of the Labour rebels. If it wished, the Government 
itself could take legal action through the Attorney General to make the 
city set a legal rate. And the district auditor could initiate action, if he 
decided the councillors were guilty of 'wilful misconduct' in the 
management of the city's financial affairs and have them surcharged 
under the 1982 Local Government Finance Act. Each guilty councillor 
would be made personally liable for illegal spending. If the loss was more 
than £2,000, it could lead to disqualification of councillors from public 
office for five years, and bankruptcy if they were unable to pay the 
money. 
Finally, if the city's basic services did collapse when it ran out of 
money, the Government could introduce legislation allowing it to take 
over the city directly and run it with commissioners. But the problems 
for the Government in doing that were enormous. Civil servants were 
appalled at the prospect ofhaving to run Liverpool. They knew their life 
would be miserable. They were not impressed by the city's administra-
tion of its services. They always had difficulty with the Labour 
administration getting the quality of co-operation and information they 
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wanted to make their joint programmes work. The idea of being 
responsible for all of the city's basic services, to say the least, alarmed 
them. Also, the broad role commissioners might play was quite 
uncertain. It was unclear how extensive their duties would be, how long 
they would have to stay, how they could be removed once installed. 
Would they stay to the next election, the next financial year or far longer 
until the money was sorted out? It was not clear whether they would get 
the necessary co-operation of the local workforce to run the city, 
especially if they imposed cuts in services, or made employees 
redundant. Nor was it known whether there would be any form of 
popular resistance. 
The Government was becoming increasingly worried by the situa-
tion in Liverpool. The prospect of getting directly involved in running 
the city with commissioners, with the very high risk of making political 
or administrative mistakes, was very unattractive. But the Government 
also realised that it could not stand aside indefinitely if services in one of 
the country's largest cities, where there had recently been extensive civil 
unrest and violence, began to collapse. The attraction ofleaving matters 
to the courts was that it distanced the Government from the immediate 
decision. But it could hardly deny its general involvement in Liverpool's 
financial problems. Nor was it enthusiastic about the uncertainty 
involved in leaving things to the courts, or of the possibility that legal 
action might make martyrs of Labour councillors and turn public 
opinion nationally against the Government. 
Until the council made its next move, of course, the Government had 
no need to do anything. For the time being its plan was to remain as 
distant as possible from the issue, emphasising that it was the council's, 
not the Government's responsibility to set a rate, in the hope that the 
growing political isolation of the council would bring capitulation. The 
Government's willingness to sit on its hands alarmed some local officials, 
who felt it was showing a lack of common sense about the city's 
difficulties. Indeed, the chief executive, Alfred Stocks, was concerned 
that revolt was in the air in the city, and might come, if the Government 
continued with these tactics. 
These fears were echoed by the city's church leaders. The influential 
Bishop of Liverpool, David Sheppard, although wholly opposed to 
Labour's plan, argued that behind it lay 'a cry of pain.' 'Some of us' he 
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said 'are trying to persuade people not to abandon the rule of law and 
peaceful processes of change. But, if we are successful in such law 
abiding persuasion and they pull back from the brink, what will happen 
then? Will prosperous Britain heave a sigh of relief and forget about 
Liverpool again? Make no mistake, we are wasting the God-given 
resources of the nation by leaving three million people on the dole and 
we are breeding a dangerously bitter spirit.' Politicians, officials and 
church leaders were all agreed at least about one thing, the potential 
dangers of the situation. Violence was always a lurking possibility. And 
throughout the confrontation, the Bishop and his Roman Catholic 
counterpart, Archbishop Derek Worlock, remained in constant contact 
with Jenkin and Thatcher, as well as the local Labour leaders, trying to 
avoid that possibility and to keep the lines of communication open and 
with it the hope of moderate solutions. Their contribution was subtle but 
undeniable. Arguably it helped shape the Government's final response. 
Labour presses on 
Liverpool, meanwhile, turned back to Neil Kinnock for help after the 
city's five Labour MPs had persuaded him to meet the local leaders. But 
to their surprise, when the councillors arrived at the House of 
Commons, they found not only Kinnock, but the national general 
secretaries of the three major local authority unions, all of whom 
expressed their worries about where Liverpool was leading their local 
members. Labour's reply was brutal. Their finance spokesman, Tony 
Byrne, explained that he fully understood these· worries. They presented 
no problem for the Labour council. But he asked each union leader to tell 
him the names of the thousand of their local members he should make 
redundant. At this point, the union leaders beat a collective exit to allow 
Neil Kinnock his opportunity to persuade the local politicians of the folly 
of their ways. He failed. 
But Kinnock would not make what he called the 'idle gesture' of 
endorsing Liverpool's stand. He told them to get in line with party 
policy, administer the cuts humanely and maintain a common front for 
1985. He insisted there were 'difficult but nonetheless practical budget 
alternatives' which the city should consider. And although he did not 
suggest any specific answers to Liverpool's problem, it was widely 
known that after Straw's inspection of the city's books, Kinnock's 
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private office had produced an alternative budget outline which implied a 
60 per cent rate rise. This was the stra~egy that he wanted Liverpool to 
follow. As Kinnock said on other occasions - better the dented shield 
than none at all. 
But obviously Liverpool were not going to do this. And this marked 
the estrangement of the two sides. Throughout the struggle, many 
Liverpool councillors, especially the Militants, regarded the national 
leaders as traitors who constantly pushed unacceptable solutions on 
Liverpool, providing their opponents in the city with powerful 
arguments against them. In fact many believed that the national 
leadership's real worry was that if they sided with Liverpool's case for 
special treatment when the Conservatives were in office, they would be 
storing up future trouble for themselves if they ever formed a 
Government. This was part of the problem. Many in the Liverpool 
Labour party had little confidence that a future Labour Government 
would follow the kinds of socialist policies they wanted. Liverpool's plan 
was to use the struggle over the budget to first drive out Thatcher. But 
the struggle would only then begin for control of the Labour 
Government. As Tony Byrne publicly argued, it was no good just 
having any kind of Labour Government repeating the betrayals of its 
predecessors. For some in the Liverpool Labour party, a future Labour 
Government would be as much a potential enemy as a potential ally. 
The legal warnings 
After the unsuccessful meetings with Kinnock in March 1984, it was 
clear that Liverpool was out on its own. And the pressures on the Labour 
group were growing alarmingly. On 19 March the district auditor, 
Lesley Stanford, entered the scene by warning the councillors of the 
dangers they were in. If they levied an insufficient rate, the council 
would run out of money, be unable to borrow and there would be 'a 
serious breakdown.' There would be inevitable losses to the council and 
he would have to decide whether to charge the individual councillors 
involved for them. His told them that 'it would be less than helpful if I 
were to fail to say at rhis stage that I should find it difficult to see how the 
deliberate making of an inadequate rate could be anything other than 
wilful misconduct'. But he did not give them a deadline for action. And 
they did not take him very seriously. 
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These warnings were underlined in a report by the city's three senior 
officers produced the same day. If Labour made an illegal rate, there 
would be severe effects on the daily running of the council services. If the 
Government did not authorise borrowing, the city_ would not be able to 
pay its employees, its suppliers of goods and services, voluntary 
organisations or bond-holders. Suppliers would be reluctant to deal with 
the authority and investors and financial institutions reluctant to lend. 
The city might have to pay a high price in the future, as investors could 
force the authority to pay higher interest rates for its loans. 'Quite what 
the effect would be', the officials argued, 'it is impossible to say. There 
could be a gradual and protracted deterioration in services or a sudden 
and dramatic one, and there might be differences depending upon 
whether an insufficient rate was made or no rate at all.' But Tony 
Byrne's classic reply to all these legal strictures was, 'the morality of the 
stance we are taking over-rides what happens to be in the district 
auditor's report.' This view, that there was only one 'correct' position-
their own- kept Labour going forward. And it unnerved many who had 
to deal with it. 
Budget day - deadlock and on to the election 
The party was not going to be diverted from its course. On 21 March the 
district Labour party reaffirmed its illegal strategy. The Labour group 
only had sight of the budget which might bankrupt them six days before 
the council meeting. Expenditure was planned at £m267, £m55 above the 
Government's target. The deficit budget was presented on 29 March after 
a march of25,000 striking council workers and others, which had closed 
much of the city. The debate, which lasted over eight hours, was heated 
and controversial, with much discussion of class war and many 
accusations of treachery and retribution. But in the end, as expected, the 
six Labour rebels voted with the Conservatives and Liberals to defeat the 
deficit budget. 
The real question was whether any alternative could be agreed. At 
one point the Government had been hoping that the Labour rebels could 
be persuaded to join a coalition of Liberals and Conservatives to produce 
a 'save the city' budget. And Patrick Jenkin had encouraged their leading 
spokesman, Paul Orr, to do so with an offer of 'More money than the 
city has ever seen from the Manpower Service Commission, the Sports 
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Council and the urban programme, if you get the show on the road with 
a legal budget.' But voting against illegality was one thing. Voting with 
the Liberals and Conservatives looked like treachery to the rebels, and 
they would not do it. Their reluctance was encouraged by the fact that 
the Liberals had already produced an alternative budget which was £m40 
less than Labour's, but which they claimed would involve no cuts in jobs 
and services and a single figure rate rise. It was hardly a statesmanlike 
gesture at the height of the city's crisis. Even the Conservative party had 
ridiculed this as 'an unbankable sham' which was 'so irresponsible it 
would place us outside the law as surely as would the Labour party's 
declared intention.' In the time-honoured tradition of budgetary politics 
in Liverpool, the opposition parties failed to rise to the occasion. The 
pursuit of partisan self interest which had marked the lost decade still 
guided the behaviour of all parties on the council. Eventually, the 
meeting was abandoned without any budget agreed. It was not the first 
time it had happened in Liverpool. But this was quite different. A chasm 
of uncertainty had appeared. 
National opinion was shocked by Liverpool's actions. The Labour 
leadership was especially appalled. John Cunningham argued 'I don't 
believe a Government can be blackmailed into giving extra resources by 
making a city bankrupt - it's the worst possible course of action to 
choose.' Accusing the Liverpool leadership of deliberately trying to 
mislead people about the city's finances, he argued there had been 'no 
proper working budget document in the city council chamber for many 
weeks and that's an unprecedented situation. And a number of people in 
senior positions in the group have decided to keep their cards close to 
their chest in the hope that this strategy and its implications would not be 
properly understood.' The Labour leadership was becoming infuriated 
by Liverpool's actions. But in a show of national elite solidarity in the 
face of provincial recalcitrance, Cunningham offered to lead a deputation 
of city councillors to Government Ministers to find a solution to the 
crisis. And Patrick Jenkin, while refusing to make a special case for 
Liverpool, replied 'My door is always open.' That offer, and its 
acceptance, in the end proved crucial. It opened the way to what the 
council had been after, and the Government had been resisting, real talks 
about Liverpool's financial problems. 
In mid-April the two sides did meet again but failed to get any 
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agreement. However two things did emerge which proved important 
later on. First, Jenkin promised that at some point he would visit the city. 
And in these talks, the idea first surfaced of holding an independent 
investigation of the previous ten years of the city's finances. Liverpool 
was pressing for this because they believed it would not only discredit 
the opposition parties, but would show that the crisis had not been 
invented by them, and had been developing during the last decade. But the 
Government did not want to get involved in that sort of investigation, 
and become more deeply immersed in Liverpool's financial problems, 
than was good for it. It offered instead an investigation by the district 
auditor of the city's services, in an effort to prove its own argument that 
Liverpool's financial troubles were caused by its own inefficiencies as 
much as by the Government's grant system. But even this was on offer 
only if Liverpool would first introduce a legal budget. The issue of an 
enquiry ran into the sand, along with all the other deliberations that were 
taking place, although the principle reappeared in a very important guise 
later on. But both sides were now waiting for the council elections in 
May and serious negotiations could not take place until then. 
The Government was showing growing consternation at the 
obduracy of the Labour council and its willingness endlessly to repeat the 
simple argument that the Government had stolen its money and it 
wanted some of it back. After the meetings had broken down, Patrick 
Jenkin could scarcely credit what had happened and almost disbe-
lievingly accused the Labour leaders of planning to commit 'municipal 
hari kari.' A former great city seemed on the point of collapse. A second 
budget meeting did take place on 25 April, but with the failure of the 
London talks to produce anything it was doomed from the start. The 
opposition parties had made no serious effort to get together to construct 
an alternative budget. And Labour was determined not to move. 
The treasurer, Michael Reddington, described Labour's budget as 
'frankly invalid.' But the Liberal proposals were so optimistic that 
Reddington described them as 'doubtfully realistic.' Both the opposition 
parties' budgets implied that the council could make annual savings at 
twice the rate ever achieved in the past. As throughout the lost decade, 
both were frightened by the electoral risks of putting forward the level of 
rate increase necessary to balance the books. Nobody could agree about 
anything and the meeting ended in disarray once more. The city was left 
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without a budget in the second month of the financial year. Senior 
officials were left completely unsure of their legal right to spend or 
borrow money. The day after the meeting, the authority was virtually 
paralysed as they were frightened to buy even a postage stamp. 
By May 1984, the Labour council's year long campaign had brought 
the city to the edge of a financial abyss. Nobody knew what lay ahead. 
The party certainly did not. The Government was amazed that things 
had gone so far. The national Labour leadership was embarrassed. Local 
officers were nervous and uncertain. The Church leaders were worried 
and leading the city in vigils of prayer. The only people who had not yet 
clearly spoken on the issue were the general public in Liverpool. So far, 
the whole affair had been dominated by political elites as they carried out 
their British Rail diplomacy between Liverpool and London. But now 
the voters would be given the chance to speak their mind and break the 
stalemate. The annual council elections were due on 5 May. The choice 
before the voters was an extraordinary one. But nobody really knew 
how the voters would react to Labour's threatened illegality and the 
dangers they had placed the city in. Would they solve the problem by 
throwing out the Militants and rejecting 'revolutionary defeatism?' Or 
did they believe that Labour had a case? And if so, would they vote for 
municipal bankruptcy? Their behaviour would be absolutely crucial for 
both sides. 
LABOUR VINDICATED AND FIRST STEPS TO NEGOTIATION 
- The May 1984 Election 
The May election was a crucial test of Labour's strategy and it became 
another turning point in the story. The result had a major effect upon the 
way Liverpool's case was treated by national elites. And it opened the 
way to genuine negotiations with a Government which until then had 
successfully managed to stay clear of the problem. One third of the 99 
seats on the council were up for election in the thirty-three wards in the 
city. Obviously Labour had to win enough extra seats to make up for 
their six defectors and to get a majority for their deficit budget. But it 
also needed the voters' endorsement to strengthen its hand against the 
Government. Throughout the argument the Labour council had insisted 
that it had got not only union, but popular support, because of its council 
election victory in May 1983 on a platform of 'no cuts in jobs and 
services'. But its critics could legitimately argue that no one in 1983 
knew they were voting for municipal bankruptcy. So the Liverpool 
Labour party badly wanted to get a 'double mandate' in 1984 for its 
illegal budget strategy. It knew this would increase enormously its 
ability to blackmail the Government into giving it some extra money. 
And it was confident it would win. 
Labour ran an intensive campaign to persuade the voters to support 
them and it worked. Almost two months after the financial year 1984/85 
had started, when Labour still had not made a budget and was 
threatening to take the city into the chaos of municipal bankruptcy, the 
party won the election and increased its majority by seven seats from 51 
to 58. The Liberals and Conservatives combined got 41 seats. Even if the 
remaining five rebel Labour councillors voted with the opposition, the 
election had given Labour the majority to drive an illegal budget through 
the council. 
In contrast to their national leadership, the local Labour party leaders 
immediately claimed the election had been a referendum on the budget 
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crisis, which had produced a decisive result in favour of their illegality. In 
fact this was not entirely clear. Labour's success was to some extent a 
result of the types of seats being fought in the election. Labour was 
mainly defending safe seats in wards where it had won in the 1983 
council election. By contrast the opposition parties were defending scats 
in vulnerable wards where they had lost in 1983. It would have been a 
major reversal of recent election trends in Liverpool if Labour had lost 
seats in 1984. Nevertheless, the election produced a massive 51 per cent 
turnout, 20 per cent up on 1983. And exactly as in 1983 Labour got 46 
per cent of the votes, the highest in its history. In two years it had 
increased its seats on the Council by almost half. Whatever else, the 
threat of bankruptcy did not lose them support. The public mood in 
Liverpool continued to run very strongly in favour of the Labour party. 
In fact, although Labour never had a majority on the city council 
between 1973 and 1983, the party had been gaining strength throughout 
the decade. Since its election disaster in 1973, when the Liberals first 
seized control of the new Liverpool city council after local government 
re-organisation, the Labour party had slowly been re-establishing its 
position. And despite the fact that it controlled the city for much of the 
decade, the Liberal party actually lost seats in all but one council election 
fought in Liverpool after their landslide victory in 1973, as table 1 in 
chapter 1 showed. That one very important exception was 1980. That 
was the controversial year in which the Labour council had raised the 
rates by 50 per cent to balance the books and it suffered the disaster of 
losing six seats, five of them to the Liberals. Prior to that election the 
Liberals were in decline and had lost almost forty per cent of their seats 
on the council in six years. That defeat after the large rate rise scarred the 
Labour party and affected its behaviour ever after. 
But the key feature of that 1980 election was that, because the ward 
boundaries had been redrawn, all the council's 99 seats were being 
contested. And instead of one councillor in each ward standing for 
election, all three were fighting the seats. The effect was to increase 
dramatically the number of seats the Liberals won that year. Labour was 
likely to lose seats because of its rate rise. But instead of losing just one 
councillor in each ward, in some it actually lost all three. This was an 
enormous piece of electoral good fortune for the Liberal party which 
arrested their gradual decline and established them as a major force on the 
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council once again. And it was the second time it had happened. In 1973, 
because of the reorganisation of local government, all the 99 seats had 
been contested which meant that Liberal votes again won them more 
seats on the council than would have been the case in a normal year if 
only one seat out of the three in every ward had been contested. 
Labour had almost clawed itself back to equality from that setback in 
1973 when it lost badly again in 1980. And it had been regaining ground 
since then. The long term voting trend in Liverpool was very much 
against the Liberals in favour of the Labour party, which again increased 
the likelihood of a Labour victory in the 1984 election. The same was 
true of parliamentary elections. Labour made gains throughout the 
decade, but this time at the expense of the Conservatives. In the 1983 
general election, held six weeks after the council elections which had 
given Labour its first majority for a decade, the Conservative Party 
finally lost its one remaining MP in the city. Nationally, the general 
election results showed a swing from Labour to Conservative of 3. 9 per 
cent. But in Liverpool the swing was 2.4 per cent away from the 
Conservatives to Labour. The Liverpool Labour party would needed to 
have done very badly to have lost the 1984 council elections. 
Nevertheless, the Labour council was naturally jubilant with the 
results and its victory. Government officials knew the long-term voting 
trends, and were not completely surprised. But they still found it hard to 
understand why so many people had voted for a party apparently intent 
on financial suicide. Some answers to this crucial question were provided 
by our survey of over 1,200 voters conducted by National Opinion 
Polling in Liverpool during the week after the election. The survey 
explored peoples' understanding of the crisis, their motives and 
expectations, their hopes and their fears. It told us how much they knew 
about the crisis, what they expected the Labour council and the 
Government to do as well as what they wanted them to do. The poll 
provided a very clear insight into the mood of the city, in particular the 
widespread frustration about its decline, and possible reaction if the 
Conservative Government tried to impose draconian solutions from 
outside. It helped explain why the Conservatives had finally lost support 
in the city during the last five years, and a hard left Labour party had 
emerged to take control of the council. And it also suggested why the 
Conservative Government does not like Liverpool and has grown tired 
of its 'special pleading.' 
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Opinion poll 
Despite Labour's elaborate year-long campaign, as might have been 
expected in these complicated areas, very few people actually understood 
many of the central issues of the budget drama. For example, there was 
enormous confusion in voters' minds about what Labour would do if it 
was re-elected. The majority of even Labour voters, in fact, thought the 
party would back down from its illegal stance if it won. There was equal 
uncertainty about what the Government would do if Labour did not 
back down - whether it would impose commissioners, leave things to 
the courts, make severe cuts in Liverpool services or make financial 
concessions itself to the city. In fact, fewest people thought the 
Government would make any concessions. In other words, when they 
voted the majority were confused and fearing the worst outcome. Of 
course the voters were not on their own in this respect. Throughout the 
crisis, even those most intimately involved had no idea how the issue 
would finally be settled. The endless manoeuvrings and efforts to read 
the entrails to discover the other side's real intentions were a constant 
feature of the confrontation. Nevertheless, despite their worries and 
confusion many of the electorate still supported Labour. 
But the election was not really, as Labour claimed, a direct 
referendum upon the merits of municipal bankruptcy. In fact, very few 
people voted specifically in those terms. The majority of Labour and 
Conservative voters actually voted out of traditional loyalty to their 
party. The campaign particularly strengthened Labour voters support for 
their party, without necessarily convincing them of its plan for an illegal 
budget. The real importance of the confrontation with the Government 
was not to provide understanding or persuade people on the detailed 
arguments, but to strengthen the voters' existing party loyalties. For 
example, when asked who was responsible for the crisis, the large 
majority of people in all three parties blamed the other side for the crisis. 
Very few were willing to share the blame amongst all those who had 
actually been involved locally and nationally, and had contributed to the 
crisis, during the previous decade. 
Similarly, few voters were willing to believe what the other parties 
said about the city's financial problems. For example, the Labour council 
had claimed it needed a rate rise of 170 per cent to balance the books. The 
other parties had said a rise of less than 30 per cent would do. But only 
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about 10 per cent of Labour and Liberal voters and less than 5 per cent of 
Conservatives believed the other parties were telling the truth. Labour's 
tactic of dramatising the issue and only presenting stark alternatives, had 
the desired effect. It may have driven away Liberal and Conservative 
voters, but it made sure that its own traditional supporters believed their 
case. Given the importance to Labour of getting a high turnout and 
making sure their working-class supporters voted, its campaign suc-
ceeded. 
Local chauvinism and protest 
But if the pattern of public opinion did not confirm Labour's more 
extravagant claims about the election, there was nevertheless a very 
strong current of public support for Labour's challenge to the Govern-
ment and in particular a very strong sense of grievance about the 
Conservative's treatment of the city. In fact the most marked feature of 
opinion was a strand of local chauvinism which ran through all three 
political parties. The voters were protesting to the Government. More 
ominously, they were warning it that protest could turn to resistance if 
the Government attempted to take control of the city and put Liverpool's 
house in order. 
Voters were asked, for example, which forms of opposition to central 
government commissioners they would support: public demonstrations, 
occupation of the council offices by local authority workers who had 
been made redundant; non-cooperation by council workers with the 
commissioners; strikes by council workers; rent and rate strikes and a 
general strike by all workers. And the survey, to which both the 
Government and the Labour councillors paid close attention, provided 
little hope that the commissioners' occupation of the city could be a quiet 
one. 
Opinion was polarised along party lines as table 1 shows. But an 
important strand of anti-Government and pro-Liverpool, as opposed to 
pro-Labour party, thought emerged. The Conservative voters in the city 
opposed resistance, especially since it would be directed against their 
own party in Government. But Liberal voters were more mixed. 
Although they blamed the Labour council and the Government for the 
crisis, substantial minorities of Liberals consistently approved of all 
forms of opposition to the commissioners. Particularly significant, 28 
Table 1: Opposing a Central Government Take-over 
Labour Liberal Conservative 
By means of: approve disapprove not sure approve disapprove not sure approve disapprove not sure 
% % % 
Demonstrations 62 31 6 17 79 3 8 87 5 
Occupation by 
redundant council 68 25 7 28 64 8 8 83 8 
workers 
Strike by council 
workers 59 32 9 14 80 6 4 91 5 
General strike 55 34 11 14 77 8 5 87 8 
Council workers 
refusing to 
cooperate with 56 32 4 14 77 8 2 89 9 
commissioners 
Rent and rates 
strike 48 41 11 22 71 7 8 85 8 
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per cent would approve of resistance by any local authority workers who 
were made redundant by the commissioners. Jobs, and public sector 
jobs, were an emotive theme even for Labour's opponents. 
But support for resistance was inevitably strongest amongst the 
Labour supporters. As with the Liberals the prospect of unemployment 
was again the most important issue, reflecting public worries in a city 
with 60,000 people out of work. Almost 70 per cent of Labour voters 
were in favour of the occupation of council offices by local authority 
workers if they were made redundant. Large numbers of Labour 
supporters also favoured the more extreme forms of resistance. Almost 
half were in favour of rent and rate strikes. And 55 per cent of Labour 
voters would support a general strike. If attitudes were a reliable guide to 
future behaviour, the Government could expect trouble. At best the 
administration of the city's services would be problematic. At worst, 
there could be sustained political confrontation between the commission-
ers and the public, and the possibility of guerilla like violence. 
Of course, the Government had contingency plans for commission-
ers, even though there was a lot of uncertainty about which kinds of 
people would be willing and able to serve. For example, it was felt that 
former local authority officials might not be sufficiently hardline to 
enforce the cuts in jobs and services that might be necessary. Someone 
from private industry might be tough enough but might also be too 
controversial. Former civil servants might not have the necessary 
experience or capacity to carry local officials with them. Some believed 
that someone with experience in public sector trade unions would be 
necessary to persuade the workforce to cooperate. 
Spotting the commissioners became something of a local, even a 
national, pastime. There was no shortage of volunteers. The Govern-
ment received many unsolicited offers from people without any 
qualifications for the job, except an intense desire to sort out Liverpool 
and the Militant Tendency. But such delicate concerns about personnel 
paled into insignificance in comparison with the problems the Govern-
ment knew might face the commissioners trying to run the city. The 
problems experienced by commissioners in Clay Cross in 1972, who had 
a much narrower role in a much less politically volatile place, was hardly 
encouraging. Their first problem would be in getting the doors of the 
offices unlocked and then finding a working telephone. Indeed the 
66 I LABOUR VINDICATED 
standing joke in Government circles was that since they would never get 
off the end of the local motorway, the commissioners would need offices 
with a flat roof to allow the helicopters taking them in and out of the city 
to land. The question was how far, and in what form, opposition might 
develop and what the political consequences might be for the Govern-
ment. However successful its occupation of the city, it could be no more 
than an exercise in damage limitation with few tangible political benefits. 
The explanation of the extraordinary public willingness to resist the 
Government lay in the depth of the pro-city, anti-Government sentiment 
which ran through voters in all the political parties. The Government 
claimed, for example, that Liverpool was not only treated fairly and 
equally by the grant system, but that it had also received a whole battery 
of special programmes and initiatives in recent years which meant that in 
some respects Liverpool had done even better than other cities. Labour 
argued, by contrast, that the Government was punishing the city 
financially and that its special initiatives nowhere near compensated for 
the £m 270 that the Conservatives had 'stolen' from the city. 
Not surprisingly, virtually all Labour voters believed the council. But 
even amongst Liberal voters who blamed the Labour group for the 
immediate crisis, only one third believed the Government's argument. 
The majority of Liberals actually believed Labour. Even among 
Conservatives, who in almost every other respect took the Govern-
ment's side, a substantial minority believed Labour's claim that 
Liverpool had had a raw deal from the Government. And even though 
few people believed it would do so, almost three quarters of Labour 
voters, two thirds of Liberals and half of even Conservatives, wanted the 
Government to make a special case and find some extra money to help 
the city through the immediate crisis. When it saw the results of the poll, 
the Government rightly concluded it was not getting its message across 
to substantial proportions of its own supporters, let alone the opposition 
parties in Liverpool. 
The local chauvinism extended across the parties to their views about 
the long-term futun~ of Liverpool. For example, people indicated which 
they thought was the most realistic view of the city's future: that 
Liverpool was bound to decline and little could be done to help it; that its 
problems could be resolved if the Government would introduce new 
programmes and increase public spending; or that the city's problems 
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Table 2: Has Liverpool Had a Fair Deal? 
Labour Liberal Conservative 
% 
Not fair 89 53 28 
Fair 5 33 61 
Not sure 6 14 11 
could be solved if all the local institutions and groups could work 
together more successfully. Perhaps the most extraordinary feature of 
the responses was the general optimism about the city's long term future 
that pervaded all parties. Although Labour voters tended to place more 
emphasis on Government spending than the others, all parties believed 
that many of the city's problems were in fact soluble by local action. In 
many respects this was an unrealistic view of the city's future. But it 
gives some indication of the extent of patriotism in the beleaguered city 
which lay at the root of the pervasive resentment of the Government's 
apparent lack of concern for the city. One voter canvassed by a Liberal 
candidate expressed the mood precisely in saying 'I can't stand the 
Militant. But at least someone is standing up to the Bitch in London.' 
Table 3: How Could Liverpool be Saved? 
Labour Liberal Conservative 
% 
Public spending 38 17 11 
Local actions 35 60 63 
Bound to decline 17 15 17 
Not sure 11 10 10 
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Support for a deficit budget? 
But support for Labour was as much a gesture of defiance at the 
Government as it was an endorsement of bankruptcy. It drew upon a 
deep well of anti-Thatcherism in the city. This was clear from voters 
view of what Labour should do if it was re-elected. Despite their residual 
resentment of the Government and their hopes for special treatment, 
Conservative and Liberal voters were completely opposed to illegality. 
This was to be expected. But, the majority of Labour voters were also 
opposed to Labour's plans for illegality. 46 per cent of those who actually 
voted for Labour did not want a deficit budget; 18 per cent had still not 
made up their mind even after they had voted. Only 35 per cent of people 
who voted Labour wanted the council to default. 
In other words, a minority of Labour supporters - a fifth of all voters 
in the city - agreed with the Labour council that the city's financial 
problems were so great that they might as well stage the final 
confrontation with the Government and plunge the city into bankruptcy. 
Frustration at and resentment of Thatcherism had apparently driven 
most people to vote Labour rather than an active endorsement of 
bankruptcy. But the problem was that despite their qualifications, the 
voters actually encouraged the Labour party to go along that road. The 
vote could not capture the ambiguity of people's feelings. If Labour 
wanted to claim a decisive victory, it would also have to claim a decisive 
mandate for bankruptcy as well. 
But while a minority of even Labour voters, 35 per cent was still a 
large number of people in favour of such an extreme course. Who were 
they? Our survey showed that they were not predominantly council 
house tenants, but they were just as likely as other Labour voters to own 
their own homes. They were certainly no more likely to be unemployed. 
They were in general a little younger than the moderate Labour 
supporters. They were certainly not drawn from the least well-off 
sections of the city. In fact they were rather more likely to be in 
professional, middle class jobs, and less likely to be in manual, working 
class jobs than other Labour voters. In other words, the Labour 
'resisters', as we call them, were not typically the older, poorer, 
unemployed, council tenants who were economically displaced, with 
little to lose from an act of despair. It was rather the other way round. 
They were more likely to be younger, working, professional and 
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middle-class property owners - the new hard Left. 
In fact it was the ideological differences between Labour voters which 
revealed most about their attitude to the crisis. Labour voters divided 
into one-third hard Left who identified with Tony Benn, and two-thirds 
soft Left who identified with Neil Kinnock. The two sets of supporters 
were remarkably alike in terms of their class background. But they had 
quite different political views about Liverpool's financial problem. 
Kinnock supporters were considerably more moderate. A majority in 
both camps supported virtually all kinds of resistance to the commission-
ers. But Benn supporters were much stronger in their opposition. In fact, 
Kinnock's supporters drew the line at rent and rate strikes to which a 
small majority were actually opposed, whereas the majority of Benn 
voters were in favour of such a strike. However, the difference was 
clearest in their attitude to the illegal budget. Kinnock supporters were 
far less willing to go bankrupt. 65 per cent were opposed to it, and only 
35 per cent were in favour. But in the case of Benn supporters, the 
position was reversed - 35 per cent opposed illegality but 65 per cent 
were in favour. 
As many as 51 per cent of the electorate turned out to vote - an 
extraordinarily high figure for a local election. And the confrontation 
appeared to touch everyone in the city and involved them equally. 
Women voted as often as men. The social classes behaved similarly, with 
working class people voting only a little less frequently than middle and 
upper middle class groups. The highest turnout came from housewives 
and old age pensioners. But the unemployed, for example, voted almost 
as heavily as the employed. Nor did housing tenure affect turnout. 
Identical proportions of home-owners, council tenants and private 
renters voted. Whatever their views about the causes of the problem, the 
people in Liverpool were obviously affected and mobilised by it. 
The council workers 
But the most distinctive group of voters were the 30,000 local 
authority workers. They were by far the largest group of employees in 
either the public or private sector in the city. And they were most 
immediately involved in and affected by the illegal budget and possible 
cuts in services or jobs. The issues mobilised them. Council workers 
turned out in massive numbers with 80 per cent of all groups - teachers, 
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social workers, blue collar workers and white collar administrators -
voting. And the issues also radicalised them. Other workers voted 13 per 
cent Conservative, 30 per cent Liberal and 55 per cent Labour. But 
council employees voted 11 per cent Conservative, 15 per cent Liberal 
and a massive 72 per cent Labour. A decade of Liberal control had lost 
them support amongst the workforce. All the council workers who had 
been mobilised by the confrontation and who, for example, voted in 
1984 but had not voted in 1983, supported Labour. By contrast, the 
non-council workers who had voted in 1984 but not 1983 were 
marginally more in favour of the Liberals. 
The radicalisation of council workers was also demonstrated by their 
much greater willingness than the rest of workers in Liverpool to oppose 
the Government's commissioners. They were far more willing to take 
part in demonstrations and sit-ins, to support strikes by council workers, 
or a general strike, as well as rents and rate strikes. And they were willing 
by a much larger margin to support strikes by council workers if they 
were made redundant. However, despite their support for the Labour 
party, the council workers were no more anxious to see an illegal budget 
than the rest of the city's voters. Only 25 per cent of council workers, as 
opposed to 20 per cent of all voters, favoured the illegal budget. Their 
greater militancy stopped at this. To some extent, self-interest drove the 
council workers along this path. But it was still true that the group 
whose interests were most directly entwined with the issues in the 
dispute, had been most exposed to the full thrust of Labour's propaganda 
campaign and had most direct experience of the impact of their 
predecessor's policies, were far more in support of the Labour council 
than any other group of voters in the city. 
The Government could never really understand why the workforce 
supported Labour in its stand. They thought it was irrational since it 
would lead to chaos and the eventual loss of more jobs than if Labour 
compromised. There were two union responses to this. The first was 
that if the Government and its commissioners would have to sack local 
authority workers in the end, there was no reason for the Labour council 
to anticipate that and do the Government's dirty work. The unions 
would rather fight the Tories about the cuts than the Labour council. 
Also there was some feeling that the commissioners might be reluctant to 
sack people and that the Government would bail them out with some 
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extra money. In which case, the cuts might not be too bad. The second 
response was that if the Labour council did raise the rates by the figure 
necessary to balance the books, it would be tantamount to losing the next 
election and turning control of the city back to the Liberals. At which 
point, the unions believed that their job would be threatened by a 
combination of privatisation and natural wastage under a Liberal 
administration. Either way, the unions calculated the best thing to do 
was to stay behind the Labour council. 
This radicalisation of the workforce had serious implications for a 
Government contemplating taking over Liverpool. Any attempt by 
commissioners to balance the budget quickly might need large staff cuts. 
Given workforce attitudes, this could be politically dangerous for the 
Government. It realised that if commissioners could not make the 
necessary savings in the short term, their period of office might run to 
several years before the city's services and workforce could be reduced 
sufficiently to meet Government spending limits, at a pace the workforce 
would tolerate. It also knew that the city's politicians during the lost 
decade of the 1970s had failed to deal with many of the problems of the 
blue-collar workforce because of political and administrative pressures. 
The Government would be in the difficult position of similarly trying to 
rationalise those sectors to achieve its economies while faced with the 
exteme hostility of all city workers. And it might have to stay in 
Liverpool far longer than might be good for it. The survey, like the 
electorate itself, made bleak reading for the Government and confirmed 
their worst fears about their standing in Liverpool. And it heightened 
their dilemma. 
The lessons of the election 
The question the Government asked itself after the May election was 
why people had voted in such large numbers for the Labour party and 
financial suicide. It seemed self-destructive. The answer was that they 
were actually protesting to the Government. The extent of popular 
discontent in Liverpool was in fact even greater than the election results 
suggested. Many more than Labour voters were opposed to Government 
policies, and even some of their own supporters had doubts. Not 
surprisingly, popular understanding of the technical budget issues was 
slight and people seemed confused about what was going to happen. But 
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these are difficult matters which have defeated the initiated including, 
occasionally, Patrick Jenkin himself. 
But the voters had grasped the main outlines of the story and 
connected it with the picture of obvious economic,physical and social 
decline they could witness daily around them. The private sector was 
collapsing and unemployment was rising and lasting longer. However 
tangentially related, crime and drug abuse was also seen to be on the 
increase. Under these circumstances, the Government's policy of cutting 
public expenditure and reducing the money spent on housing and local 
authority jobs, seemed to lack commonsense. The budget stood at the 
intersection of all these issues. Very few people wanted the council to 
break the law. But in their frustration, many wanted Labour to take the 
struggle to the Government in some kind of act of collective defiance. 
Symbolically, the election almost seemed like Liverpool's last stand. And 
it had a dramatic effect on the outcome of the confrontation in 1984. 
Labour's May election victory transformed the politics of the budget 
struggle in 1984. The position had become very different for both sides. 
Labour's threats and the dangers to themselves and the city were more 
realistic. The Government's faint hope that the electorate would be 
frightened off by Labour's stand had disappeared. They could no longer 
claim that the electorate did not know the implications of voting Labour 
as it had been able to argue about the 1983 election. Both had to consider 
how to play the confrontation and how much they were willing to 
compromise to avoid the chaos ofbankruptcy. 
Labour saw no need to compromise. The election results had 
strengthened their hand enormously. They had received the so-called 
double mandate from the people of Liverpool, they believed that right 
was now clearly on their side and they could press the Government still 
further. Derek Hatton insisted 'this must be a warning to Jenkin that he is 
not just taking on 58 Labour councillors. The people have spoken very 
loudly and clearly in favour of the policies of the Liverpool Labour party 
tonight. And it is a warning Mr. Jenkin must take notice of.' None of the 
Labour group knew what would happen next. Many were nervous and 
worried about their own future. But, ironically, all of them became 
further committed to the policy by their election success. Both the 
councillors whose personal futures were at stake, and the district Labour 
party whose generally were not, believed that Labour would seem 
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foolish and damage its reputation in the city, if it retreated from illegality 
in the aftermath of its victory. 
The Government's dilemma 
But the Government was even more trapped by the results. Uncertainty 
was still very high and it could not be sure which way the workforce 
would move as the risk of municipal collapse loomed. But the voters had 
made their views clear. And the Government did not know whether the 
new Labour majority on the council would disintegrate. But all the new 
Labour councillors had known what they were getting into and were, in 
fact, less likely than any existing councillors to defect in future. IfLabour 
now pressed on and the Government did nothing, it might lose control 
of events with unpredictable political consequences for itself. If it 
installed commissioners, the prospect of running the city on a very tight 
budget was equally alarming. But, if it made concessions to Liverpool it 
would reinforce doubts about its current grant system. Most important, 
it would be seen giving in to blackmail and anger other Labour cities and 
Conservative counties who were trying to cope with different degrees of 
financial difficulties. Anything it might do was bound to be taken as a 
precedent for future years by other local authorities. All its options had 
drawbacks. 
But after Labour's election victory the odds shifted in favour of the 
Government making short term concessions to Labour, extricating itself 
from the conflict and trying to limit the political damage, rather than 
becoming increasingly embroiled in a battle which it did not want and 
felt might not be won. The Government's immediate reaction in the new 
war of nerves was a hardline one. Replying to Liverpool MPs claims, 
Jenkin argued that there could be no electoral mandate for an illegal act. 
And there was 'no question of our even contemplating putting in 
commissioners until the situation has dramatically broken down in 
Liverpool, until the local council has absolutely shown beyond a 
per-adventure that they are not prepared to keep services going, they are 
not prepared to do what is necessary for the city to remain within the 
law.' It was very important for the Government that if it did take over 
the city, it did so only after everyone understood that the Liverpool 
Labour party had recklessly brought the chaos to the city. In that way, 
the Conservatives would appear like the saviour of a city on its knees, 
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rather than an avenging monetarist regime trying to strangle at birth a 
popular socialist administration. So for the time being, Liverpool was to 
be left to stew in its own juices. 
But, elsewhere the mood was changing as a result of the election. The 
people had apparently spoken and everyone was now anxious to line up 
behind them. The local press, while still critical of Labour's course, 
began to emphasise the need for Government flexibility. The Roman 
Catholic Archbishop, Derek Warlock, while criticising extremism asked 
'is it really out of the question that discussion and even negotiation 
should take place?' More important, the national Labour Party line was 
changing. It could see an opportunity to break the stalemate without too 
much electoral damage to itself, by using the council's popularity against 
the Thatcher Government. Although Kinnock was still pressing Liver-
pool to fix a legal rate, his response to their victory was that 'it now 
would really make a lot of sense for Patrick Jenkin to find some extra 
money for the city.' And John Cunningham soon offered to mediate 
between the two sides, arguing there now was 'a clear and broad 
consensus in favour of a settlement of the city's problem which goes 
right across the churches, voluntary bodies as well as across the political 
parties.' The issue should be resolved by negotiations between the two 
sides 'not by allowing the problems of the city to slide into chaos.' 
The Negotiations 
Labour's election victory made it difficult for the Government to resist 
this line. It had shown that, whatever the immediate details of the 
financial crisis, many people believed at least some of Labour's argument 
that the Government was not treating fairly a city with severe economic 
problems. The pressures upon the Government to now enter into 
negotiations were growing. It did not want them because it could see the 
political risks involved. It would open up the whole question of its grant 
system and could start raising doubts about it. But it was even harder to 
refuse. 
In the end the opportunity to turn the general wish for further 
negotiations into reality was quite fortuitous. On a previous visit to 
Liverpool to see the International Garden Festival, Patrick Jenkin had 
refused to meet the Labour council's demand that he inspect derelict 
housing instead. But he said he would do so in the future. 
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A routine enquiry from the press in early May to find out when the 
Minister would be coming to the city led his unwitting private office in 
Liverpool to reveal the arranged date was 7 June. This public 
announcement allowed the delighted Labour leaders to claim that Jenkin 
had been persuaded after all to come and see Liverpool's financial 
problems at first hand. The appalled Minister was forced to deny this 
interpretation the following day in Parliament. He insisted he was going 
to Liverpool to look at housing problems as a background to future 
housing capital allocations. The visit had 'no connection with the 
council's budget-making and rate-fixing process and there must be no 
misunderstanding about that.' 
But it was too late. The district Labour party had postponed the 
planned council budget meeting on 15 May until after Jenkin's visit. The 
Liverpool MPs in Parliament were welcoming his initiative, applauding 
the constructive move by Liverpool's leaders, and asking Patrick Jenkin 
to go without 'rigid, preconceived ideas.' The Labour leaders now 
believed that it would be very difficult for the Minister, after such a long 
publicised visit, to dash expectations and make no constructive response, 
particularly as sympathy for the city's financial predicament seemed to be 
growing. Labour had gained an important political advantage over the 
Government. 
John Cunningham now stepped in on behalf of the national Labour 
Party and set up a further round of talks between Liverpool and the 
Government. And from these talks in May between councillors, MPs, 
trade union officials, civil servants and Ministers, a very important 
initiative emerged. Both sides agreed that a joint team of senior civil 
servants and local authority officials would begin a series of discussions, 
without politicians present, to explore the financial arguments and try to 
construct alternative proposals which might form the basis of a new 
budget before the Minister's visit on 7 June. The idea had first been 
discussed in the meetings between the two sides in London in April. But 
at that time Labour had wanted an enquiry into the last ten years of the 
city's financial affairs, while the Government had wanted the district 
auditor to do an expose of Liverpool's services. These discussions were 
neither of those two. But the 'joint report' which they produced played a 
key role in producing the eventual settlement in July 1984. 
The talks were intensive lasting over three weeks in May and June 
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and involved frequent VISits to Liverpool by a team of semor 
Departmental officials, including Terry Heiser, the man who had 
invented the grant system and who was soon to be made Permanent 
Secretary of the Department of the Environment. There were extensive 
negotiations between the London civil servants, members of the Task 
Force and senior council officials. The process was closely monitored on 
a weekly basis in London by the most senior Ministers - the Prime 
Minister herself, Patrick Jenkin, Michael Heseltine, Norman Tebbitt, 
Leon Brittan and Tom King. The negotiations in effect suspended 
political debate about Liverpool's budget. When the 'joint report' was 
finally produced, as well as a set of proposals for resolving the immediate 
budgetary crisis, it contained a fascinating detailed discussion of both 
sides' views of the long term causes of the city's financial problems. 
The discussions were crucial to the course of the confrontation. In the 
first place they allowed detailed discussions to take place in which changes 
of positions could occur and which helped identify the basis of a 
settlement in 1984. Before then there had never been any genuine 
negotiations in meetings between the two sides, at either a political or an 
official level. Both had rehearsed their familiar lines, essentially talking 
past each other. This was probably intentional. The Government only 
wanted to tell Liverpool to obey the law like everyone else- not to get 
drawn into an argument about the origins or scale of the city's problems. 
Also they simply did not trust the Labour leadership. The Labour 
leaders, for their part, did not want to abandon their ultimate sanction -
the threat of plunging the city into bankruptcy - until they were quite 
certain that the Government was not willing to make concessions which 
would give Liverpool an ideological as well as a financial victory. 
The second important political result of the negotiations were that 
they demonstrated that, whatever their scale, the city's financial 
problems were real. Nothing conveyed the political implications of the 
'joint report' more vividly than the banner headline of the Liverpool 
Echo on the day it was leaked- 'Whitehall Whiz Kids Stumped.' Despite 
the protestations of civil servants, the Labour party concluded that its 
own position had been strengthened, and the Government's undermined, 
by the negotiations and that they represented a major propaganda victory 
for Liverpool. 
This was allied in Labour's view to that scored one week later when 
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Patrick Jenkin made his long-awaited and much publicised tour of the 
city's housing, which had a curious parallel to Michael Heseltine's tour of 
the riot zone of Toxteth three years earlier. After the tour, Jenkin 
announced, 'I have seen some families living in conditions the like of 
which I have never seen before. They are very grim.' Whether the 
Secretary of the Environment should not have seen such housing before, 
whether it was actually worse in Liverpool than anywhere else, or 
whether he should have admitted it publicly, are all open questions. But 
his admission was a major tactical error and only reinforced the fact that 
Patrick Jenkin could now hardly avoid making some offer on housing to 
the city, without severe political embarrassment. When it was 
announced that talks would take place about ways of giving Liverpool 
extra housing aid, it looked like the Government was also trying to find 
money to help the council balance its books. And this is exactly what the 
Liverpool Labour leaders claimed. They had set up the Government for a 
fall and were now waiting to push it over. 
The May 1984 election had been crucial for both sides. And the 
Liverpool Labour party successfully used its victory to outmanoeuvre 
the Government. The victory brought many people over to its side and 
gave its argument a new legitimacy. It could no longer be argued that the 
council had hijacked the city. It had popular support. The Government 
found it could no longer maintain its distance from the problem. Instead, 
it got publicly drawn much deeper into Liverpool's financial problems 
than it wanted and was forced to admit that they were real and urgent. It 
could now hardly refuse to make some initiative without appearing 
unreasonable to an outside world which was showing increasing 
sympathy with Liverpool's case and looking for a negotiated settlement. 
And much of this had been achieved by the negotiations between the two 
sets of professionals in May and June and their final 'joint report.' But 
what did it show about their political masters' claims? Had the Labour 
council invented the financial crisis merely to launch an attack on the 
Conservative Government? Had the voters of Liverpool been duped by 
the Militant Tendency? Was the Government right that the city's 
problems were quite manageable given common sense and political will? 
Or did Liverpool have a case that the Government's policy had created 
for it an impossible financial situation? 
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LIVERPOOL AGAINST WHITEHALL: 
THE PROFESSIONALS JOIN IN - May · June 1984 
If Labour's election victory was one decisive turning point in the budget 
saga, the negotiations between civil servants and local officials, and their 
final 'joint report', were another. They created a space for political 
manoeuvring and led to the eventual settlement. But they were also a 
serious attempt to look at the longer-term financial issues which 
underpinned Liverpool's ideological challenge to the Government. And 
the negotiations revealed that, whatever they thought about the way the 
Labour party presented its argument politically, Liverpool's professional 
officers also believed that the city had a good case and the Government 
was in the wrong. Labour had not invented the problem even if it was 
exploiting it. 
In the officers' eyes, the Government's grant system, and the 
assumptions underlying it, punished Liverpool in an arbitrary and 
unacceptable way. The system lacked a sense of proportion about the 
city's financial and economic problems and made a bad situation worse. 
Michael Reddington, the city treasurer, likened it to being on the side of 
an icy mountain - the further you slid down, the harder it was to stop the 
slide and rescue yourself, even if you were trying. It might have needed 
Thatcher, Hatton and Byrne to start the political fight. But in the 
officers' minds, the reasons for it had been lurking around for some time. 
The civil servants, like their Ministers, could not have disagreed more. 
The size of the gap between the two became crystal clear during the 
negotiations in May 1984. 
The Government's grant system- giving and taking money 
The Labour party's argument with the Government was essentially a 
political one based on its rejection of Thatcherite economic policies and 
their impact upon a declining city like Liverpool. But it rested on a 
technical critique of the way the Government allocated money to the 
4 
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city, which tied into the larger argument about the labrynthine rate 
support grant the Conservatives developed in the 1980s. The political 
argument was about values, mandates and the rule of law. The technical 
argument was about administrative and financial rationality and was 
developed by the city's profe,ssional officers. 
There are two kinds of local spending - capital and revenue. Capital 
expenditure buys buildings, land and plant which have a long-term life, 
and is paid for primarily by long-term borrowing. Revenue expenditure 
is mainly the annual cost of providing services like education, housing, 
social services, leisure and cultural facilities, transport and cleansing. 
Over half of revenue spending covers employees' wages and salaries, one 
third running costs and the rest covers debt charges. About half of the 
money is received from Government grant, one third from the rates and 
the rest from rents and fees. About 85 per cent of Government grant 
comes as a general block grant and the rest for specific services like 
housing, transport, the police and the urban programme. Most of the 
recent political controversy has been about the way the block grant 
system works. It was the basic cause of Liverpool's argument with the 
Thatcher Government which tried to use the system to cut the financial 
support it gave local authorities, as well as to cut what they spent from 
their own income. 
The block grant system is extremely complicated and has changed 
several times since it was first introduced by the Conservative 
Government in 1981. But in principle it attempts to do two rather 
different things. On the one hand it tries to use central government 
money to equalise the financial position of local authorities and to make. 
sure that local authorities with very different financial resources can 
provide a similar level of local service which their different populations 
need, for a similar rate level. 
But at the same time the grant system is also meant to reduce local 
government spending by penalising individual authorities who spend 
more than the Government tells them to. The first is a relatively 
systematic, if complicated, way of allocating Government money to 
local authorities. The second is a much more arbitrary way of reducing 
local expenditure, which undermines the first intention of equalising the 
financial circumstances of different authorities. And as the Conservative 
Government has tried harder through the 1980s to limit the spending of 
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Labour-controlled local authorities, the second has become harsher and 
more controversial. 
Every year the Government decides the total amount of money it 
wants local authorities to spend the following year, and what percentage 
of that local spending it will pay for. Both have been cut back in recent 
years. Between 1979/80 and 1985/86, the percentage oflocal expenditure 
the Conservative Government paid for fell drastically, from 61 per cent 
to 48 per cent. And between 1981/82 and 1985/86 the total block grant 
fell in real terms by 16 per cent. This forced up rate levels to provide the 
same level of local services. 
Once the total block grant has been decided, it is distributed between 
individual local authorities in an extremely complicated way, which has 
created enormous conflict. Through a complex series of over sixty 
different kinds of computer based analyses, in which a whole range of 
indicators of local need are identified, quantified and given different 
weightings, the Government calculates what it thinks an authority 
should spend, given the social, economic, environmental and geog-
raphical composition of its population. This is called its grant-related 
expenditure assessment. The Government then calculates how much 
income a local authority would raise with a particular rate level, given 
the rateable value of the property in its area. The difference between that 
figure and the total the Government has determined the authority needs 
to spend, is what the authority gets as its block grant from the 
Government. In this way, ratepayers can expect to receive the same 
standard of service for the same rate in the pound, wherever they live and 
no matter how rich or how poor their local authority is. But much of this 
depends on whether the Government's assessment of what an authority 
needs to spend is accurate and fair. Liverpool has consistently disagreed 
with the Government about this. 
However complicated the process of deciding an authority's needs 
and the grant it should get, it is at least systematic. But this is not true of 
the target and penalty system which the Government simply grafted on 
to the block grant system in 1982, in order to tighten its control over 
local authority spending. Since then the Government every year has set 
each local authority an expenditure target figure, and if the authority 
spends above it, it has to pay a penalty - the Government cuts the 
amount of grant it had originally calculated the authority should get. The 
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authority has to increase its rates to compensate for the Government's cut 
in grant, if it wants to keep up its spending. 
The way in which targets and penalties are calculated is again very 
complicated and has changed several times since they were first 
introduced. The original targets for 1981/82 were determined simply by 
taking each local authority's spending in 1978/79 and cutting it by 5.6 per 
cent in real terms. The base years for calculating targets have since 
changed, and the Government's assessment oflocal need also plays a part 
in determining them. But the principle, that its previous expenditure 
levels broadly determine an authority's target, remains. Local authorities 
have simply been asked systematically to cut back spending from earlier 
levels. Whereas the Government's assessment of need is a relatively 
objective measure for allocating grant, local expenditure in a single year 
can be determined by many things, and might bear no real relationship to 
need. It is not a similarly objective method of deciding what grant an 
authority should get. 
The penalties for overspending target have become progressively 
tougher and now increase very steeply. The more an authority spends, 
the higher the penalty it pays. For example, in 1984/85 if an authority 
spent 1 per cent over its target, it would have to increase its rate by 2p to 
compensate for its loss of Government grant. If it spent 6 per cent over 
its target, it would have to increase its rates by 41p to cover for the cut in 
grant. Once again, rate payers pay a heavy price for keeping services at a 
spending level beyond the Government's target figure. This has caused 
intense political controversy, not only in high-spending Labour but in 
many low-spending Conservative authorities, which the target system 
has also penalised. And it has raised technical questions of whether the 
target system is not simply too primitive a way of deciding how much 
Government support an authority should get. Even the Government's 
own quango on local government finance, the Audit Commission, for 
example, in 1984 argued that the grant system, with its needs assessment 
and equalisation machinery was broadly fair and consistent. But it had 
been significantly weakened by the superimposition of expenditure 
targets and penalties. 
In the mid-1980s the Government was still unhappy about its failure 
to control local spending as many local authorities refused to cut their 
spending down to Government targets, and increased their rates to make 
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up for the loss of Government grant. In 1985 the Minister, with his 
rate-capping legislation, actually took the power to control local 
spending by determining what rate levels the highest spending local 
authorities could set. By this time a system which had set out to 
rationalise local government spending was under constant attack from 
virtually all quarters. It was seen by many independent observers as a 
complicated, irrational and arbitrary system, which at best had seriously 
damaged local democracy and relations between central and local 
government. The left regarded it as a punitive attack by a sectarian, 
monetarist Government on the social wage of an urban working class 
already suffering badly from Conservative policies. 
Professional tensions 
Liverpool's dispute with the Government revolved around many of the 
technical issues raised by this new grant system - the way the 
Government calculated grant entitlement, its use of targets and penalties, 
the way the city managed and financed its services, the implications of 
rapid social and demographic change for public sector organisations. 
Liverpool's officials' essential argument was that the city's problems 
were primarily caused by the damaging effect of the Government's grant 
regime upon its finances, and that everything else was relatively trivial in 
significance. In their view, the system was irrational, providing no 
incentives for prudential accounting behaviour and punishing the local 
authority very heavily for minor breaches of the rules. The system was 
so severe that it made it difficult to get a rational political response to it. 
Especially in a period of economic decline, the system itself was 
fundamentally destabilising. In city treasurer Michael Reddington's 
words, 'There used to be a spirit to the game, but the rules have been 
changed. The Government keeps moving the goalposts.' The view of 
Departmental officials, however, was that its grant system was 
reasonable and equitable. It did not discriminate against Liverpool. The 
city's problems were of its own making and the remedy was in its own 
hands. It was badly managed, overstaffed, inefficient and expensive. 
These professional arguments were fully developed in the joint 
discussions between civil servants and local officials in May 1984. There 
was a particular piquancy to the negotiations because they directly 
involved the man who had designed the grant system, Terry Heiser, a 
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rising star who was subsequently appointed Permanent Secretary, in a 
flurry of publicity, at the age of 53. In other words, they brought 
face-to-face, in a quite unique way, the authors of the system with the 
officers who were grappling with the problems of implementing it in a 
hard-pressed local authority. Liverpool's officials could not help feeling 
that the civil servants' tenacity in defence of the grant system was 
affected by this fact. In one official's words, civil servants were having to 
'defend the indefensible', and it was not clear to him 'whether they 
actually believe in what they are doing or just say they do.' The civil 
servants had the tiger by the tail and it was threatening to turn on them. 
But at the end of it all a senior civil servant responded 'I don't know 
anybody in Whitehall who believes Liverpool's claims about the problem 
of the grant regime.' Both sets of officials not only presented the 
arguments of their political masters. They believed them as well. 
The negotiations touched many of the raw nerves that characterise 
relations between the professionals in central and local government. In 
many respects 'a culture of disdain' exemplifies the attitudes of senior 
civil servants towards the local authority world. The mandarins' sense of 
elite superiority frequently leads them to undervalue local government 
officials. They in turn are often frustrated by the fact that civil servants 
set the rules from on high, but never have to put them into practice. The 
extent of this cultural gap was made very clear by the joint discussions. 
Civil servants became increasingly intolerant of Liverpool officials' 
arguments, which they regarded as special pleading. Local officials were 
disenchanted by the civil servants' attempt to apply standards to the local 
authority which their own Departments would never meet, as well as by 
their refusal to admit the unreasonableness of the grant system, which 
Liverpool's officials called 'wayward and capricious'. If the politicians 
talked past each other during the argument, in many ways the 
professionals did as well. 
Despite these professional tensions, however, the 'joint report' they 
produced was not a narrowly argued analysis, and it remains the 
authoritative statement of Liverpool's budgetary problems. For political 
reasons, the Liverpool Labour party always presented the worst case 
analysis, which its critics argued was a caricature of the city's real 
financial position. The report allows one to judge that criticism of the 
Labour council. It also must be said that, although the discussions were 
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much fuller in 1984, it was not the first time that Liverpool had made its 
arguments to Government. In fact, city officials had been making annual 
visitations to the Department of the Environment in Marsham Street 
ever since 1978 to present their case, both about the broad impact of 
public expenditure cuts on Liverpool's economic problems, and more 
specifically after 1981 about the adverse effect of the new grant system 
upon the city's finances. 
Each time the Government thanked its visitors and reassured them in 
the words of Alfred Stocks, the chief executive, that it would 'bear it in 
mind next year.' But it never did until Labour gave it a more forceful 
reminder in 1984. By the time the Labour council offered its illegal 
challenge to the Government, senior officials could hardly argue that 
more conventional forms of persuasion would be more effective. Even 
though they were absolutely opposed to illegality, Liverpool's senior 
officers believed that Labour's argument had a lot of validity, and they 
were increasingly frustrated by their inability to persuade the Govern-
ment. The knowledge of their officials' frustration encouraged the 
Labour group a little further along the road to confrontation. 
The objections - Liverpool in the penalty area 
Liverpool's officials had two basic objections to the grant system. One 
was the impact of the target and penalty system upon the city. The other 
was the way in which the Government assessed the city's need to spend 
when it calculated how much money it should be given. Liverpool's 
objection to the target system was that it discriminated against the city 
because it had originally been quite arbitrarily based on expenditure 
levels in one year, 1978/79. All authorities had been asked to cut back 
spending from that base year. But this ignored that fact that the city's 
spending that year was already low because it had behaved 'responsibly' 
during the 1970s and it had held down its spending. The target forced the 
city to cut its expenditure for a second time again in the 1980s. While 
Liverpool was being penalised by a cut in grant because of its earlier 
financial responsibility, other cities with similar needs were being treated 
much more generously by the target system. This unfairness was 
aggravated by the fact that Liverpool's targets and penalties were more 
severe because the city also spent beyond the Government's assessment 
of need figure. Liverpool's officials argued that this figure was too low in 
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the first case. For the Government to use it to toughen the penalty was a 
double indemnity for the city. The targets were, in Reddington's words, 
'arbitrary and punitive.' 
The argument about Liverpool's target figure is closely connected to 
the city's politics during the 1970s and early 1980s. The target system 
was designed to control the high spending of Labour controlled cities, 
which the Government argued had been inefficient and profligate since 
the mid 1970s. But during this period, as we have seen, Liverpool was 
run not by the Labour party but by a Liberal-Conservative coalition 
whose primary purpose was to hold down the rates and spending, much 
to Labour's distaste at the time. Table 1 shows that Liverpool was a 
high-rating authority while under Labour control - for example in 
1971/72 its rates were 19 per cent above the national average and they 
rose as much as 45 per cent above in 1973/74. By contrast, spending fell 
rapidly towards the end of that decade when the Liberals were in power 
Table 1: Liverpool's Rates Compared with Averages 
for England and Wales 
Year Liverpool Average Difference 
pin£ pin£ % 
1960/61 18.8 16.5 14 
1965/66 23.8 21.3 12 
1970/71 31.7 29.0 9 
1971/72 39.7 33.2 19 
1972/73 46.5 37.0 26 
1973/74 58.5 40.3 45 
1974/75* 64.6 52.0 24 
1975/76* 69.1 67.9 2 
1976/77* 71.1 72.7 -2 
1977/78* 82.0 80.0 3 
1978/79* 86.1 85.0 1 
* Liberal budget. 
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and by 1976/77 Liverpool's rates were 2 per cent below the national 
average. In fact between 1975 and 1979 rate increases failed to keep pace 
even with the rate of inflation. Table 2 shows that in 1976/77 Liverpool's 
domestic rate increase was only 4 per cent compared with a 25.2 per cent 
increase in the retail price index. The city's rate increases were larger after 
1979, but the greatest part of that increase is explained by the fact that by 
this time the city was compensating from its own resources for the cuts 
in central government support. 
Also, the Liberals in their concern to hold down the rates made 
relatively small contingency provisions and often incurred budget 
deficits, as the income they raised failed to meet expenditure. This 
happened in six years out of ten between 1974 and 1983. Unlike many 
other high-rating Labour local authorities, during the 1970s Liverpool 
Table 2: Domestic Rate Increases in Liverpool1975-1983 
Year Rate increase RPI increase 
% % 
1975/76 
1976/77 4.0 25.2 
1977/78 20.8 14.9 
1978/79 6.4 13.1 
1979/80 23.4 8.1 
1975/1979 63.0 76.0 
1979/80 
1980/81* 50.6 17.3 
1981/82 24.5 15.3 
1982/83 16.0 12.6 
1983/84 8.7 6.3 
1979/1983 136.4 61.0 
* Labour budget. 
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did not levy the kind of rates which produced large annual balances. As a 
result they did not build up the financial reserves which those other local 
authorities have been able to use during the early 1980s to help balance 
their budgets and avoid Government grant penalties. This again 
increased Labour's budget problems. 
The impact upon the city's spending can be seen in table 3. Taking 
1973/74 as a base year and controlling for inflation, it compares the 
growth in spending by Liverpool with that which the Government was 
willing to pay for, as well as with spending by other local authorities. 
Because of the Liberal's parsimony, Liverpool spent not merely less than 
other local authorities, but even less than Government guidelines 
indicated it should be spending. This became crucial to the argument 
about the city's finances, when the Government originally selected 
1978/79 as a base for its expenditure target. To meet those Government 
targets, Liverpool has been obliged every year to cut back its expenditure 
from that already low level. If Liverpool's spending had gone up through 
the 1970s at the same rate as other local authorities or even according to 
Government guidelines, the city's target would have been much higher 
in 1984/85. And its difficulties in meeting the target and -balancing the 
budget would have been far smaller. 
However, the unfairness was worse than appeared. Despite the fact 
that its expenditure fell during the 1970s, in the first years of the grant 
system Liverpool cooperated with Government policy and made further 
Table 3: Net Expenditure on Local Services 
1973/74 = 100 
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 
Liverpool distriCt 104.1 106.9 104.2 101.5 101.3 100.7 
council 
Government guidelines for: 
district authorities 101.8 109.3 112.8 115.3 115.9 118.9 
all authorities 101.5 113.1 115.5 116.2 115.5 118.0 
All local authorities 116.7 117.9 119.3 120.7 121.4 122.8 
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reductions. Other local authorities refused. They set out instead to break 
the new target system with a deliberate policy of high rather than low 
spending. The problems this caused eventually forced the Government 
to revise the system in 1982. This time it made local expenditure in 
1981/82 the basis for future targets. This again penalised Liverpool, who 
had cooperated with the Government, because it was given another low 
target. By contrast, those authorities who had refused to cooperate, and 
had 'overspent' their original target, were set correspondingly higher 
targets. 
As a result, in 1984/85 the total target figure in real terms for all 
English authorities was only 6 per cent lower than their expenditure in 
1980/81. Liverpool's target was 11 per cent lower. Liverpool's officials 
calculated that between 1978/79 and 1983/84 the city had lost between 
£m26 and £m34 in Government grant as a direct result of penalties being 
imposed for spending over its target. This was the £m30 that the Labour 
council claimed the Government had 'stolen' from Liverpool and was 
demanding back. Officials argued that if the Government would take 
into account the city's financial behaviour throughout the whole rather 
than just half the decade, and adjust the target system to a 1974/75 base, 
Liverpool's financial problems would be solved immediately. 
City officials argued that if the target system was fair, Liverpool 
would be treated no worse than any other city. But this was not the case. 
They illustrated this point by making a comparison with Manchester- a 
very similar city to Liverpool. In 1974/75, the first year of the new local 
councils, Manchester's expenditure was £m81 in comparison with 
Liverpool's £m79. Because of the Liberals' financial restraint in 1978/79 
Liverpool was spending only £m125. Under a Labour council Manches-
ter's spending had gone up to £m147. Since the cities' targets were 
originally tied to expenditure in that year, Liverpool had been given a 
target for 1984/85 of £m216, but Manchester's target was set at £m245. 
This was despite the fact that Manchester's assessment of need made by 
the Government was actually £m4lower than Liverpool's. City officials 
argued that Liverpool's target should have moved in the same way as 
Manchester's to £m245 in 1984/85. That would reduce what the Labour 
council would need to raise from the rates by almost £m60. They also 
argued that if the comparison was made with not just one, but with all 
metropolitan district councils, based upon the average increases in 
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expenditure since 1974/75, Liverpool should be given a target of £m243. 
Again, that target would wipe out its budget problems at a stroke. 
For all these reasons, the Liverpool professionals believed that the 
Government's grant regime was asking the city to do more financially 
than was sensible. The target was already a very crude device to cut local 
spending. Its effect upon the city was even cruder. It was difficult for 
officials to persuade local Labour politicians to behave reasonably when 
the Government's own system seemed so unreasonable. They had a 
point. The anomalies of the target system reinforced the Labour 
politicians' worries and resentment of the city's economic decline. Tc 
them it made a bad situation worse and seemed politically provocative. It 
encouraged their belief in the moral correctness of their stand against the 
Government. In Tony Byrne's words, the target system was 'wicked and 
evil.' 
Measuring social need in a declining city 
The second part of the officials' case concerned what they called 'the 
flaws and inequities' of the grant system to which they had 'repeatedly 
drawn the Government's attention at length and in detail' and to 'the 
serious cumulative effect which this had had upon the finances of the 
council.' Their claim was that Liverpool had again suffered unfairly 
because since the grant system had been introduced in 1981/82, 
Liverpool's assessment of need had gone up by only 8.5 per cent. The 
average increase for all metropolitan districts had been 14 per cent, and 
for all local authorities it had been 17 per cent. In 1984/85 Liverpool's 
grant was £m 198 as opposed to £m 196 for 1983/84, a cash increase of less 
than 1 per cent and a reduction in real terms closer to 10 per cent. The 
average grant for all other local authorities in 1984/85 had declined by 
only 6 per cent in real terms. This loss of grant in Reddington's view 
meant the indicators used to determine need, and the importance it 
attached to them, were inadequate. It also meant that other measures of 
social need, which would benefit Liverpool more, were excluded. 
The city's main objection to the way need was assessed was the 
assumption that, since the city's population had fallen dramatically, its 
need to spend, and therefore its grant from the Government, should fall 
more or less at the same rate. Liverpool's officials insisted that its need to 
spend money did not necessarily drop at the same rate as the population 
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did. Partly this was because the remaining population was more socially 
needy and more expensive to provide for. Also historic service 
commitments for a larger population could not automatically be reduced 
as the population fell. A decline in population imposed costs which could 
not always be avoided in the short term. Grant calculations based on the 
size of the city's population at a single point in time seriously 
underestimated Liverpool's real need to spend. 
The city argued that, for the same reason, the Government's use of 
Liverpool's relatively high expenditure per head of population in 
comparison with other local authorities as an indicator of its inefficiency, 
was equally unfair. Liverpool did spend more on some of its services. 
There were many reasons why this was so. Inefficiency might be only 
part of the reason. There was also the larger argument about the rate at 
which public sector organisations can adjust to change and cut back 
historic spending commitments. Liverpool's officers believed that the 
Government's estimates of how quickly local expenditure could be 
reduced when the city's population had been falling so rapidly, were 
wildly over-optimistic. Whoever was right in this technical argument, 
the result was that Liverpool got less grant than its officials felt was fair. 
Liverpool's primary case was that, whatever safeguards were built in 
to the grant system, it broadly assumed that a drop in the city's 
population led to an increase in the resources available for those who 
remained and a drop in the authority's total costs. This is because the 
grant system, although very complex, rests on a very simple assump-
tion. In order to get some indication of the prosperity or needs of an 
authority, the total rateable value of all properties in an authority is 
divided by its population to give a rateable value per head. In 1984 the 
Government declared a norm for this of £166.70. If an authority's actual 
figure is lower than this, it is considered 'poor', and if it is greater it is 
considered 'advantaged'. All the grant calculations are geared to bringing 
an authority's grant towards that standard figure. The advantaged areas 
receive less, and the poor areas receive more. That seems fair. 
But there is a catch in this arrangement for declining cities like 
Liverpool. The rateable valuation of all properties was last carried out 
nationally in 1973. Since then the levels of economic activity and the 
general wealth in Liverpool have fallen dramatically. However, assessed 
rateable values have not, and remain at the 1973 levels. Using that 
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measure, Liverpool seems richer than it is. Other cities which have 
prospered since 1973, seem poorer than they are for grant calculation 
purposes, because their rateable values have not been increased to take 
that new prosperity into account. That unfairness is aggravated by the 
fact that the Government 'norm' is calculated by dividing this outdated, 
inaccurate 1973 rateable value, by an up-to-date, accurate 1984 popula-
tion figure. In Liverpool's case this is 60,000 smaller than in 1973. As a 
result, Liverpool appears to be far more 'advantaged' than it really is and 
receives less grant than is fair. In the same way, flourishing places with 
rising populations, but with artificially lower rateable values, get more 
grant than is fair. Since Liverpool has suffered the greatest economic 
decline and the highest loss of population of any big city in the country, 
the discrimination against it by the grant calculations is even worse than 
against other cities with similar but less severe problems. 
Liverpool also argued that with a large and rapid drop in population 
the unit costs of providing local services did not decline; they went up. 
The city could not reduce revenue expenditure, or the historic costs of 
capital expenditure, at the same rapid rate as the population declined. In 
the short term, the same number of staff had to be paid, the same number 
of schools, libraries, old people's homes and public buildings had to be 
heated and maintained. The same miles of roads had to be swept. Often 
the same number of bins emptied- there were fewer people but often the 
same number of households. The same substantial interest charges had to 
be paid upon the city's long term capital debts, which had been originally 
used to build a city for a much larger population. Even in the long term, 
debts did not go away just because the people had. 
As Michael Reddington often pointed out, the problems of financing 
a city whose population had dropped rapidly from a much higher level 
down to half a million were quite different from those of running a city 
with a relatively stable, or slowly growing, half a million population. In 
the longer term, the city could be expected to reduce staff and buildings. 
But things like school closures could be controversial, protracted and 
costly. Their practicality depended upon complicated issues - the age 
composition of the staff, the rate of population decline in different parts 
of the city, or school catchment areas, over which the authority had no 
control. There might be fewer children in every school. But that did not 
mean that one could close all classes for 9 year olds and make large 
savmgs. 
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The treasurer made this point with the example of education,· by far 
the largest item oflocal expenditure. Between the financial years 1981/82 
and 1982/83 the city's assessment of need was reduced by £m4.5, because 
the population in the city had fallen. Of that, £m3.25 was accounted for 
by education alone. In other words, the Government assumed that 
because it had to teach fewer children, Liverpool needed to spend less on 
education and could reduce its expenditure by £m3.25 in one year. 
However, the historic evidence contradicted this. Education costs had 
never contracted in that way in Liverpool. 
For example, in 1958 the cost of educating a pupil in the Liverpool 
schools was 2 per cent below the national average. By 1982 it was 10 per 
cent above the average. However, the reasons were complicated. By 
1982/83 the city's school population had fallen by 35 per cent - the 
overall national drop had been only 18 per cent. During this period the 
city had reduced its 'variable' costs, mainly staff salaries, more or less at 
the same rate as its population fell, by 31 per cent. It had only been able 
to reduce its 'fixed costs' - debt charges, maintenance costs, rents and 
rates- by about 12 per cent. The result was that in 1982/83, Liverpool's 
'variable' costs were only 2.5 per cent above the national average. But the 
'fixed' element was 32 per cent greater than the national average. In other 
words, despite making reductions where it could, in staffing, the 
difficulty of reducing 'fixed' costs had forced up the price of educating a 
child in Liverpool. The same difficulties would limit the rate of future 
reductions. In that light, the Government's grant cut of £m3.25 in 
1982/83 was harsh. 
Part of this problem was that the peculiarities of Liverpool's politics 
had prevented any administration getting a majority for any scheme to 
reorganise secondary education during the 1970s. This meant that in the 
1980s the city provided too many school places and the service was far 
more expensive than it ought to be. As the Government rightly pointed 
out, that was Liverpool's own problem and it knew what it had to do to 
get its costs down. In fact, by 1985 the Labour administration had done 
this. However, the Government itself had actually contributed to the 
city's problem here. Since 1978, Liverpool had presented proposals to the 
Government for reorganising secondary schools on three separate 
occasions. Each time the Secretary of State had refused the city 
permission to implement them fully. Whatever the educational merits of 
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those decisions, in this way the Government had contributed to 
Liverpool's failure to cut spending. Now it was penalising them for it. 
Also the Government argued that since during the 1970s local 
authorities had levied high rates in order to build up cash reserves on 
which they now earned interest, it was legitimate to reduce the total 
grant by a comparable figure. The Government simply assumed without 
checking that all authorities had such balances and reduced all their grants 
accordingly. However, as we have seen, Liverpool had behaved in a 
conservative, financially responsible way in the past, and had not 
accumulated substantial balances. This meant in the first place that, 
unlike other authorities, it did not have these reserves to spend to cushion 
itself from the impact of grant cuts in the 1980s. But to add insult to 
injury, its grant was still actually reduced as if it did have them. 
Local officials were not only worried by the inadequacies of existing 
measures of need. They were equally concerned about the city's 
particular needs that were not taken into account but which, if they were 
included, would bring Liverpool more grant money. For example, no 
allowance was made in the grant for the heavy costs incurred in running 
a major port health authority, in providing a regional library service or 
cleaning a major teaching hospital. Also when calculating the city's 
education grant, the Government did not count the number of places 
actually provided in nursery schools, special schools or further educa-
tion. Instead, it simply inferred provision from the local population- the 
number of children under five, the school population or the adult 
population. Liverpool argued that greater social need in the city - the 
larger numbers of children at risk or higher rates of unemployment -
meant it provided these services at a much higher rate than the n~tional 
average. If the actual provision was counted, the authority would receive 
more grant for providing more places. The same applied in the field of 
mental illness and mental and physical handicap, where provision in 
inner city areas was liable to be higher than the national average, and 
actual measures of provision would bring the city more money. 
More generally, officials argued that one of the crucial features of the 
city's decline was very high rates of unemployment, which imposed 
greatly increased demands upon its social services, adult and further 
education, and library and recreational services. The city simply had to 
provide more of these for a community without work. No specific 
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allowance was made for this factor in the grant. Most important, the 
grant system made no particular allowance for those cities which because 
of their unique concentration of social, environmental and economic 
deprivation, the Government had identified as needing special treatment 
via the urban programme. In particular, the Government's recent 
emphasis in the urban programme on economic decline and regeneration 
made the absence of a sufficient unemployment or low-income factor in 
the block grant calculation even more unintelligible. Liverpool argued 
powerfully that if direct measures of economic deprivation were given 
the weight they deserved, the city would get much more grant money 
from the Government. 
Overall, officials calculated that since the Conservatives had taken 
office in 1979, Liverpool had lost grant in four different ways. Liverpool 
had had to pay heavy penalties for spending over its target. It had also 
suffered because the way the grant was distributed between different 
kinds oflocal authorities had moved money away from the cities. On top 
of that, the Government had failed to increase its grant in line with the 
level of inflation. And it had also reduced the overall percentage of local 
spending it would fund. Local officials calculated the combined effect of 
all these upon the city was that it had lost £m116 in 1983 figures. 
Of course, these technical disputes constantly exercise all those 
involved in giving and getting grants. They are part of the common 
currency of that debate. There is no single formula which could meet the 
diverse interests within and between central and local government. But 
many of the city's arguments were good ones. They also argued that 
while such disagreements of definition were inevitable and perhaps 
legitimate when an authority's grant was being decided, it was quite a 
different matter when the results were also used to determine its 
expenditure targets. The Government has always characterised Liver-
pool as an overspender in relation to its assessed need. Its targets and 
penalties have been harsher as a result. These differences in definition 
became much more important politically when they contributed to the 
city's financial problems and the larger political conflict about them. The 
city's case was persuasive on two counts. The assumptions of the grant 
system were unsympathetic to the problems of both population loss and 
of economic decline. The Government's policy failed to help the city as 
much as might be expected in these two respects - they are two key 
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dimensions of urban decline. For Liverpool's politicians, they were also 
two of the most visible indicators of the city's decline. Like their 
objections to the target system, this fact only reinforced Labour 
politicians' refusal to collaborate in a policy which seemed to worsen an 
already difficult situation. 
The civil servants' reply 
Civil servants were wholly unsympathetic to Liverpool officials' 
arguments. They were particularly sceptical of the claim that it had 'lost' 
£m116 in grant since 1979/80. This was based, in their view, on the quite 
unjustifiable assumption that the Government's financial support for the 
city should be fixed for all time at the 1979/80 level, whereas everyone 
knew that Government policy had changed since then, and the 
reductions in grant support had been made 'as a deliberate act to 
strengthen local accountability.' Liverpool was not treated differently 
from any other authority when its assessment of need was calculated. In 
fact its per capita need assessment was the fourth highest of any 
metropolitan district. 
Nor would the civil servants accept that the fall in the city's share of 
the national grant total was evidence of inequity in the system. It was 
Government policy to reduce local government spending and central 
government's contribution to it. The size of the national cake had fallen 
and Liverpool's slice with it. An individual authority's share of grant 
could fall for a variety of reasons - because of changes in its resources, 
changes in its expenditure level or in its level of need. It was true that 
Liverpool's assessment and grant had fallen. This was not the result of 
any discrimination - merely the application of the general rules for 
allocating Government grant. Since 1981/82 Liverpool's need assessment 
had fallen by 1 per cent. This had been caused by several things: there had 
been an above average reduction in the number of secondary school 
pupils; the 1981 Census had provided more accurate information about 
its smaller population; the doubling of the weight given to the ethnic 
minority population in measuring additional needs had benefited other 
authorities more than Liverpool; and housing need had fallen because of a 
drop in interest rates and increases in rents which had reduced the 
subsidy paid from general rates. 
Despite this fall, civil servants pointed out that Liverpool's assess-
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ment was still 10 per cent higher than the average of all metropolitan 
districts and only three cities in the country had a higher one. They 
argued that the question of measures of need was always under review by 
the grant working group of central and local government officials, and 
the city could take its arguments there if it wanted to change the rules. 
However, as they also admitted, the politics of grant allocation were 
fierce, because 'any improvements in the city's position would be 
balanced by losses to other authorities.' In other words, with the total 
grant limited and declining, the Government could always play off one 
set oflocal interests against another, which would make Liverpool's case 
difficult to win. 
Civil servants argued essentially that the arrangements were fixed and 
Liverpool would have to live within the rules as everyone else did. The 
city's officials' argument was that the rules were discriminatory, even if 
they had to be accepted. Liverpool's politicians' view was that the rules 
were there to be broken if they were discriminatory. At least two of the 
Government's defences of Liverpool's grant were worth an argument. It 
was quite clearly ignoring the city's major claim that its expenditure did 
not decline as rapidly as its population fell. In particular, the city's 
inability to cut the costs of education in response to falling school rolls 
was obviously being particularly heavily penalised by grant reduction in 
the 1980s, despite the good case it had made about educational 
expenditure. 
The Government also admitted that the way in which ethnic 
minorities are counted for grant purposes penalised Liverpool. The city 
has a substantial black population, estimated between 20,000 and 40,000, 
which suffers well documented, racial disadvantage. Since the majority 
are not recent immigrants, but long-standing residents, they are not 
counted in Government measures of ethnic deprivation. Liverpool had 
argued for a long time that this anomaly prevented the city taking 
advantage of the most important source of Government money for 
dealing with racial disadvantage, Section II of the 1966 Local Govern-
ment Act, as well as giving it less block grant than it should have. It 
seemed unreasonable at best that only one year after the Toxteth riots, 
this was further aggravated by changes in the grant which gave other 
cities more money for ethnic minorities. 
The Department's reply to the city's argument about targets and 
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penalties was even less sympathetic. It merely restated the obvious point 
that the general rules had been applied to the city as to everywhere else 
and that Liverpool had lost £m 14 in the two years 1982-84. The 
Government imposed lower targets on those authorities who had spent 
above their assessment of need, and their targets in previous years, 
compared with those who had not. Liverpool knew this but had still 
spent above both its assessment and target figures and had therefore been 
penalised. The responsibility, they argued, was 'entirely in the hands of 
the local authority.' This reply simply ignored the two key elements in 
the city's claim. The first was that the targets were discriminatory 
because of the choice of low base years which inevitably had made it 
difficult for Liverpool to make the necessary reductions and avoid 
penalties in successive years. The second was that the calculations of need 
were insensitive to Liverpool's problems and, while they might be used 
simply to allocate money, they should not be used in determining targets 
and therefore penalties. 
Equally, officials simply rejected Liverpool's comparison of its target 
with Manchester's. They just would not accept that 'a single comparison 
with a particular authority over a particular period of time provides a 
valid basis for arguing that Liverpool's target is unfair or unreasonable.' 
But they offered no justification for their view, even though it could be 
argued that the similarities between the two cities made the comparison a 
sensible, if not a precise, test of the fairness or reasonableness of the 
target system. Also, the city had made comparisons of its targets with 
not one, but all metropolitan districts, which had strengthened its case. 
The Government again simply ignored this. 
In defence of Liverpool's 1984/85 target, civil servants argued that 35 
authorities had received larger cuts than Liverpool in their targets that 
year compared with the previous year's figure. This was disingenuous. 
The Government knew that Liverpool's 1983/84 target had been much 
lower than its actual expenditure. The Liberal administration that year 
had agreed to meet the target, without specifying how the necessary 
large reductions in expenditure would be made. The target had not been 
met in 1983/84. Labour had spent above it, incurred penalties and run up 
a deficit which made it even more difficult to stay within the new target. 
In other words, it was the cumulative impact of target reductions, not 
those in a single year which was important. The civil servants must have 
appreciated that. 
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Liverpool's claims about the target system were well founded, even 
though the civil servants could not afford to admit it. The best they could 
argue was that the system had to begin at some year, and the 
Government had chosen the year it had taken office. There were bound 
to be anomalies. This was not a very persuasive case. The fact that the 
Government abandoned the whole target system in 1985 only streng-
thened the Liverpool professionals' claims about the arbitrariness of the 
system. While it does not necessarily justify the Labour council's 
behaviour, it does explain why they were so reluctant to play the game 
when they thought the rules were so unfair. Labour may have been 
looking for an argument, but the target system provided them with a 
pe~fect excuse. 
Balancing the books - Liverpool's requests 
Apart from rehearsing the opposing views of the origins of Liverpool's 
problems, the discussions also looked at proposals for resolving the 
immediate financial crisis. They became the basis for a settlement in 
1984. The city was mainly looking for extra money. The Government 
was mainly looking for economies through increased efficiency and 
creative accountancy. Unlike their politicians, Liverpool's officials 
accepted that their grant and target had been set by Parliament for 
1984/85 and could not be changed for that year. They were hoping for 
some changes on those issues in the 1985/86 settlement. For 1984/85 they 
were trying to get Government help from outside the main grant system 
in four areas: exemptions from grant penalties for certain kinds of city 
spending, extra aid from the urban programme, increased money for 
housing and relief from housing debt charges. 
The city's first request concerned the special power the Minister had 
to exclude or 'disregard' any local authority's spending over target when 
he calculated its grant penalties. In 1984/85 Patrick Jenkin was planning 
to 'disregard' only four kinds of spending by local authorities: increases 
in urban programme expenditure, expenditure on schemes jointly 
financed with health authorities, expenditure on civil defence and the 
costs to local authorities of policing the miners' strike. City officials 
wanted the Minister to extend this exclusion to a range of Liverpool's 
spending. They argued that the Government's target figure for the city in 
1984/85 was based on Liverpool's planned budget expenditure in 
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1981/82. However, in keeping with Liberal administration's strategy at 
the time, those figures had both underestimated the real costs of paying 
for the city's services and exaggerated its likely income. As a result, 
expenditure that year, as in succeeding years, had been far greater than 
the planned figure. Liverpool's officials argued that the city's actual, not 
its intended, expenditure was a more reasonable base for the Govern-
ment to set the city's target and its grant penalties. 
The difference between the planned and final expenditure in the three 
years since 1981/82 added up to £m35 above the target figures. This had 
lost the city £m54 in grant because of the penalties imposed for 
overspending. Officials argued that this loss reflected the insensitivity of 
the national target system to Liverpool's particular local problems. They 
asked the Minister to 'disregard' retrospectively that £m35, as well as 
£m18 for 1984/5. Once penalties were taken into account, this would 
reduce the burden on the city's rates that year by £m38. The civil 
servants argued such exemptions could not be given to Liverpool alone 
but would have to apply to all local authorities. The disregards the 
Minister had decided to make nationally only added up to £m17 in total, 
whereas the cost of Liverpool's proposals would be over £m100. The 
suggestions were rejected on cost grounds. Although civil servants 
might also have argued this was a particular form of special pleading 
from Liverpool to compensate for the Liberals' financial inadequacies 
over the years. 
City officials also wanted more money for housing, arguing that the 
Government's restrictions on its housing investment programme in 
recent years had dramatically reduced Liverpool's ability to build new 
houses. Because of the extra pressure upon its limited housing resources, 
the Labour council had decided that in future it would not use its housing 
programme to pay for repairs to existing property, because this directly 
reduced the amount of money it had to build new houses. Instead of 
'capitalising' £m5.6 worth of repairs in 1983/84 in this way and 
borrowing the money long term, as the previous Liberal budget had 
planned, the Labour party was planning to pay for it, as well as a further 
£m8 in 1984/85, from its revenue budget. This would give the city an 
extra £m13.6 for building new houses in 1984/85. 
Equally it would add the same amount to its revenue budget that 
year. That would cause a huge deficit, if Labour refused to increase the 
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rates to pay for this new expenditure. City officials wanted the 
Government to increase its housing allowance for the two years by 
£m13.6 to avoid that deficit. Again the civil servants refused to help. 
They argued that there was nothing left from other councils' under-
spending in 1983/84. And everything for 1984/85 had already been 
allocated. Instead they argued that the council should speed up its sale of 
council houses so that it could use the proceeds to finance new house 
building. This proved especially ironic later in the year when the 
argument about housing resources was reopened and the Government 
cut what the city could spend that way. The report pointed out that the 
Minister planned to visit the city at some point to examine its housing 
problems and resource needs for 1985/86. Although it was not known at 
the time, this would help change the course of the confrontation. The 
promise of money for housing became a central element in the budget 
saga the whole of next year. Although the Government refused these 
first two major request for aid for 1984/85, Liverpool's two other 
requests for urban programme money and relief from some housing debt 
interest charges received a rather more favourable response, and were 
crucial to the final settlement, as we shall see. 
Government's search for economies 
The joint talks also gave Government officials a chance to go through the 
city's books in great detail and to suggest a number of ways in which 
Labour's planned 1984/5 deficit budget could be reduced. They 
recommended that Labour should abandon all its new spending 
proposals. This would immediately cut the total by £m10.25. The city 
could also make technical changes in the way it repaid debt charges by 
switching from equal annual instalments to a sinking fund method, 
which could save between £m0.8 and £m3.6. Most important, the city 
could save £m13.6 from its revenue budget by 'capitalising' housing 
repairs in 1983/84 and 1984/85, as the Liberal administration had 
planned. Civil servants also argued that, although the city planned to use 
£m7.2 from its reserves, they had found a further £m7.3 in various 
special funds whcih the city could use in 1984/85. These changes would 
reduce the size of the budget problem enormously. But even if all those 
measures were taken to cut expenditure and reduce grant loss, the civil 
servants had to admit that Liverpool would still need a rate increase of 
between 59 per cent and 84 per cent. 
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Government officials also suggested Liverpool should raise its rents 
in keeping with Government guidelines. Labour was refusing to do this 
because the city's rents were higher than any city outside London as a 
result of previous Liberal policies. But the city lost grant because of this 
decision not to increase. Officials also told the city to sell off corporate 
assets, which would reduce its debt charges, even though it would lead 
to a future loss of rent. Liverpool should freeze employment and should 
not fill staff vacancies, a Liberal practice which Labour had abandoned. It 
should implement an early retirement policy and introduce a voluntary 
redundancy policy, even though there would be initial costs because of 
redundancy payments. Civil servants calculated these measures could 
save the authority between £m4-7 a year. If that budget figure was 
reached, the increase in the city's rate could be held to between 37 per 
cent and 71 per cent. 
As well as their reactions to the city's immediate crisis, the 'joint 
report' also revealed the civil servants general view of Liverpool as the 
worst kind of local authority - inefficient, overstaffed and expensive. 
Even a stripped down budget would still be 16--20 per cent higher than 
their assessment of what the city needed to spend. And as they were at 
constant pains to point out, Liverpool's costs for education, personal 
social services, recreation, environmental health and refuse collection 
were higher than average metropolitan district costs, because of the city's 
'inefficiency.' In their view, the budget problem was partly the result of a 
political gesture but partly a result of long-term managerial weaknesses 
which made the city's services far more expensive than they should be. 
Civil servants suggested a number of areas for immediate economies: 
reorganising the refuse collection, rationalising the education service in 
keeping with its plans for secondary school reorganisation and reducing 
the size of the direct labour organisation. 
City officials were not happy with the civil servants' suggestions. 
One of their primary objections was that Government comparisons of 
local authority expenditure on a per capita basis were quite misleading 
because they ignored the effects of a declining population. Since fixed 
costs could not always be reduced quickly, the Government could not 
argue that high spending proved that Liverpool was simply 'inefficient' 
in that blanket fashion. As the city officials pointed out, and as the civil 
servants had to accept, the Government's proposals all had longer-term 
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costs for the city. Changing the method of repaying debt charges would 
lead to higher interest charges in the future. 'Capitalising' housing repairs 
meant that fewer resources would be available to finance the house 
building programme. It also meant that in seven years the extra interest 
charges could add up to the original cost of repairs, and would then incur 
even greater Government penalties for higher city spending. The final 
costs to the ratepayer in real terms would be very much greater. Finally, 
if all its financial reserves were used in one year 1984/85, it would 
obviously mean they would not be available in future years. The 
treasurer estimated that if the city used them in 1984/85, it could need a 
45 per cent rate increase in 1985/86 just to make up for them. In other 
words, the Government proposals might ease the city's difficulties in 
1984/85. But only at the expense of storing up financial problems for the 
future. 
Which side won? 
The review dramatically revealed the two sides' radically different 
perceptions of the city's financial problems. City officials were con-
cerned with the harsh effects of the Government grant system which was 
insensitive to the city's problems. The civil servants focused on the 
internal managerial failings of the authority and the range of options that 
were open to the Labour council, but which it had rejected on political 
grounds. To some extent, these differences stemmed from different time 
horizons - city officials were anxious to stress long-term impacts, civil 
servants to emphasise short-term solutions. Publicly and privately, both 
believed they had won the argument. 
The Government might have won the argument about whether 
Liverpool faced an unavoidable budget crisis, which could not be 
resolved without draconian policies or consequences in 1984. There were 
things the city could do. But Liverpool surely won the larger argument 
that it was facing major financial problems which were aggravating its 
even larger economic and social problems and that Government policies, 
especially the target system, were making that bad situation worse. The 
city's financial options were gradually being eliminated year by year. 
And from Labour's point of view, there was a clear political rationale for 
dramatising the position and resisting the Government from the outset, 
rather than collaborating in the sacrifices year after year. And as we have 
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seen, public opinion in Liverpool certainly saw the issue in those terms. 
The 'joint report' in many ways confirmed this. Even when rejecting 
the city's larger complaints about the grant system, and recommending 
measures which they knew would impose longer-term costs, the civil 
servants could not produce a balanced budget for 1984/85 which did not 
mean further sacrifices for the city or substantial rate rises. The 
newspaper headline 'Whitehall Whiz Kids stumped' was quite accurate. 
The 'joint report' showed both sides had good points to make. But 
Liverpool had more of them than the Government. There are no easy 
solutions for dealing with the problems of a city in rapid decline like 
Liverpool. However, this review suggested that the Government's grant 
system was worsening, not helping, them. And it encouraged the 
Labour council in its resistance, which now believed it had technical as 
well as moral right on its side. As Tony Byrne claimed 'it has been 
proved time and time again this year that our interpretation of the facts 
and figures has been correct. Any analysis will prove us to be absolutely 
right.' 
The discussions also had an important political effect. The Labour 
leadership trapped the Government into becoming much more deeply 
embroiled in the city's problems and politics than it wished to be, or was 
good for it. As long as the Government could remain aloof from the local 
implications of its grant system the contradictions within it remained 
hidden. But once it became directly involved in the details of Liverpool's 
financial affairs, the Government was bound to get into trouble. It could 
not deny the problems were real, and it could find no easy solutions to 
them. The distance which typically separates central and local govern-
ment has genuine political benefits for the centre. And these were lost by 
the Government. Even Labour's opponents could see how they had 
revealed the vulnerability of the Government on these issues. 
Despite all these issues, the negotiations became the basis of 
Liverpool's 1984 budget settlement. The city's requests for extra money, 
and the civil servants' suggestions for cuts in the deficit budget and long-
term economies, all formed. part of the deal. After the 'joint report' was 
produced in early June, a package was drawn up by the Ministers who 
had been monitoring the negotiations. They were formalised in a letter in 
late June from Patrick Jenkin to John Hamilton and allowed the Labour 
council to make a quite different legal budget in early July. If it had been 
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hard for the Government to get Liverpool to agree to compromise, the 
presentation of the final deal proved even more difficult. It soured 
political relations between the two sides from then on. In particular, it 
focused the Labour council, especially its Militant deputy leader, Derek 
Hatton, in Margaret Thatcher's sights. From that point they were never 
far off her long term agenda. 
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CONCESSIONS AND CONTROVERSY 
- The July 1984 Settlement 
The months of tension and negotiations were finally ended in July 
1984 when the Labour group at last made a budget and set a rate, four 
months into the financial year. Instead of the threatened 170 per cent, the 
rate rise was 17 per cent. Despite all the talk oflegal action by the district 
auditor, the courts or the Attorney General, and of municipal bank-
ruptcy, nothing had happened to Liverpool. No one had moved against 
them. The financial institutions continued to lend. The Public Works 
Loan Board continued to lend. The Government paid the rate support 
grant. Council tenants paid their rent. Many ratepayers paid their rates 
even though none had been levied. The budget was finally set amidst a 
welter of claims and counter-claims which seemed designed to confuse 
the outside world, as both sides claimed a political and financial victory. 
The deal on which Liverpool's legal budget was based was spelt out 
in a confidential letter from Patrick Jenkin to John Hamilton written on 
29 June. The two sides met in London on 9 July to agree the details and 
finalise the agreement. At the end of the meeting, the Government's 
understanding was that the details would be kept secret until the Labour 
group presented its revised legal budget to the council on 11 July. It 
would then be quite clear what both sides had had to give up to get a 
legal budget. But in the Government's eyes Liverpool reneged on that 
arrangement both by the timing of its announcement and the way it 
presented the deal publicly, as it set out to extract the maximum political 
capital from it. 
Immediately after the meeting on 9 July, the Liverpool delegation 
returned home to present the package in the evening to the district 
Labour party for its endorsement. Having got that, the leaders emerged 
from the meeting with clenched fists raised to face the television cameras 
and the crowds chanting the miners' hymn 'Here we go'. And they 
began to publicise the Government's offer in the most favourable light to 
5 
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themselves. Even at the time, many in the party doubted the wisdom of 
the leaders' crowing over the Government in this way. But they pressed 
on. It led one civil servant at the time to exclaim 'I'd like to see the lot of 
them locked up in gaol.' 
The claims and counter claims 
Party leader John Hamilton argued that the Government's concessions 
would be worth £m50 to Liverpool. Finance chairman Tony Byrne, put 
it even higher, arguing that the immediate concessions, combined with 
budget adjustments which would be made in view of Government 
promises of future aid, could make the deal worth £m60 to £m90. 
Replying to Patrick Jenkin's protestations that no specific promises had 
been made about future years, he said 'What do you expect a very 
battered Tory minister to be saying?' But that issue was to return with a 
vengeance later in the year. The powerful Militant leader of the district 
Labour party, Tony Mulhearn, called it 'a major U-turn by this 
Government' which emphasised the lessons for Labour's national 
leadership who had sat on the fence during the crisis. Most provoca-
tively, Derek Hatton argued that Margaret Thatcher and Patrick Jenkin 
had 'bottled out' of a confrontation with Liverpool, and it was only a 
matter of time before Jenkin resigned or Thatcher sacked him. 'There is 
no way' he claimed, 'even Thatcher can take on the might of the working 
class in this city. And this is just the start. Next year we will see not only 
the defeat of rate-capping and the plans to cut the metropolitan councils, 
but we will start to see the kicking out of Thatcher herself.' That bold 
claim permanently altered the way the Conservatives would view and 
treat Liverpool in future. 
Other Labour councils did not miss the point either. Sheffield's 
leader, David Blunkett, promptly emphasised its relevance to the 
Government's rate-capping plans, arguing 'it could mean up to a dozen 
Liverpools next year and it is Ministers who will have to pay the price.' 
The Labour councillors, he argued, had 'shamed' Mr Jenkin into a 
substantial climbdown. Ted Knight, leader of Lambeth, added 'I think 
Jenkin is just flound!:!ring. The concessions he has made to Liverpool will 
strengthen the fight of other Labour authorities in the coming year.' 
Even the Liberals weighed in as David Alton, the sole Liverpool Liberal 
MP, argued that the Government had sent the message out to moderates 
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that it 'will give in to intimidation, blackmail, bludgeoning, and the 
threat of riots.' 
Mrs. Thatcher was infuriated by Labour's behaviour. In her view 
they had broken the agreement and grossly exaggerated the settlement. 
She was not to forgive them for the trouble it caused her, as she had to 
defend the deal in Parliament to friends and foes alike. One Conservative 
backbencher put the feeling most clearly 'More public attention has been 
devoted to that area in recent years than to anywhere else and the only 
result has been ever more whining and whinging from the left wing 
commissars there, and the rest of the country's ratepayers and taxpayers 
are fed up with it.' Patrick Jenkin also did his best to defend the limited 
nature of the deal, angrily attacking Hatton and Labour for trying to 
'dance on his political grave' and con the public into believing they had 
won a great victory. 'In fact,' he argued, 'they have had to eat their 
words. Their policy of confrontation and blackmail has failed.' 
Others were also trying to play down the deal. Sir Trevor Jones, 
Liverpool's Liberal leader, with a different eye on the local repercussions, 
insisted Jenkin had made no real concessions. 'There is no new money,' 
he argued. 'They are merely trying to continue the confidence trick, but 
in fact it has been a massive climbdown by the Labour party.' The 
national Labour leadership, for different reasons, was equally anxious to 
minimise the deal, as well as to emphasise their own contribution to the 
negotiated settlement. They stressed the negotiations had only flourished 
once they had intervened. They still praised the defections of the 'sensible 
six' rebel councillors 'without whose action there would never even have 
been the opportunity to have the negotiations.' And reacting to the city's 
claim of total victory, John Cunningham warned, 'It would be barmy to 
exaggerate what the Government has given because the people will be 
able to see what the figures are.' The national leadership was as unhappy 
with Liverpool's presentation of the settlement as it had been with its 
behaviour throughout the crisis. 
The two sides could hardly be further apart in their public claims. 
Whatever the facts and despite its protestations, the Government could 
only feel it had lost the propaganda battle. It had been trapped by the 
logic of its own grant system. To bend that system, it was bound to be 
seen as giving away either too much, or too little, too late. Everyone 
agreed the most important implication was for the coming year. It would 
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encourage other Labour authorities and return to haunt the leadership of 
both national parties. In fact the process was already under way. The 
Labour Party's conference on local government was held in Sheffield the 
weekend before the Liverpool settlement was announced. The delegates 
had an early opportunity to see the confidential details with their 
apparent testimony to the results of municipal pressure. And ·it 
galvanised them. The reception given to Liverpool was much more 
favourable than it had been at a similar conference six months earlier in 
Nottingham, when the majority of speakers had been sceptical of 
Liverpool's case and its tactics. The conference, supported by Eric Heffer 
andJohn Cunningham, finally agreed a strategy of non-compliance with 
the Government's rate-capping in 1985. 
The final resolution argued that Labour authorities had 'a legal 
obligation to provide services for the homeless, for elderly people and for 
children. They have a legal obligation to protect the public. If they 
comply with the Government they will be forced to break these 
obligations. In this context, non-compliance with the rates act is the only 
option to fulfil public responsibilities.' In this hardening of Labour's 
position, Liverpool had played an important part. Arguably, Liverpool's 
'victory' in 1984 misled the other Labour authorities in their campaign 
against the Government in 1985. The overselling of Liverpool's success 
led the rest to overplay their hand and finally undermined them in 1985. 
Liverpool had been after a political and a financial victory in 1984. If it 
got the first, the second was more problematic. 
Doing the deal: deficit budgets and legal budgets 
Although other Labour authorities were encouraged by Liverpool's 
'victory', who was telling the truth? Was there really enough in the deal 
to persuade other Labour councils to resist the Government in 1985 in a 
search for similar concessions? The scale of Labour's 'victory' and the 
Government's concessions can only be assessed by comparing Labour's 
original April 'deficit' budget with the legal one presented in July, along 
with the issues raised in the ~oint report' and Patrick Jenkin's letter to 
John Hamilton. The most important question is: how did the Labour 
council transform an apparently impossible financial position in April to 
an apparently manageable one in July? Had the Government bought 
them out of the dilemma? Indeed were the problems in any sense 
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resolved, or merely defined away in July? If so, what implications did 
this have for the next financial year? 
Labour's original 'deficit' budget for 1984/85 had been £m296. 7. But 
how did Labour reach that figure when it was actually running the city in 
1983/84 on the £m212 budget it had inherited from the Liberal party? 
Labour claimed that a large part of its problem stemmed from their 
predecessors' policies. In particular, it argued that the last Liberal budget 
which Labour had inherited had been financially unsound, because it 
underestimated the real costs of the city's services and its probable levels 
of expenditure. It would inevitably mean there would be a budget deficit 
at the end of the year, causing problems for 1984/85. In fact, when the 
Liberals were originally planning the budget for 1983/84 they arrived at a 
figure of £m234 which would have needed a rate rise of about 40 per 
cent. Eventually they settled on £m218. But the Government then set the 
city a target of £m212. To avoid large grant penalties, the Liberals 
reduced their planned expenditure to that figure. 
But they did this, not by reducing the services but primarily by 
creative accountancy. They planned to use the authority's £m7 reserves 
which had been built up over the years, rather than increasing the rates. 
They also simply reduced planned expenditure for 1983/84 by £m6 
without specifying where those 'unallocated cuts' would be made. They 
did not add to the cost of the 1983/83 budget the £m3 deficit that was 
actually being carried forward from 1982/83. Labour argued that this 
£m16 should have been included in the real cost of running the city in 
1983/84 and the Liberal rate increase should have been much higher. In 
their view, and in that of the local authority unions, the Liberals' was an 
illegal 'deficit' budget from the time it was made. Whether that was true, 
the Labour council inherited a very messy and difficult financial position 
from the Liberal administration. The financial juggling act which the 
Liberals and Conservatives carried out during the 1970s and early 1980s 
finally caught up with the city. The self-interested search for votes in that 
lost decade sowed a bitter harvest for the 1980s. 
But Labour did not try to implement the Liberal budget which it 
regarded as dishonest. Quite apart from this, the party claimed it had 
been elected in 1983 with a mandate to protect jobs and services, not to 
cut them. In the event, most of the Liberals' 'unspecified' savings of £m6 
were never made by Labour. In its first year of office, it spent £m4.2 
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more than the Liberals had planned. Given their failures over the years to 
achieve the rate of savings they promised, there must be considerable 
doubt whether the Liberals could have achieved the £m6 savings in one 
year, even if they had run the city and had been actively trying to make 
economies. It was too optimistic and bound to run into problems. In 
1983/84 Labour spent not £m212 but £m216. This became the base for 
the controversial 'deficit' budget which was primarily made by the 
party's finance spokesman Tony Byrne. 
Labour's 'deficit' budget for 1984/85 was constructed by adding new 
items onto the previous year's. As table 1 shows, the original Liberal 
budget for 1983/84 had been £m212.3. Labour added to that £m11.1 to 
cover for inflation during that year. It then added the £m4.2 deficit which 
it had spent beyond the Liberals' figure . The real cost of existing services 
in 1984/85 prices was calculated by Labour as £m227. 6, an expenditure of 
£m11 over target. It would cost that much just to stand still in 1984/85. 
And Labour planned to add an extra £m22 to that for new programmes. 
But a third of that extra was actually intended to get into the base 
budget enough money to cover real commitments the city actually had, 
but for which no allowance had ever been made in Liberal budgets. For 
example, since Labour had not made the Liberals' unallocated cuts in 
1983/84, it calculated that just over £m4 would have to be added to the 
1984/85 budget to pay for existing services. 
Also the Liberals throughout the 1970s, in their anxiety to minimise 
spending, had always assumed that local authority jobs would be lost by 
natural wastage and the freezing of vacancies. In fact, the assumed rate of 
loss had never been achieved and the city always had more employees on 
the payroll than the Liberal budget figures ever admitted existed. For 
1984/85 Labour estimated that there were 350 'extra' employees on the 
staff and that their salaries would cost in the region of £m3. Labour 
intended to recognise the staff existed and incorporate that figure in the 
new budget. In other words, this £m7 was not for new policy 
commitments by Labour, but their calculation of the price of getting the 
city's budget on a sound financial footing after a decade of the failings of 
their Liberal predecessors. 
But there were many new policies which the Labour party had 
chosen to put in the budget which swelled it enormously. In 1983 it had 
promised to create 1,000 new council jobs in its first year of office. 
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Labour had not, in fact, added that many to its regular payroll. But it had 
sponsored almost that number of people on Manpower Services 
Commission projects, and Labour promised that, as these lapsed after 
twelve months, it would employ the people on a permanent basis. That 
would cost £m3.4 in 1984/85. The policy was the Labour council's 
Table 1: Labour's Deficit Budget for 1984/85 £m 
Expenditure 
£m 
Total 296.7 
Base budget 269.1 
Real cost of 1983/84 budget 227.6 
of which: original agreed 212.3 
inflation 11.1 
overspend 4.2 
New growth 22.1 
Housing repairs 8.6 
Loss of grant 2.8 
Inflation 8.0 
Deficit 34.7 
Less use of reserves -7.1 
Income 
Total 296.7 
Grant 27.6 
Rate required 269.1 
9% rate levy 108.2 
Shortfall* 160.9 
* Equivalent to a rate increase of 170 per cent or 5,000 local authority employees' salaries. 
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response to the Liberals' shedding of council jobs in the 1970s and 1980s. 
But the costs to it were great. 
An even larger, controversial item in Labour's budget was the 
'decoration allowances' which they were planning to make to council 
house tenants. As we have seen, Labour constantly attacked the Liberals 
and Conservatives throughout the lost decade for starving public sector 
housing, and allowing the council rents to become the highest in the 
country outside London. In the 1983 election Labour had promised to cut 
rents by £2 a week and it devised a way to pay back council tenants some 
of their rent, which avoided the Government simply clawing it back 
through cuts in social security benefit to tenants. It had paid each tenant 
£16 as a 'decoration allowance' in compensation for their high rents. This 
had cost £m1 in 1983/84. The Labour council planned to do this again on 
a much larger scale in 1984/85 at a cost of £m8. 5. 
Patrick Jenkin used this as evidence that the council's financial 
problems were self-imposed. But it must also be seen in the political 
context in which for a decade the Liberals and Conservatives had 
consistently raised council house rents higher than central governments 
at the time thought necessary. In other words, they had subsidised the 
services and the rate payers at the expense of the rent payers. The Labour 
council was intending to redress the balance. But in the 1980s the price to 
the council in grant penalty for the extra £m8.5 involved was again very 
high. 
Labour's finance chief, Tony Byrne, also planned to add £m8.6 to the 
budget because he refused to pay for housing repairs from the city's 
capital programme, charging it instead to the rates. This would create 
tremendous problems in balancing the budget once Government 
penalties of almost £m16 were added. But once again it has to be seen in 
the context of the Liberal and Conservative policies of the 1970s of 
abandoning the council house building programme. To compensate for 
that period, Labour wanted to expand its house building programmes 
dramatically. But if it used the capital programme, rather than the rates, 
to pay for housing repairs, this would seriously restrict the size of its 
building programme. On top of that, £m2.8 was added to cover the 
expected loss of Government money for urban programme projects 
which had had three years Government support, and were ineligible for 
any more. Liverpool planned to keep those projects going and pay for 
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them from the rates. Finally £m8 was put into the budget to cover for 
inflation in the year 1984/85. Once these were added to the revised base 
budget, Labour planned to spend £m269.1 in 1984/85. 
That figure was then reduced because Labour planned to spend in 
1984/85 the £m 7 from its reserves that the Liberals had originally 
intended to use in 1983-84. The reason was simple. The penalty system 
became progressively tougher each year, so that greater grant savings 
could be made by using the reserves in 1984/85 rather than in 1983/84. 
This would reduce penalty in 1984/85, but it would retrospectively 
increase expenditure and penalty in 1983/84. The deficit being carried 
forward into 1984/85, therefore, would be much higher than the Liberals 
had intended. 
This reduced Labour's planned expenditure for 1984/85 to £m262. 
However, to that there had to be added the deficit from 1983/84 which 
Labour now calculated would be £m34, half of which was accounted for 
by penalties for overspending. Labour would have to cover the inherited 
£m34 deficit from the rates in 1984/85. Once added to the £m262 base 
budget, expenditure would reach £m296. 7, with a huge loss of grant and 
the need for swingeing rate rises. That was the bargaining figure that 
Liverpool used with the Government through the spring of 1984. It was 
partly a product of unavoidable inherited difficulties and partly a result of 
its deliberate policy choices - all presented in the bleakest terms. This 
was what Labour reconstructed in order to get a settlement in July 1984, 
in response to the extra aid from Patrick Jenkin. 
The Government's offer 
But how much did the Government give Liverpool? The two sides had a 
bitter row about this, as we have seen. In fact, the Government gave four 
pieces of aid and a promise of future help in the crucial area of housing. 
The aid was offered in Patrick Jenkin's letter written to John Hamilton 
on June 29 after the professionals' negotiations. Jenkin's letter made it 
quite clear that the Government was not going to make any major 
concessions to Liverpool in the grant, target or penalty system, or its 
housing allocation for 1984/85. These had all been fixed and approved by 
Parliament. The Government was not giving way to pressure on those. 
But Jenkin did admit that he had some 'marginal flexibility' in the special 
urban programme money which he would use to help Liverpool over its 
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short-term problems. First, the Government offered to allow up to 
£m3.1 of the city's urban programme money to be used to continue 
support for projects which otherwise Liverpool would have to support 
on the rates. Once reduced penalties for spending less over target had 
been taken into account, this would reduce the city's expenditure by 
£m7.5. Secondly, and 'in addition,' as Tony Byrne forever insisted, the 
Government added an extra £m2.5 to Liverpool's urban programme 
allowance of £m24. Again Jenkin admitted, once the penalties were 
included, this would reduce Liverpool's expenditure by a further £m7. 
The third piece of Government help was in housing finance. Along 
with many other urban authorities, Liverpool had a large stock of 
high-rise buildings built in the 1950s and 1960s which had become so 
unpopular with tenants that the only solution, in many cases, was to 
demolish them. But if this was done, the city continued to pay interest 
charges on the money they had borrowed to build them, long after the 
flats were knocked down and the Government subsidy ended. The city 
asked the Government to ease this burden by giving it housing subsidy 
to cover those continuing interest charges, and to help with the actual 
costs of demolition. 
Patrick Jenkin said he had already been considering this idea. He 
decided that he would change this in future, but it would apply to all 
authorities. No precise figure was put on this, but Liverpool calculated it 
would be worth about £ml. 7 to them, or £m5 once penalties were taken 
into account. Finally, the Government would pay the city about £m1 for 
environmental works which had already been carried out in housing 
action areas and general improvement areas. In total, the aid given by the 
Government amounted to £m8.6. This would reduce its grant penalties 
by £m12. The package was actually worth just over £m20 to the city's 
revenue budget. 
Although the amount was helpful, it was nowhere near the figure 
Liverpool had been after. The Government tried to suggest that it could 
all have been achieved through the normal processes of consultation, 
without the bankruptcy campaign. This seems doubtful. The aid for 
environmental improvements certainly was a mere accounting device 
and the talks only identified the amount and brought forward payment. 
The money would have been paid anyway. That was less clear in the case 
of the other three pieces of aid. It was true that local authorities had been 
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pressing for a review of housing subsidy for demolished properties. 
However, they press governments for many things, without necessarily 
getting them. Liverpool's pressure at least encouraged or hastened the 
process of change. 
The £m2.5 of urban programme money the Government gave 
Liverpool was obviously new. The status of the £m3.1 funding for the 
'time expired' projects was less certain. It was true, as civil servants 
claimed, that the Government knew that 'time expiry' was a general 
problem in the urban programme and that any local authority could 
discuss it with them. But the experience of Liverpool and other 
authorities in the past, did not suggest that the Government was willing 
to help automatically with the 'time expiry' problem in this way. Indeed 
when some months later a number of inner London authorities argued 
that they would qualify for a large extra amount of grant if, like 
Liverpool they were given special support for their 'time expired' 
projects, the Government dismissed the claim. This money did help 
Liverpool. However, it did not mean that the city's urban programme 
allocation was increased by £m3.1. Liverpool was given greater 
discretion in the use of its existing money, but it was at the cost of new 
projects which might otherwise have been funded in 1984/85. 
Labour's concessions 
How was the deal worth the £m50 claimed by John Hamilton or the 
£m60-90 by Tony Byrne? The answer was that if the Government made 
some concessions in July 1984, Liverpool made far greater ones. It 
dropped many of its spending plans and did a lot of creative accounting. 
It first reorganised the accounts for 1983/84 to reduce the deficit that was 
being carried into 1984/85, as table 2 shows. Over £m3 was deducted 
from the 1983/84 budget because the treasurer had overprovided for 
inflation. Labour used £m4 of its reserves to reduce the deficit in 1983/84. 
It also adopted the Government's suggestion on the method of repaying 
interest charges on loans. This saved £m2.6 in 1983/84 although it meant 
more would be paid in the longer term. Most important, Tony Byrne 
agreed to 'capitalise' housing repairs rather than putting them on the 
revenue budget. This further reduced the deficit by £m5. Expenditure in 
1983/84 was retrospectively reduced from £m231 to £m218, and the city 
avoided the £m17 in grant penalties. The deficit carried into 1984/85 was 
reduced from a threatened £m34 to £m4.7 (see table 2). 
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Table 2: How the 1983/84 Budget Deficit was Reduced 
Total deficit reduction 
Lower rate of inflation 
The use of reserves 
Debt rescheduling 
Capitilising housing repairs 
Additional growth items cost 
Penalty for overspending 
The deficit was reduced by £m30 from £m34. 7 to £m4. 7 
+ 
£m 
30.0 
3.1 
4.0 
2.6 
5.0 
1.2 
16.5 
Having reduced the deficit for 1983/84, Byrne then reduced the 
1984/85 budget from £m262 to £m223, as table 3 shows. Inflation of pay 
and prices had been less than anticipated in 1983/84, so the base budget in 
1984/85 was reduced by £m3. 8 to allow for this. Rescheduling the 
repayment of debts in 1984/85 also saved £m2. 9. But these were 
accounting matters. The major savings were made by cancelling nearly 
all of Labour's new policies. The decoration allowances were simply 
abandoned, reducing expenditure by £m8.5. Housing repairs were again 
put on the capital budget. This saved a further £m8.6 in 1984/85. 
The money that had been intended to cover existing, but unacknow-
ledged service commitments, was also dropped from the July budget. 
No specific provision was made for the £m4.3 unallocated reductions 
originally proposed by the Liberals in their 1983/84 budget. Similarly, no 
provision was made for the cost of 350 staff actually on the payroll, but 
not included in the city's base budget, which had been priced at £m3 in 
the deficit budget. Finally, the deficit budget had set aside £m3.4 to pay 
for continuing employment on Manpower Service Commission 
schemes. This was reduced to £m1.3 in July. Labour's July budget 
assumed that the money needed to finance this spending would be found 
from the contingency fund or by economies during the year or it would 
lead to overspending. 
The original deficit budget had provided £m8 to cover for contingen-
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Table 3: How the 1984/85 Budget Total was Reduced 
Budget reduction 
Lower rate of inflation 
Debt rescheduling 
Capitalising housing repairs 
Increased government grants 
Decoration allowance dropped 
Unallocated reductions not covered 
Existing staff salaries not covered 
Reduction in salary cover MSC employees 
Reductions in committee expenditure 
Contingency fund increased by 
Original deficit budget reduced from £m262 to £m223. 
+ 
£m 
39.3 
3.8 
2.9 
8.6 
8.1 
8.5 
4.3 
3.0 
2.1 
2.0 
4.0 
cies and inflation. This was increased by £m4 in the July budget to 
provide for all the unallocated savings, extra staff and the Manpower 
Service Commission employees. However, this was wildly optimistic 
since in the original budget they had been costed at £m9.6. On top of 
these changes, Labour was able to add the extra £m8.6 it had got from 
the Government. When they were added up, the 1984/85 budget was 
reduced by over £m39 to £m223. This was close enough to the 
Government's target so that the authority would not pay any penalties. 
And the rate rise was reduced from over 170 per cent to 17 per cent. 
The question was who, if anyone, had won? The deal had been 
achieved by a variety of creative accounting techniques which could not 
necessarily be repeated in future years. Labour did gain some concessions 
from the Government with its bankruptcy threats. But it had to drop 
many of its plans and postpone difficult choices for following years. If 
the city used in 1984/85 the £m7 reserves it had planned to save for future 
use, it would need a 45 per cent rate increase the next year just to cover 
for them. Yet the city had used them. Amid the political furore, neither 
side had any interest in making plain this kind of elementary fact. 
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The deal left open the question whether the city could pay for its 
services without making cuts later in the year or running up a large 
deficit. But it would be difficult for the Labour leadership to sell any cuts 
to its own supporters in the council group and the district Labour party. 
Labour's July budget resembled those of its Liberal predecessors. For 
many years budgets in Liverpool had been exercises in heroic assump-
tions which failed to be met. They were expressions of intent more or 
less consciously pursued, but frequently never arrived at. As the city 
treasurer admitted, if the April 'deficit' budget had been a very 
pessimistic one, the July 'legal' budget had been equally optimistic. 
Each side made the wrong claims. Liverpool's long-term financial 
problems were greater than the Government was willing to admit. It also 
knew that many of the measures it wanted the city to adopt in the short 
term, would store up problems in the longer-term. But it had no wish to 
publicise this. It simply wanted to get the show on the road. The Labour 
group was equally anxious to publicise the political concessions it had 
got from the Government. This prevented it exploiting as much as 
possible the larger financial problems it would continue to face. Also the 
Labour council could not present a rate increase much greater than 17 per 
cent without losing face with the electorate. It certainly could not have 
got a much larger one through the district Labour party. Yet the rate rise 
should have been much greater to balance the books. While outsiders 
might have heaved a collective sigh of relief at the apparent settlement, 
those on the inside well understood that 1984 was a prelude to further 
struggles in 1985. 
'Positive progress' on housing 
The real key to getting agreement on a legal budget in 1984 was 
Liverpool's housing programme. Tony Byrne's refusal to capitalise two 
years' housing repairs provoked the budget crisis. His final decision to do 
so, resolved it. His move during the June meetings with Jenkin to look 
beyond the 1984/85 budget to the longer-term question of housing 
resources for the city was a key event in the whole battle. But to get him 
to do this the Government had to offer a quid pro quo. This was again 
spelt out in the letter to John Hamilton in which Jenkin agreed with the 
Labour party about the importance of future money for Liverpool's 
housing programme. 'I well understand,' Jenkin wrote, 'that a decision 
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by your council to allow capitalisation of expenditure previously charged 
to revenue, thereby easing revenue commitments in 1984/85, will be 
influenced by the effect this might have on your capital resources in 
future years.' That is, if the city used its capital allowance to repair 
existing homes, it would have less money with which to build new 
houses. And Jenkin accepted that there was 'no disagreement between us 
about the scale of the problems you face.' 
On the other hand, Jenkin also argued 'we agree that improving the 
quality of management and maintenance is essential if better value is to 
be secured for the substantial sums of money spent.' Not only the 
authority's resources, but those of the private sector, and 'the enthusiasm 
and resourcefulness of the housing associations and the local community 
groups you serve, are also there to be tapped.' In other words, the 
Government believed that the city's housing problems were caused not 
merely by lack of cash, but by management and policy failures within the 
authority itself. Nevertheless, the Government was anxious to see how 
its resources could help deal with the problem and develop 'an effective 
and constructive partnership to tackle the needs of the people of 
Liverpool.' 
Patrick Jenkin wrote to John Hamilton 'I can give you an assurance 
that I will do my very best to ensure that allocations to Liverpool next 
year under the housing investment programme and the urban prog-
ramme, taken together, will enable the council to make positive progress 
in dealing with the city's severe needs, having regard to the scale of your 
capital commitments and the resources (including possible proceeds of 
sales of council dwellings and freeholds) available to you.' In other 
words, he implied that ifLiverpool would balance its budget for 1984/85 
by using its housing allowance to pay for repairs, he would at least make 
sure it would not restrict its ability to build new housing next year. 
No sum of money was attached to the offer. It was conditional on 
Labour diversifying its housing strategy. But the offer was clearly made. 
These 'understandings' about future treatment were a crucial factor in 
Byrne's decision to abandon the deficit budget. At the July budget 
meeting, he turned to the Government representative, Eric Sorenson, 
and publicly reminded him of the promises Patrick Jenkin had made 
about money for housing. He warned him that if those promises were 
not kept, he would take the expenditure on housing repairs out of the 
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capital account back into revenue and immediately create a financial crisis 
that year. The appalled official realised that Byrne might never let the 
Government off the hook. This argument about Liverpool's housing 
problems, and the extent and nature of the help the Government had 
offered, continued long beyond July 1984. 
For the time being the issue was settled. But the things which the 
council had to do to balance the books, and Derek Hatton's exploitation 
of the victory, guaranteed that the resolution would be a temporary one. 
The basic financial problem had been avoided and a lot of political 
hostages to fortune had been given. The 'understandings' on which the 
deal was made were very fragile. Liverpool's budget saga had a long way 
further to go. It would require a lot of goodwill on the part of both sides 
if there was to be a peaceful resolution in the next round. The 
circumstances were not promising. The spectre of Labour leaders 
'dancing on the grave' of Patrick Jenkin in 1984 would return to haunt 
them in 1985. 
MONEY, POLITICS AND HOUSING: WORSENING CONFLICT 
- July 1984 - May 1985 
By the time Liverpool had settled its quarrel with the Government in 
July 1984, it was already four months into the financial year. And the 
Government had almost prepared its plans for local government 
spending for the next financial year 1985/86. This meant that the two 
years virtually ran into each other without any political respite. Between 
the summer of1984 and the spring of1985, Liverpool's Labour party and 
the Government got locked into a further series of disputes which drove 
the wedge between the two sides deeper than ever. 
During these months relations eventually deteriorated so much that 
Patrick Jenkin and his officials finally refused to talk to the city about its 
budget problems any more, bluntly telling Labour to stop complaining 
and get on with sorting out their financial affairs. The Government 
claimed it had been willing in July to help ease Liverpool through its 
financial crisis with some special cash, if it would play the game. In the 
end they simply gave up because Labour would not cooperate. Labour 
politicians denied any substantial help was ever offered by the Govern-
ment after July. As one of the central union figures said about their hints 
of offers 'They would say that, wouldn't they ... 'It can never be certain 
what offer the Government would have made, what the conditions 
might have been and whether it would have been big enough to make a 
difference to the city's financial problems. There remains a critical 
question mark lingering over the whole affair. 
Whoever was right, the breakdown in communications became 
crucial in the summer of 1985 when, after a further year of unexpected 
twists and turns in the saga, the whole thing seemed to go wrong for 
Labour. The inability, or unwillingness, of each side to negotiate was 
partly responsible for the fact that the Liverpool Labour party finally 
toppled over the edge of the financial and political precipice it had walked 
along for almost two years. For much of the second year of the conflict, 
6 
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it seemed that Labour would walk to safety beyond the edge. Instead, the 
party became the unintended victim of its own campaign against the 
Government as it finally slid down the side of the precipice towards 
municipal bankruptcy. 
The lessons of 1984 
The two sides had drawn very different conclusions from the events of 
1984. But another confrontation in 1985 was made virtually inevitable. 
The Government realised it had made a tactical error in being drawn into 
prolonged negotiations with Liverpool, which had only brought it 
trouble with its friends and its enemies. It also recognised it had lost the 
propaganda battle in 1984, and had failed to get its arguments across to 
the electorate. The Government now decided to shift the ground of the 
argument and attack the Labour council directly in future, portraying the 
conflict not as a technical dispute about money and grant systems, but as 
a Militant plot against the Government. 
Liverpool, on the other hand, drew the opposite moral. It decided to 
exactly repeat its behaviour the following year. In the first place, its 
budget problems had not been resolved, merely postponed, by the July 
1984 settlement. It knew it would have to return to the financial 
argument with the Government. It also wanted to repeat its political 
victory. The Liverpool Labour party very successfully exploited its 
modest gains to claim enormous political credit with other Labour 
authorities. After July everybody wanted to know how Liverpool had 
done this, and the city sent a steady stream of speakers across the country 
publicising its achievements. 
Liverpool, and Derek Hatton in particular, made the running at the 
Labour Party's annual conference in November 1984 and, much to the 
unease of the national leadership, got the national party committed to 
support Labour local authorities who resisted the law in defence of 
essential jobs and services. This strengthened the resolve of the resisting 
rate-capped authorities. Liverpool badly wanted to keep going the 
momentum of that political struggle with the Conservative Govern-
ment, as well as force the national Labour Party further to the left on the 
issue. It was especially important to the Militants in Liverpool to 
continue the fight. The bloody nose which Derek Hatton claimed to 
have given Margaret Thatcher with the victory in July, was a perfect 
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advert for what a hard left party could do when it stood up to the 
Government. Militant, who had ambitions to play on a broader national 
stage, used it as an important platform for its recruitment campaign 
across the country. 
The July success also reinforced the position of its principal architect, 
Tony Byrne. In future, it became difficult to challenge his arguments, 
since no one else in the party had mastered the intricacies of the city's 
finances. Even the professional officers had little influence over Byrne's 
policies. In 1984, as one officer put it, Byrne played a game of cat and 
mouse with Patrick Jenkin. Once the Minister walked into the trap, 
Byrne pulled down the gate and Jenkin could not escape. Byrne also 
knew the game had to be played again in 1985. The other councillors 
trusted him to do it. When later in 1984 the treasurer's report pointed out 
the seriousness of the city's financial position, one councillor simply said 
'Tony got us out of the mess last year and he will do it again this year.' 
That remained an open question. 
Hostilities resumed : free market conservatism versus 
'municipal Stalinism.' 
The second round of the conflict opened almost as soon as the first 
ended. The mutual recriminations over the budget had hardly settled, 
when hostilities broke out again. In late July the Government announced 
Liverpool's spending target for 1985/86. It was set at £m222, an increase 
of £m6 over 1984-85, but in real terms a decrease. John Hamilton was 
'shocked and disappointed' claiming that unless there was a change in the 
settlement 'we will be back at square one and challenging him again next 
year.' In a supreme piece of unintended irony, Hamilton argued 'Jenkin 
has learnt nothing from the Liverpool experience.' 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Patrick Jenkin had learned 
his lesson well and had prepared a new tough line. The Government 
would not single Liverpool out for special treatment next year - there 
would be 'no soft options.' The answer to its difficulties was not more 
Government money but 'vigorous policies to root out inefficiency in 
their service provision.' Jenkin gradually began to implement his new 
strategy- broadening the Government's attack on the Labour council, 
emphasing its 'municipal Stalinism', its ideological isolation from other 
Labour authorities, and its conflicts with many people within the city. 
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Underlining this new-found toughness, Jenkin warned other Labour 
authorities 'If anyone thinks they are going to get something by aping 
the antics of Liverpool in going to the brink ofbankruptcy they have got 
another think coming.' Attitudes had already hardened by the autumn of 
1984 and even during the preliminary skirmishes, did not bode well for 
the next round. But neither Liverpool nor the other authorities believed 
the Government's tougher line would be held. 
Relations between Liverpool and the Government deteriorated 
through the autumn. In September, Kenneth Baker was drafted into the 
Department of the Environment as Minister for Local Government, to 
give it more backbone in its struggles with other Labour authorities. It 
was announced that Patrick Jenkin would now have more time to spend 
in Liverpool and was hoping to improve relations with the Labour 
council through regular direct contacts. It was hinted that increased 
urban aid money might be available if the council cooperated. However, 
as one ofhis advisers pointed out 'We have got to try to find areas where 
dialogue can take place with the city council. Patrick Jenkin will be 
trying. But it takes two to tango.' The city did not want to dance. There 
were constant wranglings about the details of all Labour's dealings with 
the Government - the July budget settlement, the city's housing 
programme, the management of its urban programme. 
Eventually the Government became tired of having its tail twisted by 
Liverpool and decided to go on the offensive. In October 1984 Jenkin 
launched an ideological broadside on the Labour leadership who he 
argued 'spend their entire time abusing one, attacking and criticising. 
They can't expect us to put up with it forever.' Invoking the outside 
world against Liverpool, he argued it was 'increasingly difficult for me to 
sell the need for substantial additional help for Liverpool when all they 
do is turn round and kick us in the teeth.' He would try to defend what 
he was doing for the city but 'there comes a point when people say 
"Look, why are you wasting your time and our money on an 
unappreciative part of the country?".' 
Jenkin argued the city was being run in an unacceptable way. In 
particular, the professional officers had been excluded from decision-
making. In many cases 'they simply don't know what's happening. They 
aren't told.' But nor was anyone else in his view. The centralisation of 
power meant that Liverpool 'was being handled by a few leading 
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councillors.' Jenkin claimed this was not just a matter of political 
differences between them and the Government, because they had quite 
effective working relationships with other left-wing councils. Jenkin had 
begun to focus on an issue which had always worried the national Labour 
party - the secretiveness with which party policy was made and the role 
in it of the influential Militant Tendency, through its interlocking 
membership of the district Labour party, its powerful executive 
committee and the Labour group. 
The dispute between the two was about more than style. It was 
essentially a conflict of ideologies. The Thatcher free market Govern-
ment was very unhappy with Liverpool's rejection of the Conservative 
strategy for the revival of the city- private-sector-led economic revival-
and its adoption of a 'total municipal solution.' Jenkin argued that the 
Labour council was excluding the private sector, housing associations, 
and housing co-operatives from its housing strategy, instead concentrat-
ing all of its financial and housing resources in a limited number of places 
in the city 'to the exclusion of all else.' He was sceptical of Liverpool's 
own plan for revival, its urban regeneration strategy, which was 
fundamentally 'unbalanced' in trying to revive the local economy solely 
through a council house building programme which ignored the need to 
help small businesses. The Government was equally unhappy with the 
Labour council's efforts to 'municipalise' community and voluntary 
provision in the city, either by wholly taking over projects which had 
previously been supported by the council, or stopping their funding 
altogether. Jenkin was not only expressing the Government's dis-
approval of a left-wing Labour authority. He was trying to encourage 
and capitalise upon some local concern about the ideological thrust and 
political style of the Labour council. 
Financial worries again 
These ideological differences between the hard-right Thatcher adminis-
tration and the hard-left city council were a central part of the the conflict 
between the two sides. However, in November 1984 another threatening 
issue arose, which dominated relations between the two sides during the 
next four months, and led the Government along another tortuous path. 
It was not directly concerned with Liverpool's long-running revenue 
problems but with the money for its housing programme, the city's 
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capital budget. The revenue budget paid for all the services the city 
provided on an annual basis and was financed by rates, rents and 
government grants. The capital budget paid for long-term construction 
and was financed by borrowing. Eventually, of course, the loans had to 
be repaid from the city's revenue budget. 
Although the council finally paid for the work, the Government 
could decide how much construction the city could carry out, by setting 
a limit on what it could borrow and on the proportion of its own assets it 
could use to to pay for the work. In Liverpool almost 85 per cent of its 
capital budget was used for housing. The money it could spend on this in 
1985/86 had been a key element in the July settlement. As the 
Government had always feared, the new dispute in November stemmed 
from the terms of that settlement. A central part of the July deal had been 
Byrne's decision to balance the budget by 'capitalising' two years' 
housing repairs, over £m13. He only agreed to do this because Patrick 
Jenkin promised that he would do all he could the following year to help 
ease Liverpool's housing problems. The issue exploded in the face of the 
Government, ironically, on 5 November, Guy Fawkes night. 
That day civil servants from the Task Force met councillors and local 
officers in a routine meeting to discuss the city's housing programme for 
1985/86. But the meeting had to be abandoned when Tony Byrne 
refused to carry on until the civil servants gave him a guarantee that the 
Government would allow Liverpool a capital budget of £m130 in 
1985/86 to carry out its massive council house building programme. 
Byrne insisted Jenkin had promised this in July 1984. The alarmed civil 
servants promptly denied any such promises had been made, pulling out 
of a briefcase as evidence a copy of the 29 June letter to John Hamilton 
from Patrick Jenkin, as well as a transcript they had kept of the crucial 9 
July meeting in London. But the claim sent the civil servants dashing 
back to talk to the Minister to establish a sensible response to this new 
demand from their difficult opponent. 
Eleven days later, in a letter to the chief executive, Alfred Stocks, the 
Task Force insisted that Jenkin's 'own recollections' as well as the official 
record confirmed the Minister had 'made no such promise' and that 'no 
reasonable interpretation of anything said then could support your 
allegation.' The letter also underlined that Jenkin had emphasised several 
times during the discussions in July that no firm commitment could be 
MONEY, POLITICS AND HOUSING /129 
given for 1985/86. It also insisted that the offer of help had been made 
only if Liverpool would broaden its housing strategy by diluting its 
municipalisation programme and pulling in the private and voluntary 
sectors. 
Byrne refused to back down arguing that the Government had 
reneged on the promise of £m130 it had made in July. 'We would not 
have agreed to make a budget without that promise' he said. Patrick 
Jenkin had told 'deliberate and calculated lies.' Kenneth Baker angrily 
denied any such promise had been made. The council had made 'a new 
and totally false claim.' The figure was three times this year's allocation, 
and belonged 'in cloud cuckoo land. No responsible council could 
possibly base its plans on such a wild assumption.' 
The issue spilled out onto the front pages of the national press when 
the Government released the transcript of the 9 July discussions. In 
answer to Byrne's claim that Liverpool needed a £m130 capital 
programme, Jenkin said 'there is nothing I can do except take note of 
what you say.' He hoped 'to encourage positive progress in dealing with 
the housing problem. I cannot go further than say it would be our aim to 
do this . . . what I cannot do is to give some kind of quantified 
undertaking.' Byrne's eliptical reply, however, was 'We don't need you 
to say yes. It is sufficient that you don't say no. In fact we would rather 
you didn't say yes. They are simple folk in the party who are only 
interested in the programmes. We need to indicate to the party that we 
would be in a position to carry out that scale of progress, which is the 
minimum needed.' 
The conversation could hardly be described as a firm foundation on 
which Liverpool should base a major new housing programme. But 
there was enough in the exchange, when combined with the 'admitted 
offer' in the original letter from Patrick Jenkin to John Hamilton, to let 
Labour make a lot of political capital from its claim that the Government 
had broken the spirit of the summer's agreement, when Jenkin had 
publicly admitted the scale of Liverpool's housing problems. This was 
particularly true when, in December, as part of a national cut in housing 
expenditure, the Government actually cut Liverpool's housing funds for 
1985/86 by almost 20 per cent. Labour then was able to claim the 
Government was being especially punitive against Liverpool because of 
the way it had exploited politically the July budget settlement. 
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The Government argued that Liverpool had refused to read the very 
obvious signal it had given them in July - that they would get extra 
resources for housing only if they would play ball. Although it would 
never have trebled its housing allocation, in July 1984 the Government 
claimed to be willing to provide more money for Liverpool the 
following year. It was only because of Labour's intransigence on its 
municipal housing strategy that the cuts in its housing budget were 
made. The approximate amount that was taken from the Labour 
council's housing budget, £m9, was later added to the Housing 
Corporation's budget for housing in Liverpool, to promote the work of 
housing associations and diversify housing provision in the city. 
In other words, what the Government was unable to make Liverpool 
do indirectly, it decided to get done directly through its own quango. If 
the Labour council would not cooperate and spend its money on the kind 
of mixed-economy housing programme the Government wanted, it 
would give it to someone else who would. Only three months after the 
Government believed it had offered an olive branch to the Labour 
council, it had been spurned. In its view, the Labour council had 
exploited the July settlement and was now trying to embarrass Jenkin 
and the Government once again, by misrepresenting what they had said 
at the time. But for Byrne this was not a political game. He had decided 
what he wanted - a big public housing programme - and believed what 
he said about the Government. In his eyes they had reneged. 
Politics and housing in Liverpool 
This dispute about housing was central to the ideological battle between 
the the Government and the Labour council, as well as to Liverpool 
politics. In the 1970s and the early 1980s, the Liberals, anticipating 
current conservative philosophy, had encouraged the private and 
voluntary sector in housing at the expense of the public sector, and had 
abandoned council house building. That policy had provoked great 
bitterness at the time and Labour came into office determined to reverse 
the process and to develop a massive public housing programme 
virtually at all costs. Tony Byrne was the architect of this policy termed 
the urban regeneration strategy. This combined the resources of the 
housing programme and the urban programme, which the Liberals had 
concentrated on grants to small businesses and environmental improve-
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ment schemes. Labour channelled all the money into 17 priority areas in 
the city providing housing, parks and sports centres. 
The Labour council claimed that this was the largest public housing 
programme in the country which would build more council houses in a 
single year than all other local authorities put together. Between 1983 
and 1986 the programme would both provide 6, 000 homes and, by 
stimulating the local economy through the construction industry, would 
create 16,000 jobs. But the programme was controversial. Critics argued 
that although Liverpool's housing need was great, with 22,000 sub-
standard houses and 20,000 people on the waiting list, the policy had 
many weaknesses - the pace of change was too dramatic; it was 
bulldozing too many recoverable properties; it neglected too many other 
areas of the city; it neglected community and residential preferences; it 
provided too much architecturally anonymous, low-rise family housing 
in the inner city when the need was for more diverse provision for a 
range of client groups; it was too centralised; it could not be properly 
managed by the housing department and it would eventually lead to 
low-rise slums in the 1990s as opposed to the high-rise slums of the 
1960s. 
Tony Byrne's response was that the scale of need and dereliction of 
Liverpool's housing was so great, that only a centralised policy could 
deal with the problem. Since Labour might only control the city for a 
short time, the programme had to be rapidly implemented. Because 
resources were limited, they had to be concentrated in public housing. 
More to the point was Byrne's ideological defence of the programme. 'I 
am a Socialist,' he once said 'I believe in public ownership, control and 
accountability for housing through the elected council. It is the local 
authority who must satisfy the needs of the working class. Working class 
organisation in this city lies in the Labour party and the unions and not in 
housing associations.' The mixed economy approach to housing 
provision currently favoured by his own national party was, in Byrne's 
words, 'the consensus politics that have failed.' In other words, 
everything the Government stood for in housing he opposed, and vice 
versa. 
As in the budget battle itself, the dogmatism of each side reinforced 
their determination not to concede. It guaranteed what another Labour 
politician called 'the politics of the bunker.' When asked by The 
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Guardian newspaper whether the block-busting style of the policy might 
not recreate the high-rise failures oflocal politicians in the 1960s, Byrne's 
simple reply was that the problem was that all those previous politicians 
had been 'dickheads.' The housing programme was Byrne's passion, and 
his main reason for running Liverpool. And it was this which Patrick 
Jenkin was threatening to deny him by his refusal to increase his capital 
budget. 
But Tony Byrne was determined to get what he wanted. He had 
spent several years in opposition developing his ideas and mastering the 
intricacies of housing policy. The housing programme was to be 
Labour's legacy to Liverpool. If the party could not get that, there was 
no point in having power. There was certainly no point in having power 
just to implement the Tory Government's cuts in services. In this way, 
the argument about the capital programme spilt over into the one about 
the revenue budget. This argument over housing led Byrne to re-open 
the argument over the July 1984 revenue budget settlement. From 
November 1984 onwards, the capital and the revenue budgets became 
inextricably tried together. 
Going for bust on housing? 
In November 1984 the capital programme was the more pressing 
issue because Liverpool had begun to act as if it was in fact going to get 
extra money from the Government. The council had signed contracts for 
house building in 1985/86 which seemed likely to outstrip the money the 
city would have to pay with. The amount a local authority can spend is 
determined mainly by what the Government allows it to borrow in its 
housing investment programme, combined with other smaller govern-
ment grants, plus a fixed percentage of the capital receipts it receives 
from selling off existing assets. By December 1984 Liverpool had signed 
contracts for 1985/86 worth £m88, and the treasurer estimated that the 
city would be £m11 short of the money it needed. This would have to be 
found from some other source. But he did not say which. Just as six 
months earlier Liverpool had gambled on its high-risk, illegal revenue 
budget, now it was apparently doing so in its capital programme. 
To make matters worse, in late December the Government 
announced its national housing programme for 1985/86. Major cuts in 
expenditure reduced the money available from £bn1.8 in 1984/85 to 
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£bn1.6 in 1985/86. Equally crucial, in trying to control public expendi-
ture, the Conservatives cut the percentage of capital receipts from their 
council house sales that the local authorities could spend on new housing, 
from 40 per cent to 20 per cent. The announcement caused an uproar 
nationally with the local authorities, the building industry and the 
Labour Party. In Parliament 30 Conservative MPs abstained upon and 
three voted against the Government's policy. 
The impact of this policy upon Liverpool was enormous. Its housing 
investment programme was reduced from £m46 in 1984/85 to £m37 in 
1985/86. Most important, Liverpool was given a much larger cut in 
housing budget than every other local authority on Merseyside. Two of 
them received a 7 per cent cut, another 14 per cent and a fourth 17 per 
cent. Liverpool's cut was 20 per cent. Labour claimed that the cuts were 
made in a vindictive fashion against the city, as Jenkin's retribution for 
the trouble they had caused him in July. The capital receipts Liverpool 
could spend was also reduced from £m21 in 1984/85 to £m13 in 1985/86. 
All together it was a 34 per cent cut in housing resources and the city 
would not be able to pay for a housing programme which was already 
running at £m88. This was six months after Patrick Jenkin had promised 
to make positive progress to solve the city's housing problems! Byrne 
called it 'a declaration of war on Liverpool.' 
It seemed a politically inept move by the Government- unless it was 
primarily interested in teaching Liverpool a lesson. In fact, it was another 
sign that the Government had had enough of Liverpool. It would put 
housing money in other local authorities on Merseyside where it got the 
kind of political response it wanted. Byrne was not easily put off his goal 
of building housing fit for Liverpool's working classes. He simply 
refused to accept the Government's cuts. 'We will not' he said, 'reduce 
our building programme by one single unit.' This seemed no idle threat 
when in mid-January the treasurer revealed that Liverpool had now 
signed contracts worth £m96. Once all its income had been added up, the 
city was still £m32 short of its planned expenditure. Even though the 
treasurer was exploring ways of raising the money, just over two 
months before the financial year started, the Labour council had no vis-
ible way of paying for one third of the building work for which it had 
signed contracts. In his anxiety to press on with the housing programme, 
Byrne had apparently overstretched himself. 
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Liverpool's new venture on the housing finance front again alarmed 
the Government. It did not want to get drawn into the morass of 
Liverpool's politics once more, but finally decided it had to move against 
the council before the financial and legal problems got out of hand. On 7 
February the Government announced that Patrick Jenkin was consider-
ing using a little-known and previously unused power under the 1980 
Local Government Act which would give him the authority to stop the 
Labour council spending the £m96. If the Minister used a section 78 
order, after 1 April 1985, all the city's new contracts, and all spending 
above the Government's limit, would have to be approved by Jenkin 
personally. In other words, he would be controlling the city's building 
programme. He gave the city fourteen days to explain themselves, but he 
said 'Liverpool cannot make their own laws. It has made no secret of its 
determination to charge ahead irrespective of having the money to pay 
the bill. We have to act on it. There is no question I am picking on 
Liverpool.' Things had apparently gone wrong for Liverpool. The local 
Daily Post commented 'it must be very clear to Liverpool's labour chiefs 
that this year Mr. Jenkin is ready for them. He will not be caught this 
spring.' 
Banque Parabas and Byrne's coup 
Once again, nothing could be further from the truth. Tony Byrne had 
another ace up his sleeve. He played it on the very last of his fourteen 
days' grace. On 22 February he revealed that not merely had Liverpool 
been exploring ways of raising money. Earlier that month, after several 
months of secret negotiations, it had actually finalised a deal which 
would allow it to pay for the housing programme. This was with a 
banking syndicate headed by Banque Para bas, one of the largest French 
banks recently nationalised by President Mitterand's socialist administra-
tion. The deal was complicated but the principle was simple. In recent 
years Liverpool had sold off over 7,000 council houses and was receiving 
monthly payments from them on long-term mortgages. In the new deal, 
the city had managed to sell its interest in those mortgages to the banking 
syndicate, from which it would receive a lump sum of £m30 
immediately. The city could then call that money a capital receipt and 
spend part of it on its house building programme. It seemed a perfect 
arrangement. 
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However, there was a potential problem. The banks had an escape 
clause which gave them the right to make Liverpool buy back all the 
mortgages after seven years, even though they did not in fact plan to use 
it. The treasurer, Michael Reddington, explained that the city could have 
got a deal over twenty-five years which could have avoided the problem 
of repurchasing. It would also have got £m2 less from the banks. He did 
not think it justifiable to lose that £m2 just to insure against the 
possibility of being forced to buy the mortgages back. This was the key 
issue. The Government could argue it was neither an outright disposal 
by the city, nor a purchase by the banks, rather a seven-year loan. In 
which case, the money would not be a capital receipt and the Labour 
council could not use the money to pay for its housing programme. The 
city, of course, as was increasingly common in the now highly litigious 
area of local government finance, had taken the advice of a QC. He had 
confirmed the city solicitor's view that the deal was legal. The question 
was what the Government would make of it. 
The financial package which Labour had drawn up for Patrick Jenkin 
had other awkward details. If the French bank deal was allowed, the city 
would be able to spend £m9 of the £m30. This would increase what it 
had to pay for its building programme from £m64 to £m73. But on its 
own this would not close the gap and raise the necessary £m97. The city 
did this by revising the figures in two equally unusual ways, which were 
explained by Michael Reddington. It argued that since Liverpool had 
never spent as much as it planned on its capital programme, but usually 
underspent its total by about 10 per cent, it was reasonable to assume this 
'slippage' would happen again in 1985/86. In which case, £m10 should be 
deducted from its planned expenditure of £m97.1. 
The city then argued that although they were usually regarded as 
synonymous, there was an important distinction between total capital 
spending and what the 1980 Act called a local authority's 'prescribed 
expenditure', which the Government could control. Liverpool argued 
that capital expenditure on repairs and maintenance, as opposed to new 
construction, 'are not, or may not be' counted as 'prescribed expendi-
ture.' It then claimed that in 1985/86, £m 11 of its planned programme 
was for repairs, and this amount should be substracted from the total of 
'prescribed expenditure.' It also argued that over £m1 capital expendi-
ture, which the city got from its various leases also might not count as 
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prescribed expenditure. When added together, these reduced the 
'prescribed expenditure' in the capital programme by over £m23 from 
£m97 to £m73. Since its income was boosted to £m73, the Labour council 
argued the shortfall had been reduced from £m32 to £600,000. As it was 
also exploring other ways of staying within the limits - like selling other 
kinds of mortgages or deferring payments to builders - Labour claimed 
Patrick Jenkin had no grounds for taking control of the city's building 
programme. This was a very clever piece of creative accounting. 
The deal was immediately splashed across the pages of the national 
press. Derek Hatton claimed that Liverpool had 'demonstrated the way 
to find the finance to build council houses. We hope other local 
authorities will follow what Liverpool has done.' Byrne rubbed Jenkin's 
nose in it, claiming that the Minister did not even understand the capital 
allocation process. 'He became gripped by his desire to seek vengeance 
on the people of Liverpool and didn't bother to look at the figures.' Once 
more Liverpool had pulled a propaganda coup over Jenkin, which 
brought many other Labour authorities to the city to find out how to 
beat the Government. 
The Government was again in a difficult political dilemma. The legal 
position had not been tested, but it soon transpired that the Govern-
ment's own lawyers had considered such a deal illegal when the idea had 
been floated a few years earlier. They had doubted whether a council 
could sell its mortgages or whether the money could be called a capital 
receipt. Jenkin tried to meet the Labour leaders to talk about the case. 
They were now quite certain of their position and refused to see him. 
Patrick Jenkin was 'not happy at all' with Liverpool's plan, which his 
lawyers were considering and he claimed it was 'doubtful whether the 
council has the power to do what it is suggesting.' But Jenkin changed 
his mind. At the end of March he announced the deal was legal after all. 
Liverpool's propaganda victory continued. By making his move at the 
very last moment, when all eyes were on the city, Tony Byrne publicly 
outwitted the Government. At the same time he made Jenkin seem 
callous in trying to cut Liverpool's housing programme after promising 
them extra help six months earlier. Most important, at the end of the 
day, Byrne still got what he wanted- the money to pay for the urban 
regeneration stragegy. 
This was more than a mere propaganda victory. In some ways it 
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changed the equation of Liverpool's financial politics. As Byrne 
constantly insisted, he was not primarily interested in a confrontation 
with the Government, but in getting the Labour party's policies 
implemented. The fact that he was now in a position to finance a further 
year of the building programe and produce another 1, 500 council houses 
made it more important to him to keep control of the city in 1985/86. 
That affected the way he viewed the other half of the city's financial 
problems, the revenue budget. Even though those problems were still 
large, a new pressure had arisen to persuade the Labour leaders to avoid a 
financial collapse for as long as possible - even though they believed it 
was inevitable in the long run - and to avoid a confrontation with the 
Government in the spring of 1985. 
To some extent the Government saw it in this way too. It also 
realised that if Byrne was denied the power to carry out his housing 
programme he would start threatening financial suicide once again. That 
political calculation, and worries about the prospect of getting enmeshed 
in Liverpool politics again and cutting back a badly needed housing 
programme, compounded the Government's uncertainty about the 
legality of Liverpool's plan. In the end, it chose not to engage the issue, 
even at the risk of encouraging other Labour authorities to copy 
Liverpool and breach the capital spending dam. It was still better to stay 
away from the place and its problems. 
However, the reverberations continued. In July 1985 Patrick Jenkin 
announced in Parliament that no more deals like this would be allowed 
and he would legislate to get rid of the legal uncertainty which had forced 
him to allow Liverpool's plan through. Jenkin admitted that, like many 
others, he had been 'taken aback' by the Banque Parabas deal which 
transferred the mortgates, without consulting the individual borrowers 
concerned, to foreign banks which might not even assume the risk 
involved in the loan. His decision would stop a number oflocal authority 
deals in the pipeline. But the political spinoff was just as revealing. As the 
junior Labour spokesman on the environment, Jack Straw, attempted to 
defend the deal, Patrick Jenkin argued it proved 'the inherent contradic-
tions' of the Labour leadership who 'showed their respectable face' in 
Parliament, but 'never fail to give aid and comfort to the wreckers who 
do not believe in the rule of law.' Liverpool's actions continued to 
embarrass their national leaders. 
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Reopening the revenue crisis 
The money for Liverpool's housing programme had been an important 
underlying issue in the first round of the battle in 1984. It did not become 
especially visible until the final stages of the negotiations. In the second 
round, in 1985, however, the budget for the housing programme was 
inextricably linked to the revenue budget from the start. In fact, the city's 
underlying revenue budget problems remained the same throughout the 
year. But the way in which they were presented by the Labour council 
varied throughout the period, depending upon their political needs at the 
time. These were frequently shaped by the status of the arguments over 
the housing programme. 
The worse the negotiations between the council and the Government 
over the housing were going, the worse the revenue problems were 
presented by Tony Byrne. He used the city's admittedly large financial 
problems as a way of putting pressure on the Government to give him 
what he wanted on the housing programme. At one point Byrne 
admitted to a housing association official that Liverpool's financial pack 
of cards would probably collapse one day, but by that time 'we'll be so 
far down the road on housing, they'll never catch up with us.' In other 
words, if the Government did have to take over the city when it ran out 
of money, it would inherit a public housing programme it could never 
get rid of. 
The tactic first became clear after the 5 November row between the 
two sides about the Minister's broken promises on housing. It marked 
the real opening shot in Labour's 1985 campaign. In many ways, the July 
settlement had been an extremely optimistic statement of the city's 
finances which concealed many of its structural financial difficulties 
because of'the understandings' about the housing programme. After the 
row, when Jenkin denied he had made any explicit offers of financial aid 
for housing, Byrne instructed the treasurer to produce a report which 
unpicked that settlement and present a worst case analysis of Liverpool's 
budget position. 
That report argul~d that the Labour council had made many changes 
in its original 'deficit' budget of March 1984, in order to get a settlement 
in July. The report's crucial claim was 'It was clear at the time of the 
budget, and indeed had been spelled out in the joint report and accepted 
by the Secretary of State, that a number of the actions then taken served 
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only to postpone the impact of the inherent problems, or depended for 
their realisation upon the outcome of the continuing discussions with 
central government and subsequent decisions favourable to the city.' 
Since Liverpool had not got what it claimed it had been promised by the 
Government, Byrne argued that it was now perfectly legitimate for 
Labour to recalculate the 1984/85 figures, and put back what in had 
agreed to take out of its original deficit budget. This was exactly what 
Byrne had publicly threatened Sorenson with in his July 1984 budget 
speech. The row between the two sides had been explained away on 
paper in July. It was a simple matter for Byrne to write it in again. 
Labour had done a lot of creative accounting to cut the March deficit 
budget of £m262 down to £m223 in July. It continued the Liberal 
practice of underestimating the real costs of paying for existing services 
and employees, ignoring any deficit that would be accumulated by the 
end of the year. It also decided to use up all of its £m11 reserves. It simply 
ignored the problem of balancing the 1985/86 budget, when all these 
reserves would be gone and the city would have to increase rates by 45 
per cent in 1985/86just to make up for that £m11. It also re-scheduled the 
debt repayments which reduced short-term costs, but imposed greater 
longer-term costs. It took the cost of £m13 housing repairs out of the 
revenue budget, in view of the 'promises' of future help from Jenkin. 
The treasurer's statement in November simply showed what would 
happen to the budgets if all this creative accounting were all reversed. 
When the real costs of paying for existing services were added back in, 
the 1984/85 base budget would not be £m223 but £m231. Once inflation 
during the year was added, the treasurer estimated the actual cost of 
paying for the city's services that year would not be £m23 but £m245. 
The major impact of all the changes would be upon the deficits. If £m11 
reserves were saved for 1985/86, and the housing repairs were put back 
on the revenue budget, this would create a deficit in 1983/84 of £m 19 and 
of £m45 in 1984/85. If the city continued to take on employees from 
Manpower Services Commission programmes, and the Government 
withheld urban programme money it had promised in July, with 
penalties this would increase the eventual deficit in 1984/85, by a further 
£m16. Since the treasurer had already reported in November 1984 that 
there was likely to be a deficit of £m14 anyway by the end of the year, 
this could mean that the city would start the financial year in 1985/86 
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with an enormous inherited deficit of £m96. 
The real cost of the 1984/85 budget had been put at £m243, the 
starting point for the 1985/86 budget. To that figure the treasurer added 
the revenue costs of decisions already taken by Labour. This would 
increase the base budget to £m256. This could be £m265 once inflation in 
1985/86 was added on. If Byrne again refused to capitalise housing 
repairs in 1985/86, this would worsen the problem by adding a further 
£m13 and give the city a base budget of£m278. The accumulated deficits 
of £m96 from earlier years would have to be added, and the city would 
have to raise £m374 in 1985/86. At that level of spending the penalties 
would completely wipe out any grant from the Government, and 
Liverpool would have to raise the rates by over 220 per cent to pay for its 
programmes. 
These calculations were designed to put the bleakest face on 
Liverpool's budget problem to strengthen its hand against the Govern-
ment. Some of the threats, such as reversing the capitalisation, were not 
likely to be carried out, and the deficits were to that extent artificially 
inflated. But the calculations about the real cost of the base budget were 
broadly accurate. In 1985/86 it might cost up to £m265 to run the city, 
which could require a rate rise in the region of 85 per cent. That was the 
scale of Labour's problem. The worst case scenario of £m374 and a 220 
per cent rate rise, however, was really designed to put pressure on the 
Government to reopen all the larger arguments about the grant, which 
the city had tried to make in the 1984 'joint report.' The council again 
wanted its target increased, certain expenditure exempted from grant 
penalties, special treatment under the urban programme, and an 
increased capital budget to allow it to keep a major housing programme 
go mg. 
However, these demands had the reverse effect upon the Govern-
ment. After this it decided it was pointless to try to talk about the grant 
with Liverpool. Jenkin and his officials refused to have any further 
discussion about Liverpool's budget problems after November 1984. 
This virtually marked the end of any contact between the Government 
and the Labour council about its financial problems. By November 1984, 
Patrick Jenkin had realised that the Labour group would never stop 
making their argument about their financial problems. He was not 
prepared to solve those problems for them. There was no point 
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continuing the discussions if Liverpool was only going to try to make 
political capital out of them. But the city's financial problems did not go 
away. They remained very large indeed. 
Massaging the overdraft 
By this time the problem of the two financial years had become deeply 
entwined. The size of any budget problem in 1985/86 was obviously 
going to be affected by the way the 1984/85 budget turned out, especially 
by how much it was overspent. The precise state of Liverpool's revenue 
budget in 1984/85 varied enormously throughout the year. And again it 
reflected the state of relations with the Government, as well as the 
political needs of the council. These changed during the year. The city's 
spending seemed in order at the beginning of the financial year, 
deteriorated alarmingly in the middle, but appeared to be brought back 
under much more control by the end of the financial year 1984/85. 
In the first months after July, the treasurer implied the city was 
broadly on target for the £m223 figure. Gradually it became clear that the 
optimistic assumptions made in the July budget were not going to be 
met. By October the treasurer indicated that the city would need to 
spend £m227, with penalties this would cause a deficit at the end of the 
year of £m14. In December the position was worse, with a predicted 
overall deficit of £m 17. And of course the city by this time had reported a 
potential deficit of £m11 on its capital programme. By January 1985, 
three months from the end of the financial year, the treasurer was 
predicting a deficit of £m25. The deficit on the capital housing 
programme was now up to £m32. Liverpool's finances appeared to be 
quite out of control. 
In February there had been little change in spending. However the 
predicted deficit for the year was reduced to £m20 by some creative 
accounting. But by March the pattern had changed dramatically. The 
deficit had been cut in half to £m10. It had been achieved primarily by 
combing all sources of possible income for the city, which had produced 
an extra £m3. Just as marginal overspending produced large penalties 
earlier in the year, marginal reductions produced a correspondingly large 
drop in penalty of over £m6, and a halving of the deficit. Almost half of 
the saving was accounted for by an increase in housing subsidy from the 
Government - the result of months of assiduous examination of 
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complicated records of building programmes over a period of years, to 
discover where subsidies had been missed in the past. 
This no longer seemed like the actions of a city bent on financial 
suicide. In the last part of the financial year, the Labour council had been 
trying very hard to get a grip on its finances. Projected overspending had 
been reduced in the previous two months by creative accounting and by 
maximising income from a variety of sources. In the final month, in an 
effort to get political control over the usual bureaucratic rush to use up 
remaining departmental budgets before the end of the financial year, 
Tony Byrne had instructed officials that no new money could be spent 
on anything in the authority, except what was absolutely necessary to 
pay for existing commitments. The result was that the city's overspend-
ing was reduced from a threatened £m96 in November, to a projected 
high of £m25 in January, to an actual £m5 at the end of March. 
If the larger financial problems remained, considerable efforts had 
been made to put the best gloss upon them politically. This would give 
the Labour leadership maximum political flexibility in presenting a 
budget for the next financial year to the district Labour party and the 
trade unions. The leaders' line on financial confrontation appeared to 
have softened. The local belief was that, especially after Byrne had won 
his victory over Patrick Jenkin in March to keep the housing programme 
going, the incentive for the party to remain in power and press on with 
its policies was pushing it toward a compromise. The question was 
whether it wanted a compromise, and if it did, would its financial 
problems, despite recent massaging, give it enough political space to 
make one? 
The March 1985 'no rates' budget 
In the spring of 1985, Liverpool's position was complicated by the fact 
that it had joined with other authorities in a national campaign against 
the Government's rate-capping legislation, which gave Patrick Jenkin the 
power to limit the expenditure of 'high spending' Labour authorities. 
Ironically, despite its financial quarrel with the Government, Liverpool 
was not regarded as serious an over-spender as others, and had not been 
rate-capped. But it brought its budget day forward to 7 March to keep in 
step with the concerted action and, like the rest of the group, moved a 
'no rates' policy. There were no detailed figures just the bald statement 
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that since the city would need to spend £m265, and its target was only 
£m222, 'it will be impossible to set a rate.' 
The noisy and emotional budget meeting went over much familiar 
ground. Byrne insisted he would make no cuts in Labour's programmes. 
If Thatcher wanted to make the cuts, she would make them herself 
through her commissioners. In view of popular support for Labour in 
the city, Byrne argued, 'I'd rather them than me.' Virtually the last line 
of his speech was addressed not to the Government, but to 'the Labour 
Party of Kinnock, Straw and Cunningham.' It was to demand a 
guarantee that a future Labour Government would give an immediate 
amnesty to any Labour councillor disqualified from office for resisting 
the Tories and defending local democracy. If rhetoric were a good guide 
to action the leaders had already decided what their fate was to be. 
However, many people in the city still suspected it was not, and that 
Labour was bluffing. 
After the 7 March meeting a curious lull lay over the budget 
deliberations in Liverpool as the council had to wait for moves elsewhere 
on the rate capping front for the next three months. Ironically, as a result 
of the 1984 settlement, when the city had set the rate and started getting 
its monthly instalments from rate payers much later in the year than 
usual, Liverpool had no apparent reason to move at the time. Rate 
income from 1984/85 was still coming into the treasurery in April and 
May 1985/86. The council had no need to set a rate to get income until 
the beginning of June. This put them in a different position from other 
authorities opposing Government policies and appeared to give them 
some freedom of movement politically. It also misled them in an 
important way. 
The district auditor steps in 
The first day of June became a crucial date in the story for another 
reason. Liverpool's budget crisis had always been monitored by Leslie 
Stanford, the district auditor, the official with the responsibility of 
making sure the local authority's financial affairs were in order. Stanford 
had written to the councillors several times since April 1984, warning 
them of the dangers they were in. However, the Labour leaders never 
took his threats seriously. In fact some Labour councillors did not even 
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bother to open his letters. Partly they did not understand the auditor's 
position. They believed that he was not an independent official but 
Patrick Jenkin's poodle, who would not act against them until told to do 
so. For much of the period they thought the Government would be 
reluctant to push Liverpool over the brink and the district auditor was 
bluffing. Paradoxically, the position was quite the reverse. But it had the 
same delaying effect. The problem for district auditors is precisely that 
they are not controlled by Ministers, but independent. They are left to 
decide when a council is breaking the law. That is not always absolutely 
clear. 
District auditors' duties and powers were written in a rather less 
controversial era. Their primary function is to certify and encourage 
sound accounting practices, not to enter into the highly charged area of 
grant politics. As a result, their powers are looser than might be assumed 
- loose enough for them to deliberate a long time before taking action 
leading to the wholesale bankruptcy of elected councillors. In 1985, the 
district auditor was in a difficult position as he considered when would 
be the right time to act against recalcitrant Liverpool. In 1984, the Labour 
council argued that they would get concessions from the Government by 
refusing to set a rate, and this was not 'wilful misconduct.' The district 
auditor at that time knew he would have some difficulty disproving this. 
Similarly, even though the Labour council had to pay about £m1 in 
interest charges on the money it had borrowed in 1984 because of the 
delay in setting a rate, it argued that it had received an extra £m8 from 
the Government as a result of its actions, which was a gain not a loss. Of 
course in 1985, as the authority's senior officers had pointed out in their 
written advice to the councillors in April1985, the position was different 
because the Government was not negotiating with Liverpool about its 
grant. 
Whatever the real position, Labour believed the district auditor was a 
paper tiger. His warning letters to them were never very threatening. 
Indeed the letter he wrote to the council in April 1985 urging them to 
make a rate, revealed a certain degree of sympathy with it, saying 'I 
realise the problems facing the council especially in bringing spending 
plans into line with available resources. This will be difficult in the short-
term, but the council will also need to be mindful of the longer-term 
issues; short-term expediencies may only serve to exacerbate problems 
MONEY, POLITICS AND HOUSING I 145 
later.' Until May 1985 the district auditor never gave Liverpool a 
deadline for setting a rate. 
However, at this time another district auditor took charge of 
Liverpool's region. The new official, Tim McMahon, came with a 
reputation for toughness. The policy changed immediately. On 21 May 
he wrote to every councillor explaining that he was not going to rehearse 
the arguments ofhis predecessor again. He did not have to wait until the 
financial year was closed. He gave them until1 June to make a rate, or he 
would take action against them. In fact, it was not pressure from Patrick 
Jenkin which made the district auditor act. He had no contact with the 
Government, whatever the Labour councillors thought. Finally, profes-
sional self-respect would not allow the auditor to ignore the council's 
constant refusal to treat seriously his powers and responsibilities, while at 
the same time apparently incurring losses and breaking the law. He had 
to choose a deadline for action and stick to it. But his timing was fateful. 
Tony Byrne replied there was no question that Liverpool would set a rate 
by 1 June. Another twist in the story had taken place. The political 
equation would never be the same again. 
At the beginning of June 1985, the Labour council was again on the 
brink of a financial abyss. It had gone through another year of bitter 
political conflict with the Conservative Government over money and 
housing. It had managed, despite the Government's efforts, to accumu-
late a lot of money to pay for a major council house building 
programme. It had gained some propaganda victories along the way. It 
believed that it had kept its promises to the electorate. Labour had not 
put up the council rents, had restricted the rate rise, had protected council 
jobs and had built public housing for rent. 
However, it had done this by confrontation rather than cooperation, 
because its Militant leaders believed that was the only way in which a 
Conservative Government could be moved. The city's longer-term 
financial problems had not been eased. They had been massaged 
throughout the year, but the city had carried forward a substantial 
deficit. Its base budget had slowly been expanded rather than reduced. 
The council was locked into a faltering campaign with other authorities 
against the Government, still pursuing its high risk strategy. The 
national Labour Party was keeping its distance. The district auditor had 
finally made a very serious move against them. In all of this, it had 
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alienated the Government and dissipated its alleged goodwill towards the 
council. In July 1984 relations between the two had been strained. By 
June 1985 they were virtually ruptured. There was little prospect ofhelp 
from that quarter. June would be another decisive month. 
POLITICS AND PRESSURE FOR THE LABOUR COUNCIL 
- June - September 1985 
Throughout 1985 there had been constant speculation about what the 
Labour council really wanted to do and how it would eventually resolve 
its political dilemma. By the spring, many civil servants, council 
officials, union leaders and politicians believed that the Labour group 
wanted a compromise and would make some kind of 'fudged' budget. 
The difficulty was that the group's own propaganda campaign over the 
previous eighteen months persuaded people that the city's financial 
problems were unmanageable. In 1984, they had been able to conceal 
many of the problems and claim a major victory over the Government. 
In 1985, if they could not put forward the same argument, they would 
have to deny the crisis was as serious as they had claimed, or take some 
fairly harsh measures to balance the books or carry out their threat of 
suicide. In the end they had to carry out that threat. 
Starting to govern 
There was plenty of evidence in 1985 that the Labour council was 
interested in retaining power and running the city. While the public 
confrontation over the budget was going on, the council was trying to 
manage the authority more efficiently. It was reorganising secondary 
schools; planning to rationalise further education; beginning to reorga-
nise housing management and the direct labour organisation; talking 
with the unions about rationalising refuse collection; and carrying out an 
urban regeneration strategy. In short, a Labour council was finally facing 
up to Liverpool's difficulties which had been identified by the Govern-
ment in the 'joint report.' 
In May 1985, the council reorganised the committee system and 
created a new finance and strategy committee chaired by Tony Byrne 
to control all the authority's strategic and expenditure decision; an 
industrial relations committee to deal with employment and personnel 
7 
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issues; and a reorganised environmental services committee to look after 
the blue-collar workforce, especially in the refuse collection service. 
These changes led to opposition allegations that control of council affairs 
was being even more concentrated in the hands of the leading councillors 
-Byrne, Hatton and Mulhearn. However, they did reflect the council's 
most urgent managerial priorities and strengthened their ability to get a 
grip on the slackness which had developed in parts of the authority's 
management system. None of this seemed like the action of a party about 
to commit financial suicide. 
Conflicting pressures on the council 
But at the same time the Labour leadership was under conflicting 
political pressures - from the Government, national Militant headquar-
ters, the local authority unions, the district Labour party, the local 
electorate, the black community, and the other Labour authorities in the 
national campaign against rate-capping. The leaders' position had been 
much simpler in 1984 when they faced the Government on their own, 
exploited the general uncertainty, and did very much what they wanted. 
But everybody had learned something from 1984. In June 1985 
Liverpool's leaders could not pick their way through this political 
minefield. 
The Government had learned its lesson from giving in to blackmail in 
1984. It adopted a much tougher line in 1985. Jenkin and Thatcher had 
been furious about the way Hatton and the others had capitalised on the 
Government's offer of an olive branch in July 1984. This, and personal 
slights towards her made at later meetings, convinced Thatcher that 
'they do not have enough respect for my office.' In her famous phrase, 
which the Labour leaders never forgot, she said 'these people must be put 
down.' Personally and politically she detested the Militant Liverpool 
leaders. They hated her. Tony Byrne, on a public platform, said of 
Margaret Thatcher 'she is evil personified.' 
In the spring of 1985, the Government refused to talk to or negotiate 
with Liverpool. It similarly refused to deal with the rate-capped 
authorities, hastening the eventual collapse of their campaign. This 
meant that when Liverpool's Labour leadership was thinking of 
postponing the confrontation and needed some concessions from the 
Government to sell to its supporters as a victory, that escape route had 
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been sealed off. In 1984, the Government had slightly lost its nerve; 
ironically, a year later, it decided that Liverpool was bluffing and there 
was no need to make any overtures. The Government could sit back and 
wait until Labour gave in, or its majority on the council disintegrated and 
some other faction emerged to run the city and take the necessary hard 
financial decisions to get its house in order. 
The national Militant leadership in London also played its part in the 
struggle, with the influence it exercised in the local Labour party through 
Derek Hatton and two other key figures, the chairman, Tony Mulhearn, 
and the party's press officer, Terry Harrison, both of whom had been 
founder members of Militant, and were independent powerful forces in 
the national organisation. There were always two conflicting dimensions 
to national Militant's view of Liverpool. On the one hand they could see 
political potential in public disorder. If the local authority's services 
collapsed and the Government took over the city, those disorders could 
be used to discredit the Government as the last gasp of capitalism. This 
might boost Militant's recruitment. At the same time, since Liverpool 
was their 'jewel in the crown' it was also important for them to be seen 
running the city efficiently and scoring propaganda victories over 
Thatcher. In this way they could present Liverpool as the model working 
class state, a kind of socialism in one city. 
The first view would lead towards outright defiance of the 
Government, the second towards a negotiated retreat. In 1984, the first 
was always a slight temptation for Militant. But the propaganda success 
of the July budget victory reinforced what was always the dominant 
strand, and by 1985 the national Militant line was much more in favour 
of keeping control of the city. The setbacks they were having across the 
country, especially their failure to gain any victories in the Labour 
Party's reselection of MPs, emphasised the dangers to them of being 
associated with chaos in Liverpool. They needed to protect their home 
base. On the other hand some rank-and-file Militants in Liverpool saw 
the issue differently. In their view, Militant would benefit if the 
Government resisted and there was trouble in the city, or if the 
Government gave in and the council scored a further propaganda 
victory. But they saw no benefit for Militant if the council gave in. These 
differences of opinion between the national and local leaders and their 
rank-and-file also played a crucial part in the denouement of the crisis in 
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June 1985. The inability of the Militant leaders to control their members 
led them towards illegality. 
The Labour leaders would also have to sell any budget to both the 
district Labour party and the trade unions, neither of whom would let 
them get away lightly with harsh measures. Although Militant could 
normally organise support in the district party, this might not be 
automatic for a fudged deal. In 1984 many members of the district party 
had thought a 17 per cent rate increase was too much of a retreat. They 
accepted it then because of the council's apparent gains from the 
Government. Also, since many Militants were local authority workers, 
they would not necessarily accept a policy of moderation if the price 
were their own jobs. 
As far as the trade unions were concerned, some of these felt that the 
Labour leadership had 'talked up' the scale of their 1984 victory in order 
to get the endorsement of the unions. In retrospect, the unions realised 
that much less had been gained than had been originally claimed. They 
had been given no time to consider the deal and had been 'bounced' into 
accepting it by the party leadership. They would be looking at the details 
of any 1985 settlement much more carefully. 
Local discontents 
Another possibility was that Labour would once more postpone all the 
hard financial decisions in 1985 by setting a compromise budget with a 
moderate rate rise. In effect they could run a deficit budget, and end up 
hopelessly overspent at the end of the year. The results could then be 
presented to the electorate in 1986. Ironically, 1985 would have been the 
year for the four-yearly Merseyside County Council elections, but 
because this had been abolished by the Government there would be no 
election in Liverpool in 1985. If they were endorsed in 1986, Labour 
could go back to the Government and say they had popular support for 
illegality and ask for money to bail out the city. IfLabour was defeated in 
the 1986 council election, the Liberals and Conservatives would be left in 
a virtually impossible financial mess. 
In fact some party members believed Labour might well have trouble 
in the 1986 elections anyway. Since its success in May 1984 the party had 
had a difficult time. Its support then had drawn on a deep well of 
anti-Thatcherism in Liverpool as much as upon a positive endorsement 
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of its illegal policies. Since then some dissatisfaction had set in and the 
party had lost by-elections in two marginal wards in the city, one of 
them extremely badly. Throughout the year a number of issues 
threatened to challenge the popular unity which had marked the Labour 
council's campaign against the Conservative Government in 1984. 
Some of Labour's problems were inherited from the lost decade of 
coalition politics. For example, the Labour council had done in less than a 
year what nobody else had done in a decade, by getting a comprehensive 
re-organisation plan for the secondary schools sector approved. But the 
scheme had upset many people. Although the Government accepted the 
council's plan, it received 70,000 objections. The backwash from that 
during its implementation hung over the council in 1985. 
Labour also got into enormous difficulty over the most prosaic of 
services, refuse collection. Not only had Patrick Jenkin made people in 
the city realise it was extremely expensive, but at various times during 
the year the service seemed to have collapsed, as the bins were not 
emptied for almost a month and rubbish piled up in the streets. The 
council's critics argued the problems were caused by union restrictive 
practices, featherbedding and inefficiency in the workforce. Labour 
replied that the failure stemmed from previous Liberal administrations' 
refusal to spend money and invest in stock, which meant the existing 
wagons were too old, constantly being repaired and unable to cope with 
the demand. In fact, both arguments were true. But the expense and 
poor quality of the service damaged the council. After two years in 
power, Labour realised it could hardly ask people to vote for them and 
support a campaign to defend local services if they were all as bad as the 
bin service. 
By the spring Labour was confronting the unions on the need to 
improve the service, pointing to the party's defeat in two by-elections as 
evidence that the city would not tolerate such poor services. The unions 
would either have to co-operate with Labour's reforms or run the risk of 
the party losing control and the Liberals privatising the service. 
However, it was not easy for the council to avoid union disputes and a 
strike by a tiny number of maintenance men over bonus schemes 
paralysed refuse collection in June 1985. Just when the confrontation with 
the Government over the defence of local services was entering its most 
serious phase, the public parks were being opened as temporary tips, 
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because the council could not get the bins emptied. 
Labour also had difficulties with a group of natural supporters, the 
council tenants, who had expected the party to tackle the problems of an 
expensive, demoralised, badly managed and inefficient direct labour 
organisation which gave tenants a terribly bad repairs and maintenance 
service. By the spring the council had mounted a major public attack on 
the organisation, and recruited a highly paid officer from outside the city 
to deal with the unions and reform management and labour practices. 
But its initial slowness in tackling the problem again weakened its 
argument that it was defending local services. These were all difficult 
managerial problems which Labour had inherited, not created. The 
administration of the city had become so slack during the coalition era 
that the Labour council was bound to face awkward, unpopular 
decisions. However, it was at least addressing them. 
Some other problems were of the party's own making. There were 
constant accusations by the opposition parties about patronage within 
the Labour administration. There were rumbling conflicts between the 
council and its white-collar employees over management decisions - the 
internal reorganisation of departments, the increased use of special 
administrative units which by-passed existing departments, the growing 
isolation of chief officers and the alleged political appointment of 
Militant supporters to local authority jobs. These matters had come to a 
controversial head in the previous November. 
The council had created a new race relations unit in the authority and 
they appointed as its director a 26-year old black quantity surveyor from 
London, Samson Bond, who had little experience and few formal 
qualifications in the field. The appointment, and the way it was 
subsequently handled, caused an uproar, with many representatives of 
the black community arguing that Bond was a Militant appointee. 
NALGO were equally unhappy and boycotted the post. The blacks 
physically harrassed Bond, and later attacked Labour councillors. At one 
point the blacks themselves were thrown out of the council chamber by 
the police. A Labour councillor resigned in protest at the policy. The 
Bond affair continued into 1985, causing great bitterness, and reinforcing 
some worries about the responsiveness of the Labour council to 
community opinion. At the same time there were disputes with the 
voluntary sector over the council's alleged efforts to weaken or 
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municipalise voluntary projects. The council's municipal housing 
strategy which had led it to abandon or municipalise a number of 
housing cooperatives, many of them in working-class areas, caused 
continuing conflict. 
In 1984 Liverpool's voters had shown enormous support for the 
Labour party's defiance of the Government - its refusal to get rid of 
council workers, to reduce its services or make local people pay for 
Government cutbacks. The risk for the council was that the need to sort 
out its services and its alienation from some groups in the city, would 
dissipate some of that support. Worries about the secretiveness of party 
decision-making and the dogmatic character of some of its policies, were 
beginning to expose political divisions. The Labour leaders replied that a 
party intent on governing was bound to break a few eggs. It was not 
clear if everyone would see it that way. 
Getting stuck behind rate-capping 
But there was another pressure on the council in 1985 which had a far 
more critical effect on the denouement of the crisis. This time the city 
was not alone in challenging the Government. In 1984, Liverpool had 
been accused of irresponsibility for breaking ranks with the national 
Labour Party. In 1985 Liverpool stayed in line with Labour's orches-
trated national protest against rate-capping. The Labour council had 
gone it alone in 1984 because it did not think the other authorities would 
be 'hard' enough in the confrontation with the Government. The events 
of 1985 only confirmed its predictions. 
From the start there were important differences of opinion about 
strategy amongst the Labour authorities. They tended to be dominated 
by the London boroughs, who had more professional, middle class, 
inner city parties, without Liverpool's strong links to the manual 
workers' unions, the district Labour party or the Militant Tendency. 
They certainly did not have the severity of Liverpool's financial 
problems. They opted for a policy of refusing to set a rate in 1985/86, 
until the Government made financial concessions to them. 
Liverpool had wanted the group to adopt a 'deficit budget' strategy. 
For Liverpool, the danger with the 'no rates' strategy was that individual 
authorities might fall by the wayside and slowly start setting rates once 
the pressures upon them increased. The campaign could begin to 
154/ POLITICS AND PRESSURE 
disintegrate and leave the Government facing a very exposed and 
vulnerable minority who could then be easily picked off by the courts. 
However, Liverpool agreed to adopt the policy to maintain common 
unity. 
The protesting authorities held together during the phoney war in the 
autumn of 1984. But in the spring of 1985, when the reality of individual 
disqualification, surcharge and bankruptcy loomed nearer, and concerns 
about the Labour Party breaking the law grew, nerves began to fail in 
many authorities. Ironically, Liverpool's apparent success in 1984 had 
encouraged the authorities to confront the Government in the first place. 
But it had also taught the Government how to play the game. After some 
initial correspondence with the group, Patrick Jenkin simply refused to 
meet them in the spring. He had not forgotten his lesson from Liverpool 
in 1984 and it helped him to defeat the larger campaign in 1985. 
On 7 March, all the authorities duly refused to set a rate for 1985/86. 
But under the threat oflegal action, and facing Jenkin's refusal to concede 
ground, the campaign slowly disintegrated, with individual authorities 
giving in with varying degrees of confusion and recrimination. The 
metropolitan counties, under a different legal obligation than the district 
councils to set a rate, went first in an initial wave after 7 March. But the 
districts soon followed. Some authorities, like Merseyside and Sheffield, 
tried to keep the struggle going by setting a rate which might eventually 
lead them to run out of money at the end of the financial year and 
provoke a confrontation then. However, the collective resistance was 
defused. The Labour leaders believed that if only four or five councils 
had held out, the Government would have faced a very different 
position. But it did not happen. 
As Liverpool's councillors feared, the debacle of the rate-capping 
campaign muddied the waters for Liverpool. It meant that they were not 
in control of the tactics, but had to support them anyway. They could 
not dominate the confrontation but had to share a stage with the other 
authorities, so that their case for special treatment for the city got lost in 
the welter of other claims. And it had a crucial effect on the timing of 
their own decision-making. 
Enter the district auditor 
At the beginning of June the pressures that had been building up on the 
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Labour council for almost two years finally exploded. In one frenetic 
week a whole series of events bore down on it. The first was the district 
auditor's actions. For over a year, the Labour group had ignored the 
auditor's warnings. Even as he gave his last one on 24 May- that they 
should make a rate by 1 June - they thought he was bluffing. But they 
did believe their senior officers. Their last formal legal advice came in 
April. This argued that every day that the council failed to make a rate 
after 1 April increased the risk of legal action against them, but it 
emphasised that 20 June was the crucial date. After that the legal position 
might become irretrievable, as it would be administratively impossible 
for the authority to give the ratepayers their legal right to pay their 
annual rate bill in ten monthly instalments. 
The officers believed if that happened, the auditor would have a 
much stronger legal case against the council. Before that deadline, it 
would be less obvious. Since the council typically received little rate 
income in April, May or June, but did receive its Government grant, it 
was not precisely clear how an auditor could prove that a real loss had 
occurred at that time amidst all the flows of the city's income and 
expenditure. As it turned out, the auditor thought differently. However, 
the Labour leaders called an emergency meeting of the council on 14 June 
which would allow time to set a legal rate, if that was what they intended 
to do. This became Labour's deadline. 
The timing was complicated by the national campaign against 
rate-capping. Even though the Labour leaders always believed the other 
authorities would finally buckle under to the Government, this took a lot 
longer than they had expected. At the beginning of June 1985 several 
authorities were still refusing to set a rate. Although most very quickly 
gave way, in the last days before Liverpool had to make a rate, the 
London borough of Lambeth was still holding out. They were, in John 
Hamilton's words, 'the joker in the pack.' If the Labour council had ever 
intended to blame the soft left nationally for abandoning Liverpool and 
leaving it isolated, so that it might then present a compromise budget, it 
could not play that card while another authority was still resisting. 
This was especially true since the leader of Lambeth council, Ted 
Knight, had a Workers' Revolutionary Party background, and might be 
happy to accuse Militant Liverpool of'bottling out' of the confrontation. 
The in-joke at the time was that Liverpool and Lambeth were playing 
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chicken in the road to see who would be the first to move - but they both 
got run down. However, that was a minor theme. The major one was 
that Liverpool had always hoped that the national campaign might 
provoke a response from the Government and that serious talks would 
be held. But the Government stuck to its guns. By the time it was 
absolutely clear that the national campaign had failed, the Labour leaders 
were almost up against their mid-June deadline. 
Setting an illegal rate 
In fact the key leaders, Byrne, Hatton and Mulhearn, only began to 
examine their options jointly during the first week in June. They knew 
they had few real political choices. Tony Byrne was the only one who 
fully understood the figures and the minimum he could get the 1985/86 
expenditure down to was £m252, which would need a 75 per cent rate 
rise. It could rise to £m270, with a rate rise of120 per cent needed. These 
increases were immediately ruled out as politically unacceptable. The 
leaders then tried to find some compromise rate rise which would not 
balance the books but might allow the city to get at least close to the end 
of the financial year before the money ran out, and might be acceptable 
to the unions and the party. This produced a figure of a 20 per cent rate 
rise. Finally a notional single figure increase of9 per cent was selected as a 
way of setting a clearly illegal rate. This figure had no budgetary 
significance; it was a symbolic commitment to resistance. 
The first meeting of the crucial budget week took place on Monday 
night, 10 June. This was between the Labour leaders and key senior 
union officials. Before the meeting, the union leaders believed that the 
Labour group would move a compromise budget with a 20 per cent rate 
rise. They were surprised to find this did not happen. Only Tony Byrne 
made a major speech and he merely rehearsed the alternative figures 
making no clear recommendation as between 9 and 20 per cent. But he 
did suggest that a 20 per cent rise might not bring in enough money to 
last the year. The Labour leaders also asked the unions to bring out their 
members in a strike which would close down the city in one week's time, 
as a gesture of support for the council. 
Whether or not the Labour leaders expected the unions to recom-
mend a 20 per cent rate rise, they did not do so. Instead, the unions 
withdrew to discuss the offer privately. Peter Cresswell, of NALGO 
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argued that if it meant that the city would run out of money and the last 
three months of the year would be spent with unions squabbling over 
whose members would have to sacrifice their jobs, there was no point 
going for 20 per cent. If it was going to mean redundancies anyway, the 
unions might as well fight the Conservative Government and its 
commissioners, as fight the Labour council. The key blue-collar union 
leader, Peter Lennard, who represented the politically more militant, 
low-paid council workers, for whom a large rate rise meant a real pay 
cut, needed no persuading that the only option was a 9 per cent rise. 
When they returned to the meeting, the union leaders would not promise 
the strike and they were non-committal on the rate rise. But they did not 
recommend 20 per cent. So the unions did not force the Labour 
leadership to go for broke. They simply refused to get them off the horns 
of their dilemma. They would not be seen taking the lead and 
recommending a compromise. 
Neither was there grass-roots support for a compromise. As the 
leaders took soundings in the wards, especially those dominated by the 
Militants, they got the message back that a compromise was not 
acceptable. If the Militant leaders wanted a compromise, it quickly 
became very clear that their rank and file would not buy it. They had 
been talked into believing the party would not go for a 'massive' rate 
rise, and they would not allow one. 
On top of that, many back bench councillors, non-Militant as well as 
Militant, argued that the party should not set a big rate rise. For many of 
them, the only principled position was to confront the issue directly and 
force the Government's hand. As one backbencher explained- 'I'm not a 
Marxist, I don't even believe in all this political stuff. I just don't think its 
fair. And I wouldn't vote for anything but a 9 per cent increase.' Another 
non-Militant councillor, who had been involved in the election disaster 
after Labour's 50 per cent rate rise in 1980, had assumed that the 
leadership would move a 20 per cent rise and had wrestled with his 
conscience all week about breaking Labour's promise not to impose 
'massive' rate rises. Finally he had decided to oppose the 20 per cent and 
move a lower one; he was intensely relieved to find that 9 per cent was 
finally chosen. 
Another backbencher, a successful solicitor who would be debarred 
from practising if he were bankrupted, was offered a dispensation from 
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supporting the illegal rate by his ward party. But he refused the offer and 
eventually voted with the group. Any political differences within the 
group between the Militants and non-Militants were overwhelmed by 
their unity on this issue. It would be the worst of all worlds to 
compromise in 1985, get accused of treachery, and then find they could 
not manage on the money, and end up in court anyway. Even if they 
lasted the year, the councillors felt they could not campaign a third time 
on the argument that the city was in serious financial trouble and still 
expect the public to believe them. By the end of the week, the Militant 
and non-Militant leaders realised that if they did try to present a 
compromise figure, they might even split the Labour group in the 
council on budget day. 
The decision to go for a 9 per cent rate rise was actually made at the 
Militant-dominated executive committee of the district Labour party on 
Wednesday night, 12 June. The meeting only lasted fifty minutes and 
there was no serious discussion of any alternative figure. By !hat time, 
nobody was willing to be seen pushing for the compromise figure. As 
the leading shopsteward for the manual workers, Ian Lowes, pointed out 
'nobody, whatever their politics, could have got a 20 per cent rate rise 
through the district party.' In other words, the national and local 
Militant leadership could not have controlled their rank and file even if 
they wanted to do anything else. 
The executive committee resolution was considered by a packed 
district Labour party meeting on Thursday, 13 June. This was now a 
formality. The district party instructed the councillors not to make a 
legal rate. There were no alternatives and no opposition from the floor. 
Nearly all the Labour councillors were present but none dissented. One 
of the few amendments was made by the secretary of the blue-collar 
union, which insisted that the councillors should not vote for a 
compromise budget, even if there were any defections in the group the 
following day. The resolution was accepted unanimously. By this time 
the Labour leaders were not engaged in debate. They were rallying the 
troops. 
The Labour group met briefly after the district party meeting and 
with the adrenalin still flowing, all the hands went up in favour of the 
illegal budget. As one councillor put it, they 'reacted to the war cry like 
troops being sent over the top.' The crucial question was whether all the 
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councillors would stick to their guns the next day at the council budget 
meeting. Until the very last moment on Friday morning, there were 
doubts that all the backbenchers would vote for illegality. But, like 
everyone else, they had been overtaken by events, as the leadership's 
decision to go for 9 per cent only became final on Wednesday night, 
which gave them just one day to make up their minds. Also, there was an 
enormous emotional pressure on the group to stand firm and not defect 
like the 'traitors' in 1984. 
But there was one final blow. The district auditor wrote to the 
councillors at the beginning of the week telling them that, since they had 
ignored his warnings to make a rate by 1 June, he was not waiting any 
longer. Their crime had already been committed and he was acting 
against them for the losses they had incurred between 1 April and June. It 
did not matter to him what rate, if any, they set on 14 June. The timing 
could not have been worse. For any councillors thinking of defecting, 
this was the last straw. They were already in danger ofbeing surcharged, 
disqualified and bankrupted. There was no point running the gauntlet of 
defection if they were already outside the law. In John Hamilton's 
words, the district auditor 'shotgunned' the group into its decision. 
There could be no retreat. Everyone in the party was now saying 'you 
might as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb.' 
The council considered Labour's budget at 9 o'clock on Friday 
morning, June 14. In contrast to the wild mood of previous meetings, a 
sombre atmosphere lay over the chamber. Hardly any information was 
presented apart from one brief page of figures; there was no explanation 
of the final budget figure of £m265. Once the deficit of almost £m6 from 
1984/85 was added to that base of £m265, the city needed to spend over 
£m270. At that level, the penalties imposed would cut the rate support 
grant from £m118 to £m29. The city would then have to find £m242 
from the rates. A 9 per cent rate rise would produce only £m125 and the 
city would be £m 117 short of the money it needed for the year. On that 
scenario it would never make it and was bound to run out of money. 
The numbers in the council chamber on 14 June the day meant that if 
only three more Labour councillors had joined the original Labour 
defectors and voted with the opposition, the budget would have been 
defeated. But to the obvious amazement of the opposition parties who 
had constantly predicted the group's collapse, 49 Labour councillors 
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voted for illegality and bankruptcy, after only just over two hours of 
debate. As they left the chamber, the consequences of their actions were 
still sinking in to many of them. John Hamilton looked weary and 
crestfallen. But others were glad to have done it regardless of the 
consequences: they were simply relieved to get off the emotional 
roller-coaster they had been on for two years. 
The council's senior officers were shattered by the decision. The 
Government was equally stunned. For months their intelligence had told 
them that Liverpool would back down. The civil servants who were 
sending the memos down to London could scarcely believe their 
contents. The council's action seemed beyond reason. The following 
week, the Cabinet committee of senior Ministers led by the Prime 
Minister, who had monitored the crisis in 1984, met again to decide what 
to do. They had very few options. As a senior civil servant said 'we can 
either sit on our hands or dust off the commissioner file from last year. 
The commissioner option looks as unattractive this year as it did last. It's 
just too uncertain.' 
The one option Ministers did consider was whether they should ask 
the Attorney General to take the case to the High Court, get the rate 
quashed and the council instructed to set a new legal rate. That move was 
open. But it was risky. It would be an olive branch to the Labour council 
who could then set a legal rate and wipe out their previous illegal act. 
However, the Government was worried that the council would only 
exploit the covert offer and argue that it had forced the Government to 
back down again. Even more alarming, if the High Court set aside the 
first rate, and the Labour council simply refused to set any rate at all, the 
city would be without income almost immediately and might collapse 
very quickly indeed. The Government was frightened of bringing the 
pack of cards down on its head. All the advice it was getting from 
Liverpool was that the Labour group was completely locked into its 
position with absolutely no prospect that it would behave 'responsibly' if 
the Government gave it a second bite at the cherry. Ministers sat around 
the table gradually realising the position that their policies on local 
Government finance had finally led them to. They were drifting towards 
the confrontation they never really wanted with no apparent way of 
avoiding it. 
The Ministers decided to sit on their hands, hoping that something 
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would tum up. But they had no idea what this might be. As one civil 
servant put it 'the Government only really has one big weapon to use -
the commissioners. When they've used it, they've used it.' It was 
unlikely that anyone else would quash the rate. The Liverpool Chamber 
of Commerce thought about it, but decided against it. The leaders of the 
opposition parties considered it but, quite apart from the expense 
involved in legal action, there were political imperatives not to do so. 
They might be accused of bringing the house down. More important, 
they would have to suggest a higher rate to be set and, given the mood in 
the city, that could only damage them with the electorate. Everybody 
was waiting and wondering about the next move. 
The Labour group's reaction was to start up its publicity campaign 
again, focusing on the threats of non-elected officials getting rid of the 
people's elected representatives. Its real target was the workforce and the 
unions. Even at the last, Derek Hatton believed that a massive 
demonstration of support by the workforce would persuade the 
Government to give Liverpool the money it was asking for. He believed 
Thatcher had made concessions to Liverpool in 1984 because of the 
pressure Liverpool had exerted upon her. Liverpool would have to do 
that again. 
The Labour leaders directed their campaign at the workforce at 
dozens of meetings, asking them to 'lock up' the city if the Government 
made a move against them. But because of the almost complete political 
and financial confusion, the workforce was not sure how to react to 
Labour's illegality. The joint shop stewards committee voted in favour 
of industrial action iflegal action was taken against the councillors. As its 
chairman, Peter Cresswell, put it, the unions were neither the paymas-
ters nor the innocent dupes of the Labour party. They were not 
defending heroic gestures. They simply believed that the council faced 
either huge cuts in jobs or very large rate rises, and the unions were 
opposed to both. They had to support the council, whatever reservations 
tbey had. But nobody was quite sure what that meant, nor when the 
action would take place - whether it would be if the councillors got a 
note of disqualification from the district auditor or whether it would be 
after the councillors were final~y disqualified after appeal, which would 
take months. 
Some blue-collar workers, who possibly had most to lose if Labour 
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lost office, were willing to 'have a go' as soon as they were asked. It was 
well known that the security force and the caretakers were willing to lock 
the commissioners out of the authority's buildings. The white-collar 
workers were more ambivalent. The teachers actually voted against a 
very moderate proposal to defend their own jobs -not the councillors -
with industrial action. But even if the unions were to take industrial 
action and hold a day or even a one-week strike as canvassed, it was not 
clear to many how this could change the Government's position anyway. 
In fact, the Government now believed that the matter was out of its 
hands. It was not willing to make financial concessions to Liverpool. In 
the Government's view, the matter was now in the hands of the law, the 
district auditor and the financial markets. 
'Wilful misconduct' 
The months from June through September were full of confusion, 
suspicion and rumour. Would the Government pay the rate support 
grant to Liverpool; would the banks lend money; if not when would the 
city run out of money; would anyone take the council to court; would 
the Government send its commissioners; what would the district auditor 
do; would the services collapse; would the council workers lose their 
jobs? Nobody seemed to know what would happen. There was little 
mutual trust around, and less accurate information, either about what 
was happening or about other people's motives and intentions. This got 
much worse after 14 June. Nobody, for example, was clear whether the 
Labour council had really meant to do what it had done, or whether it 
had stumbled into the position and wanted to get out of it. And hardly 
anyone except Tony Byrne and the treasurer, Michael Reddington, 
knew whether there was any chance of rescuing the situation anyway. 
However, some things soon became clear. 
The first was that national elites would not budge. Derek Hatton 
spoke to the Labour Party's national executive committee seeking 
support. That produced a carefully worded motion defending Labour 
councils, attacking the Government and asking for the district auditor to 
be called off. However, Neil Kinnock was on television ten minutes after 
it was released saying this did not mean they supported illegality. Patrick 
Jenkin refused to meet the council. Liverpool's MPs managed after some 
effort to get a meeting with Jenkin, but no concessions. Jenkin suggested 
POLITICS AND PRESSURE I 163 
that the council take its own case to the High Court, get the illegal rate 
quashed, and start again with a new rate. John Cunningham wrote to 
Patrick Jenkin suggesting talks, at the request of the council. But he 
knew beforehand that Jenkin would turn him down. Which he did. 
The next move was made by Tim McMahon, the district auditor. On 
26 June, McMahon started proceedings against 49 Labour councillors 
whom he thought were guilty of incurring 'losses' by 'wilful miscon-
duct.' In his view, the council had already lost money by not collecting 
its rates on time and having to pay interest charges on the money it had 
borrowed to cover for them. Since the city treasurer had calculated that 
the delay in setting a rate might have cost the city £m1.2 in interest 
charges in 1984, McMahon indicated the councillors might end up being 
charged with that kind of money. But as the figures would not be 
entirely clear until the end of the financial year, he was not proceeding 
with that for the time being. 
Instead he argued he could immediately assess a different loss. This 
arose in the following way. The Government had paid the first 
instalment of the city's rate support grant, on the assumption that it 
would actually spend at its target level. The payment would be adjusted 
once the Government got detailed information about the city's budget in 
July. That was customary. But by failing to make a rate on time the city 
had not received two other payments from the Government. The 
Department of Health and Social Security, which subsidises the housing 
benefits scheme that the local authority directly administers, had not paid 
the council the first three monthly instalments worth £m6. And the 
Treasury had not paid the first of two bi-annual instalments it normally 
paid the council instead of rates on Crown property. Since Jenkin had 
announced in Parliament in March that no authority would receive either 
of those grants until they set a rate, McMahon argued the council had 
incurred the loss by its wilful misconduct. He calculated that the council 
had lost potential interest of almost £3,000 a day from not having that 
money to invest. By 24 June these losses amounted to over £106,000. As 
that was now over £2,000 for each councillor involved they were liable 
for disqualification from office as well as surcharging. He gave the 
councillors three weeks to explain why they should not be disqualified. 
The council replied on 19 July. In a thirty-page document, they 
argued that there was no legal date by which an authority had to set a 
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rate. The judge in the most recent court case had set a limit of 1 June, but 
had said each case had to be individually considered. It pointed out that in 
1984 the district auditor had told Liverpool that 20 June, not 1 June, was 
the crucial date for setting a rate. The council's senior officers had 
emphasised the importance of this date. And the council had in fact set a 
rate before that date. The councillors had never individually or 
collectively said they would not set a rate for 1985/86. Far from 
neglecting the financial interests of the ratepayers, the council argued it 
had made every effort to increase its resources to deal with the city's 
'distressing social conditions', rehearsing all the negotiations it had had 
with the Government on its housing and urban programme. It argued 
that its budget was delayed because the Government had delayed 
decisions on important bids for urban programme money, which 
dramatically affected the council's spending plans. 
The council also repeated its objections to the grant system made in 
the 'joint report', arguing that since it had had 'a marked measure of 
success' in getting special help from the Government in 1984/85 after 
'spirited negotiations', there was 'every reason' to suppose it would do so 
again in 1985, especially since other authorities were resisting the 
Government at the time. On the specific losses, the council argued that, 
since the Government did not withhold or threaten to withhold payment 
ofhousing benefit subsidy in 1984 even though Liverpool had set its rate 
later than in 1985, it was fully entitled and expected to get the same 
treatment in 1985. The fact that it had not done so was not its fault, but a 
result of 'the will or whim' of the Government. As Treasury payments 
on Crown property were essentially the equivalent of rates, that delay 
had to be seen in the larger context of its justification for delaying setting 
a rate in the first place. Anyway, in 1984 Liverpool had not got its first 
payment from the Treasury until25 July, whereas in 1985 it had got it 
three weeks earlier on 4 July. 
The council's defence, which was nearly all concerned with the 
detailed politics of the relationship between the Government and the city 
council during its two years of office, did not turn on whether the losses 
had been incurred, but whether they were the result of wilful misconduct 
on its part. Essentially the Labour council argued that it intended to 
offset any short-term losses with extra Government money. The district 
auditor had accepted this in 1984. He should do so again in 1985. That 
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was what McMahon would have to make up his mind about by 
September 1985. Publicly, the leaders had been confident they would 
win the case. Privately, many back-benchers admitted to being terrified. 
Capital receipts and redundancy notices 
But however tragic it might be for individual councillors and their 
families, by the end of August 1985, the district auditor's case was 
something of a sideshow, unless the city could make sense of its budget. 
Liverpool might have collapsed long before the councillors' fate was 
determined. And this was what was preoccupying the treasurer. Like 
many of the other senior officers, Michael Reddington was in despair 
after the 9 per cent rate rise. It prompted desperate efforts on his part to 
try to get a grip on the position. In early July, the power to authorise any 
new spending was taken away from chief officers and given to Tony 
Byrne as chairman of the finance and strategy committee in order to limit 
spending as well as to transfer legal liability from officers to politicians. 
A 'star' chamber was set up to examine all requests for new spending. 
This started a rapid examination of all the financial options open to the 
council to reduce spending in 1985/86. By the end of the month, these 
efforts had paid a dividend. The base budget had been cut by £m10 down 
to £m255, mainly by creative accounting. 
Reddington pointed out that many of these manoeuvres stored up 
longer term financial problems and were undesirable. But this no longer 
mattered in view of the crisis facing the city. Reddington had calculated 
in early July that the 9 per cent rate rise would only produce £m229 in 
income and that the city was already contractually committed to 
spending £m171 in the year, including the three months' redundancy pay 
its employees would have to be paid. The city had to spend a further £m5 
a week beyond that to keep going. By late July, the Government had told 
Reddington that Liverpool should get £m29 grant in 1985/86. But it had 
already received over £m37 in the first instalment, so it would be getting 
no more. In late July the Public Works Loan Board told Reddington he 
could borrow no more from them until Liverpool set a legal rate and 
budget. He had to borrow in the private market and pay a gradually 
increasing premium in interest rates for doing so. 
Reddington soon would not be able to borrow any more money to 
keep his revenue budget going, because he would not be able to 
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guarantee he could repay the loans. Quite apart from questions of 
professional propriety, he might be liable to criminal charges if he 
continued to borrow in those circumstances. The local authority 
treasurers' professional association had already become so concerned 
about the position that in mid-July it had taken legal advice about how 
their members should behave when managing deficit budgets. This only 
reinforced Reddington's view about the short time he had left in which 
he could continue to borrow to keep the city afloat. 
On 19 July, McMahon wrote to the councillors again, warning them 
he might take further action against them for their 9 per cent rate rise. 
But his immediate purpose was to tell the council what he thought 
Reddington's deadline was- the end of September. He gave the council 
three choices: find ways of cutting its services or spending; go to the 
High Court, get the original rate quashed and set a new one that would 
pay the bills; or start preparing redundancy notices for its 30,000 
employees. 
There was one other option open to the council. The treasurer's 
report of31 July had shown that in the revenue budgets for the two years 
1984/85 and 1985/86, there was up to £m27 of work in housing repairs 
and maintenance which might be called capital work. Because this was 
not new building, as long as it was paid from existing capital receipts and 
not from borrowing, it would avoid the limit the Government placed on 
the city's capital spending. If enough capital receipts could be found, they 
could reduce the revenue budget by £m27. 
However, all the capital receipts the city was allowed to spend were 
needed for its massive house-building programme, which was running at 
£m112 in 1985/86. But as part of a policy to increase the money available 
to pay for the programme in future, Reddington had negotiated a 
deferred payment deal with a stockbroking firm, Philips and Drew, in 
which it would pay £m30 to builders for the work done on the housing 
programme in 1985/86. The city would repay the stockbrokers in later 
years. Although this money was needed for future years, in principle it 
could be partly used to reduce the revenue budget from £m255. This 
would mean the Government grant would then begin to flow back, and 
the city might get near the end of the financial year before the money ran 
out. In this way the immediate crisis would be averted. 
The problem for the Labour council if it accepted this 'capitalisation' 
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option would be the long-term costs. The city would have to pay interest 
charges on the loans, which in eight years might actually be as large as 
the money originally borrowed. More important, the deal would limit 
the size of the building programme in future years in two ways. The loan 
would have to be paid back at about £m8 a year, which would have to be 
deducted from the money that could otherwise be used to pay for 
house-building for several years to come. Most crucial, if the city used 
the capital receipts to pay for revenue in 1985/86, the building 
programme would have to be smaller the following year. In other 
words, capitalisation would put off the revenue crisis to 1986. But it 
would limit the council house building and the jobs it created. 
If the city had many more capital receipts in the bank it would be 
different. But it would already be using in various ways the £m60 capital 
receipts which had been accumulated in the past few years to finance 
both the city's revenue and capital programme in 1985/86. It could not 
easily generate that amount of money again. There is not that much to 
sell. And the money could only be spent once. It would only postpone 
the revenue problem until the following year, when the council would 
not have the £m20 capital receipts to pay for its jobs and services. They 
would then either have to be cut or paid for by very large rate increases. 
The beginning of the new financial year and the prospect of those tough 
financial decisions was by now only six months away. 
However, the Labour leadership insisted that it would not use its 
housing reserves in this way to balance the revenue budget. The political 
costs of backing down, and the cost to the housing programme in future, 
in its view were too great. Tony Byrne argued that the money was 
needed to pay the wages of the private sector workers who were building 
council houses for the working classes, not to pay public sector salaries 
for just another few months. The Labour leaders argued that their whole 
strategy was to protect jobs in all parts of the city. They would not make 
the building workers pay the price of keeping local authority workers in 
jobs. They regarded that as treachery and portrayed anyone who 
recommended 'capitalisation' as traitors to the party. By contrast, some 
white-collar leaders believed that capitalisation was the council's 'least 
bad' option. Labour had wilfully exaggerated its costs and rejected it in 
favour of confrontation with the Conservative Government. 
So the Labour leadership developed a new plan. It dropped its 
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demand for the return of the £m30 the Government had 'stolen'. It 
realised that this was not going to work. Instead, it asked the 
Government to let the council borrow an extra £m25, which would 
allow it to balance the books and keep the city running. Labour argued 
that if this did not happen, the city would collapse and the Government 
would be responsible. But it also made contingency plans if the 
Government would not allow the borrowing. The council would keep 
enough money to pay for absolutely minimal emergency services only-
providing residential care for the elderly, sheltering the homeless, doing 
emergency repairs, protecting public health, burying the dead. All other 
services would eventually have to cease. Because there would be no 
money left to pay them, the council would begin moves to terminate the 
contracts of all employees. The council's officers had advised the Labour 
leaders that they had to do this under the 1978 Employment Protection 
Act. If they did not do so, the employees would be able to sue the council 
for salaries, even if there was no money left. And it was quite possible 
that the individual councillors would eventually be held personally 
responsible for the millions of pounds involved. They intended to 
reinstate the workers as soon as possible, and certainly when the new 
financial year began in April 1986 and the local authority would be back 
in business again. 
This all came as a great shock to the Labour leadership, who had 
never thought about these kinds of legal implications. It came as an even 
greater shock to the unions. The political consequences of that move 
blew Labour's campaign wide open. When the plan was revealed during 
the first week in September 1985 it caused an uproar which locked the 
unions and the Labour council into a furious and .damaging argument. 
Union leaders simply refused to accept redundancy. They argued that 
they had always known that the money would one day run out and they 
would not be paid. But in two years of crisis, there had never been any 
mention of redundancies, which would jeopardise their jobs, and 
eliminate all their legal protection provided under the Act. They would 
have no guarantee that they would get their jobs back once the city 
started running again. Even if they did get them back, the interruption of 
service would mean that for a further two years they would not regain 
the legal protection of the Act. Throughout the first week of September, 
confusion reigned as the Labour leaders frantically tried to find a form of 
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words which would satisfy the unions that they would not in fact lose 
their jobs. Derek Hatton went back and forth between meetings with the 
unions and council's senior officers. But it was impossible. No amount 
of massaging the fine print could alter the basic legal position. 
On Thursday, 6 September 1985, the council finally announced its 
contingency plans- employees' existing contracts would 'cease to exist' 
()n 18 December. Finally, the implications of the alliance between the 
unions and the Labour council became clear. Whereas for almost two 
years the unions had identified their interests with those of the council in 
its fight against the Government, they now began to recognise the 
division of interest between the council as employer and themselves as 
employees. 
At the same time, the redundancy threat revealed the difference of 
interest between blue-collar and white-collar unions that had been 
broadly concealed for two years. The division broke out into the open on 
Friday, 7 September, when after meetings between the council leaders 
and the leaders of the 'General and Municipal' that union did a complete 
volte face and decided to support the redundancy plan. The explanation 
was simple. When the lower paid blue-collar workers received their 
redundancy payment and unemployment benefit, they would be 
financially better off than if they were working. Since the Government 
would have to pay one-third of the total redundancy bill, as well as the 
unemployment benefit, the council could score a propaganda victory by 
arguing that the Government had paid more to make the employees 
redundant than if they had given Liverpool its £m30 in the first place. 
Also if redundancy notices were issued, the city would in effect be 
solvent until the end of the financial year. The Labour council would 
then have until December to run its campaign against the Government. 
But the plan disintegrated at a meeting of the Joint Shop Stewards on 
Saturday, 7 September, in a long and bitter debate between blue-collar 
and white-collar unions. Whereas the blue-collar workers were confident 
of being reinstated by the Labour council, the white-collar workers 
feared that many of them would not be, and they would have no legal 
redress. Amidst much recrimination, the plan to accept redundancy was 
narrowly beaten by 51 votes to 48. Amidst the chaos, one blue-collar 
worker shouted that the unions would have to surround the Town Hall 
the following Monday, lock the Labour councillors out of the building 
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and prevent their issuing redundancy notices. And this indeed happened. 
This move dramatically escalated the financial crisis. Instead of running 
out of money in December as Labour planned, the city would be 
immediately unable to borrow in the market and it could be bankrupt in 
less than three weeks. 
Breaking ranks 
Immediately after this lock-out the shop stewards' committee met to 
consider the next move in another angry and bitter meeting. Despite the 
opposition ofNALGO, the blue-collar workers vetoed the capitalisation 
plan and proposed instead an indefinite strike to force the Government to 
give the city £m30. But the white-collar leaders would not even consider 
a strike until they had a guarantee of no redundancy. They argued they 
could not get their members out on an indefinite strike. Nor could they 
understand where it would lead. 
Finally the vote was taken and the strike call won by 56 votes to 44. 
At this point tempers were running very high indeed. The blue-collar 
workers insisted the white-collar workers' leaders should commit 
themselves to the strike, and called for the doors of the building to be 
locked until the white-collar leaders agreed. After further acrimonious 
and abusive debate, the meeting unanimously agreed to put the motion 
to their members for a strike on 24 September. Derek Hatton then gave 
NALGO their written undertaking there would be no redundancies. 
However, there were doubts from the start whether the white-collar 
workers would support the strike. By this time the national leaders of the 
white-collar unions had entered the fray and were trying to postpone the 
strike call. They were not even clear the strike was legal, since it was a 
political rather than an industrial strike. In their view the local unions 
could strike against the council as employer if the money ran out, but not 
against the Government. The results were announced on the evening of 
24 September. The strike call was defeated. 
Several union leaders did not even present the strike to their 
members. Only three unions voted for the strike. But most crucially, the 
key unions were divided. The 'General and Municipal' was in favour -
4,345 to 2,934. NALGO was opposed - 3,891 to 1,445. After this 
setback, the Joint Shop Stewards' Executive Committee voted to 
postpone the indefinite strike but to call for a one-day strike the 
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following day. The strike call had been a tactical disaster for the Labour 
council. Instead of uniting the unions with the council in a common fight 
against the Government, it set the unions against each other as well as 
against the Labour council. Labour had got itself trapped between its 
friends and its enemies. The failure of the strike call guaranteed that the 
political recriminations would continue in Liverpool. But it could not 
change the basic financial position. If there had been a total strike for six 
weeks and the city did not have to pay its employees, enough money 
could have been saved to allow the city to last the financial year. Since 
that had not happened, the council was left facing its original options. It 
could increase the rate. It would use its housing reserves to capitalise 
revenue spending and postpone the crisis. Or it could return to the 
redundancy option. 
On 25 September the Labour leaders chose the redundancy option. 
This would buy them time and allow them to borrow. But the decision 
guaranteed the continuation of their struggle with the white-collar 
unions, over capitalisation. On 26 September the Joint Shop Stewards' 
Committee finally split wide open as the blue-collar leaders endorsed the 
redundancy plan, and NALGO's representatives walked out of the 
meeting in protest. 
The war of nerves between the Government and the Labour council 
began again. While national union and the Labour party leaders began to 
panic at the way in which local troops had got out of hand, the 
Government- with Kenneth Baker now replacing Patrick Jenkin- was 
taking an even tougher line. At a meeting with Liverpool MPs on 26 
September Baker rejected a request for further borrowing. In his view, 
the council had not exhausted all possible options. They should either set 
a new rate or postpone the crisis by 'capitalisation'. And there was now 
another reason for the Government's hard line. Because Liverpool would 
be rate capped for the first time in 1986/87 at a spending limit of £m245, 
in real terms the city would have to be run on about £m30 less than in 
1985/86 anyway. The city would have difficulties enough in balancing 
the books in 1986/87, without the additional burden of paying back 
borrowed money. That problem lay only six months away and it 
virtually removed any incentive for the Labour councillors to behave 
'sensibly'. 
Another disincentive to compromise was that the district auditor 
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had in the meantime rejected the Labour council's appeal against his 
decision to disqualify or surcharge them. He argued that the delay in 
setting the rate was a deliberate attempt to blackmail the Government 
into giving the council extra money and as a recent court case had made 
clear, that was not 'a good reason to justify a clear breach of duty.' He 
gave them until the middle of October 1985 to appeal to the High Court. 
The councillors were nearer to being condemned men. Anway, 
whatever the legal outcome it would be too late to affect the frantic 
discussions taking place in September 1985. 
Despite the opposition of the white-collar unions on 27 September, 
the Labour party forced the redundancy motion through the city council. 
This meant the campaign would continue. Liverpool could fmd itself 
without any services betweenJanuary and April, 1986. In which case, the 
city would grind to a halt. The. workers would not be paid and they 
would have lost their jobs with no guarantee of getting them back. Only 
emergency services would be provided. In any event, the dispute 
between blue- and white-collar workers was bound to get worse as the 
politics of intimidation set in. And the threat of thirty thousand council 
workers' jobs would be once more used to encourage the national 
Labour Party conference to help blackmail the Government into giving 
the Labour council and Tony Byrne what they desperately wanted- the 
money for more public housing. 
But the Party conference at the beginning of October did not go to 
plan for Liverpool. Neil Kinnock chose the issue of Militant in Liverpool 
as a way of stamping his authority on the Labour Party and presenting 
himself to the electorate as a responsible future Prime Minister. He 
launched a ferocious attack on the irresponsibility of the Militant tactic 
which had ended up in 'the grotesque chaos of a Labour council hiring 
taxis to scuttle round the city handing out redundancy notices to its own 
workers.' A delegate from the Liverpool branch of the National Union 
of Public Employees brandished her redundancy notice along with the 
letter from Derek Hatton guaranteeing the council would make no 
redundancies. 
Derek Hatton had hoped to get support for his own resolution calling 
for industrial action in support of Liverpool. But in the face of the 
opposition of the union bosses he did a deal with the NEC spokesman 
and leader of Sheffield city council, David Blunkett. He Withdrew 
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Liverpool's motion in return for a promise that national Party and union 
leaders would come to Liverpool to examine the financial position and 
help them find a solution to the crisis. 
Blunkett's move saved Liverpool's face at the conference, but 
effectively placed the national leaders in the position of having to come 
up with a plan for Liverpool. Whether they realised it or not, the Labour 
leadership had repeated the Government's mistake of 1984, by getting 
sucked into Liverpool's financial affairs. It was running the risk of being 
scapegoated for the failure to find a painless solution in the same way 
Patrick Jenkin had been exposed in 1984. 
Back in Liverpool, the future remained as uncertain as it always had 
been in the city's apparently never-ending financial odyssey. 
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CONCLUSION 
This book has been about political reactions to Liverpool's economic 
decline, which has been both chronic and dramatic. That decline has been 
apparent for over fifty years, but has speeded up enormously in the past 
decade. In many respects, the process has emphasised the great natural 
strengths of local people and their communities, some of whom are 
coping impressively with great adversity while facing very bleak futures. 
However, it has created in others a sense of despair and alienation from 
the economic and political mainstream. The belief that national elites do 
not care very much about Liverpool, has produced a degree of cynicism 
in the city's public life. And it has encouraged, not only in the Liverpool 
Labour party, what may be called the politics of frustration. 
The behaviour of the Labour council can only be understood in this 
context. Its reaction to its problems was simply 'to have a go' at the 
Conservative Government. But this primitive line struck a chord with 
many people in the city, however much it may also have worried them. 
The brute facts of economic life in Liverpool made it fertile ground for 
such thinking, just as it made it fertile ground for the revolutionary 
Militant Tendency. The Militant developed Liverpool's budget strategy 
and used it for its larger political purposes; but it could not have just 
imposed it upon the city in May 1984. The voters realised the Labour 
council had not invented the city's financial and economic problems, 
even if it had done its utmost to exploit them. In many eyes, the 
Government forced the council into its resistance, turning people like 
John Hamilton, the old-fashioned Quaker school teacher and long-
standing Labour leader, into lawbreakers. 
The Government's contribution 
The Conservative Government made its contribution to Liverpool's 
crisis with a new grant system in 1981. The city argued that the system 
8 
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asked it to achieve more financially than was reasonable. It had a case. 
The system is very unsympathetic to Liverpool's dilemma. The target 
system was designed to punish Labour-controlled authorities who had 
spent expansively during the 1970s, by cutting their spending in the 
1980s. Liverpool was not a big spender then and actually spent less than 
many other cities. But its targets still required it to cut back in the 1980s 
as if it had been profligate in the 1970s. By July 1985, the Government 
had given way to the collective pressure of local authorities and 
abandoned the target system. Since Liverpool had suffered more than 
any other city through the sytem, the Government's admission of failure 
makes the city's claim about the unfairness of its treatment persuasive. In 
1984, even the Government's own Audit Commission delivered a 
withering attack on the unpredictability and irrationality of the system 
which wholly reinforced Liverpool's arguments. 
Liverpool also had a good case about the absence in the grant system 
of sufficient indicators of economic deprivation such as levels of income, 
poverty or unemployment. During the past decade, governments of 
both political parties have defined economic decline as the central issue 
for urban policy. But the block grant system, which is a local authority's 
primary source of direct government money, does not build economic 
deprivation into its calculations of local need in any significant way. If 
this were made as central to the calculation of a city's grant as it is to the 
Government's definition of the urban crisis, Liverpool would get more 
money and its financial difficulties would be more manageable. 
Equally, the city had a powerful argument that the scale of its 
population loss - from 850,000 to 490,000 in thirty years and still 
continuing at the rate of 10,000 a year- made it virtually impossible to 
cut expenditure as quickly as its grant fell. Despite all the sophistication 
of the grant related expenditure assessments, the size of the city's 
population remains by far the most important determinant of how much 
grant it gets, almost drowning more subtle indicators of need. Many of 
those directly involved in the Liverpool saga argued that, even if the city 
did have to cut its expenditure, the Government's timetable was 
unreasonable. The Labour leader, John Hamilton, put it most vividly. 
The Government was asking the Labour council to close institutions, 
reorganise services, and break union practices in very short order. But, in 
his words, 'when they tried to close five pits, they had a miners' strike on 
their hands for almost a year.' 
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The most constructive view came from one official in the Audit 
Commission, who suggested that Liverpool should not be given a set of 
punitive annual targets which became increasingly difficult to achieve. 
That only increased Labour politicians' resentment and unwillingness to 
cooperate. Instead, it needed a five year expenditure programme - the 
equivalent of an International Monetary Fund loan - which would 
provide the city with a set of realistic policies and financial goals. 
Liverpool would know what it would have to do to achieve them. In 
return, the Government would offer a longer term strategy for the city 
with an agreed revenue and capital budget. 
This would eliminate much of the uncertainty surrounding the city's 
financial position. Even if it did not provide the sums of money that 
many argue are necessary, it would at least provide a more stable context 
in which the city's difficult political decisions could be faced. Whether 
such an agreement around specific figures could be reached, given the 
practical problems and the ideological views of the current protagonists, 
is obviously an open question. However, if Liverpool is to put its 
financial house in order, that kind of timetable would be sensible. No 
doubt the Government would discover this for itself if it ever did have to 
run the city with its own commissioners. 
The Liberal legacy 
Both Liberal and Conservative parties in Liverpool made their contribu-
tion to the crisis as well. During the lost decade of coalition politics, the 
Liberals especially failed to respond adequately to the city's long-term 
decline and held down council spending and rate rises in a search for 
popularity and votes. Their endless creative accounting and consistent 
refusal to increase the rates to cover the real cost of the city's 
commitments, left serious financial difficulties for the Labour council. In 
particular, the final Liberal budget which Labour inherited significantly 
underestimated the real costs of running the city. The Liberal reign also 
encouraged the crisis in a less obvious way. Its 'natural wastage' policies 
and threats of privatisation alienated the council workforce and their 
unions, making them extremely defensive in their protection of the 
remaining council jobs. This made it more difficult for Labour to 
contemplate reducing the workforce to balance the books, even if it had 
wanted to. 
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In fact, Labour had not expected to win control of the council in May 
1983 and was astonished to find itself in office. Some of the election 
promises it made at the time, like cutting council rents by £2 a week and 
creating a thousand new council jobs, which caused them enormous 
financial difficulties when they had to run the city, were as much a 
propaganda attack on the Liberals as serious policy commitments which 
they had costed and expected to carry out. It meant that the Labour party 
came to power with rather more ideological baggage than it might have 
wanted but from which it was difficult to retreat. Even at the end of its 
second year of office, Labour was still fighting with the ghost of the 
Liberal leader, Sir Trevor Jones. The final council debates on bankruptcy 
were dominated more by Labour's attacks on him than by the fate that 
awaited the city. The exaggerated rhetoric and intellectual poverty of the 
political debate during the Liberals' lost decade, also encouraged Labour 
to make its last stand. 
The ideological divide 
Many forces pushed the Labour council towards its confrontation with 
central government. The voters, their professional officers, the unions, 
the Church leaders could all see that there was a genuine grievance; none 
of the possible legal solutions would have been popular. The fact remains 
that the Labour council actually chose to precipitate the crisis by refusing 
to take the decisions necessary to get the city's finances in order. Their 
financial problems were not insuperable. A three-year austerity prog-
ramme would have done it. However, the city would have paid a social 
and economic price. Also Labour thought it would pay a political price; 
the voters would reject the party as they did in 1980 for a 50 per cent rate 
rise. For Labour, under these circumstances, bankruptcy was preferable 
to treachery. 
The source of the conflict was the clash between two ideological 
responses to urban decline - one municipal socialist, the other free 
market conservative. By the 1980s, Liverpool's Labour party was 
committed to municipalisation as a way of protecting people in the city 
from economic decline and continuing attacks on the public sector by the 
Conservative Government. Labour defined the proper role of a local 
authority quite differently from the Government, who insisted that a 
local authority's job was to provide legally required services as efficiently 
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as possible- not to worry about jobs. The Government would look after 
that by getting the broader economic framework right. If the two sides 
would agree on that division of responsibility, the problem would go 
away. But the Labour council would not agree; the Government had not 
got the broader economic framework right in Liverpool- it had got it all 
wrong. 
For the Labour party, the council was a crucial employer for 15 per 
cent of the city's workforce. All its policies were designed to protect and 
create jobs. Like the level of rate rises and its housing programmes, these 
manpower policies had assumed intense symbolic significance for 
Labour. Tony Byrne once argued 'Local authority jobs do not belong to 
the people who have got them now. They belong to the 60,000 people on 
the dole and to the six year old children in Liverpool. They are their only 
hope of ever getting a job in their lives.' But for Patrick Jenkin, this was a 
completely illegitimate view of a local authority as a form of 'outdoor 
relief.' There lay the ideological divide. The costs of these policies 
contributed significantly to the city's financial crisis. However, the 
Labour council argued it was better for it to pay to keep people in work 
than for the Government to pay more for them to be on the dole. 
The Government was much more concerned about the quality of 
Liverpool's services. In its view, if the city could manage itself properly, 
services would improve, costs would decline and the financial difficulties 
would go away. In his attacks on the Labour council, Patrick Jenkin 
constantly emphasised that Liverpool had financial difficulties because its 
refuse collection was too expensive. This trivialised the problem. It was 
certainly true. But even if that was sorted out, it would have only a 
marginal impact upon the city's budget. The rate at which savings could 
be made through increased efficiency in council services would not 
match the rate at which the city lost money for being deemed an 
overspender. In fact, the improvements which are necessary in many of 
the city's services may increase its spending and worsen its financial 
difficulties. 
Labour's tactics 
The question remains whether the Labour council adopted the right 
tactics. Its plan was to blackmail the Government into giving extra 
money by threatening financial suicide, secure in the belief that the 
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Government would not take the political risk ofletting the city collapse. 
The strategy worked so well in the first year that, in July 1984, the 
Labour council held an enormous advantage over the Conservative 
Government. It had won the battle for both hearts and minds in the city 
with its council election victory. And with the city's professionals' 
victory in the 'joint report', the Government had tacitly conceded 
Liverpool had a case. More important, it had been given extra money for 
1984 and promised more help in the future. Though these promises were 
never made explicit or quantified, there is certainly evidence that the 
Government was willing to help Liverpool with more money for its 
housing and urban programmes. 
The money in itself would not have solved everything. It would not 
have eliminated the need to make tough financial choices. Also, there 
would have been strings attached. Liverpool would have had to make 
some political concessions to allow Patrick Jenkin to sell the deal in the 
Cabinet and on the Conservative backbenches. In particular, the Labour 
council would have had to dilute, at least symbolically, its municipalisa-
tion strategy, especially on the housing front. But in return, the council 
could have continued to negotiate directly with the Government about 
the city's financial difficulties and could have exploited privately the 
political advantage it had won. The opportunity for positive engagement 
was there. 
However, some of the Labour leaders did not see the issue in those 
terms. They lost the opportunity when they publicly exploited their 
budget 'victory.' They permanently changed the Conservative Govern-
ment's view of the Liverpool council. By November 1984, the 
Government was stony faced : the olive branch had been spurned and no 
more help would be available. When the city's MPs tried to get Patrick 
Jenkin to talk to the council leaders in July 1985, he simply replied 'They 
danced on my political grave last year. I do not intend to give them a 
second opportunity.' As one Labour backbencher put it, 'If a Con-
servative authority had done that to a Labour Government, I would 
want to know why they were going to help it a second time.' 
In Derek Hatton's view, however, the Conservative Government 
gave in to political pressure, not to negotiations, in 1984. It would give in 
to Liverpool with more money again in 1985 because it was frightened of 
having to run the city. But at the same time a senior civil servant in 
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London categorically denied any money would be given. 'We would 
come to Liverpool with great reluctance and much injured innocence' he 
said. 'But we would come.' This Militant tactic - the making of 
impossible demands - not only alienated the Conservative Government 
and some people locally, it also angered the national Labour Party 
leadership as well. In view of Liverpool's long-term dependence upon 
government money, whichever party is in power, it seemed to many a 
very high-risk strategy indeed. 
Liverpool's future - private sector solutions? 
Social justice and self-interest- the 1981 Toxteth riots are still fresh in the 
Government's memory- mean that public money will continue to come 
to Liverpool. The question is, how much and how should it best be used? 
The city does get money from a wide variety of Government 
Departments, agencies and programmes, but the detailed work necessary 
to draw up a reliable balance sheet of gains and losses in recent years has 
not been carried out. However, we do know that for many years the city 
benefited less than others from regional policy as this provided grant aid 
for the manufacturing sector - but not the service sector which 
dominates Liverpool's economy. Similarly, the Government's focus on 
job creation through small businesses is less likely to be successful in a 
city like Liverpool which has been dominated by large employers and has 
little tradition of small firms, as opposed, for example, to its neighbour 
Manchester which is a regional capital with a large indigenous small-firm 
sector. 
More important, a great deal of Government expenditure in the city 
does not pay for long-term productive investment as much as it does for 
the costs of increased unemployment. Some estimates are that as much as 
10 per cent of all Government spending in the city goes on the dole. The 
cost of all unemployment-related benefits has been calculated at £m400 a 
year, which is considerably more than the Government gives to the city 
council, the county council and Merseyside Development Corporation 
put together. The Liverpool Labour party has constantly argued that 
public money would be better used to protect jobs and improve the 
public infrastructure by building decent housing for people, even if they 
had no work. Whatever the flaws in their detailed policies, the 
Government still has to reply to that case. 
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Conservative Government policy is to achieve economic recovery by 
rolling back the boundaries of the state, cutting public expenditure and 
taxation, and encouraging the private sector and the market to bring 
growth. The evidence is that such a policy has not, and will not work, in 
Liverpool. The private sector has abandoned the city at an alarming rate 
in recent years, despite the fact that its rate levels were relatively low. 
The public sector did not crowd the private sector out of Liverpool. It 
left of its own accord. In the past six years, the number of manufacturing 
jobs in the city has been halved. The only growth to take place during the 
past decade has been in the public sector. 
Moreover, where the private sector has played a visible part in 
economic redevelopment - in tourism and leisure projects, the creation 
of a technology park, the recovery of derelict public housing for sale -
they have actually been public sector-led projects. The investment of 
substantial Government money has taken the risk out, or guaranteed the 
profit, for private investment. Though the best are successful in their 
own terms, at the moment they are like oases in the desert. If confidence 
in the city's economy is to be restored, the public sector will have to play 
a major role. 
Similarly, current Government policy is to privatise public housing. 
This reduces the quality of the remaining public housing stock and the 
money available for its improvement. This would be more sensible if the 
demand for private housing and people's capacity to pay for it were 
clearer. As it is, the proportion of people in public housing is higher in 
Liverpool than the national average, and estimates are that demand for 
private housing in the city is 10 per cent lower than the national figure. 
Low income, lack of job security and high rates of unemployment have 
forced many potential purchasers out of the private housing market. 
Also, if the goal of national policy is to encourage the private market 
to concentrate resources in those areas which are already economically 
buoyant and to make other areas wait until enough growth has taken 
place to fund regeneration, then Liverpool's economy will deteriorate 
during the next decade. Moreover, even if the private sector does work 
for some people, the benefits will be unequally shared. The private sector 
will not redistribute opportunity and rewards towards the underpri-
vileged. There will be increasing inequality and social polarisation with 
the very poorest in an economic ghetto. Already, there are two parallel 
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labour markets - the core employed and the marginal and unemployed. 
The gap between the two will inevitably widen, as the level of public 
provision on which the unemployed depend, continues to fall. As there is 
'comfortable' and 'uncomfortable' Britain, so there will be, increasingly, 
'comfortable' and 'uncomfortable' Liverpool. After the riots in the 
Autumn of 1985, the social consequences hardly need underlining. 
Wealth creation and welfare are not mutually exclusive. They both 
have to be the goal of urban policy, tailored to the needs of individual 
cities. The Government might argue that the only fair way of allocating 
resources is according to nationally agreed formulae and with this system 
one cannot treat each city differently. However, it already does so in 
many ways. For example, the urban programme accepts that cities can 
spend some of their money in different ways, according to their 
individual needs. The actual process of allocating the urban programme 
money to different cities is not done strictly on the basis of any formulae, 
but rather through Ministerial discretion. It is often argued that Glasgow 
has enjoyed some economic growth in recent years because of the 
operation of the very powerful Scottish Development Agency, which 
has enough resources and powers to guide economic development to it. 
Liverpool itself has had a battery of special agencies and programmes, 
even though they have not had sufficient powers or resources to help the 
city. 
The principle of discrimination between areas with different prob-
lems and needs is well established. If it could be developed to include 
broader urban development strategies, the long term needs of Liverpool, 
as well as other cities, might be more sensibly addressed. Such strategies 
might resemble the current urban programme system. They would 
include a standard grant determined by the size of population, combined 
with capital and revenue budgets for housing, transport, education, 
health and economic development, varied according to the different 
longer term plan developed for each city. They would also give 
Government a more positive role in making policy for the cities, as 
opposed to the powerful, but restraining, role it currently has. 
Recent experience shows it is difficult to make these kinds of 
initiatives work. However, the important thing is that, like in many 
other countries, they would make the relationship between the Govern-
ment and the cities less an administrative one and more directly political. 
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And the Minister for Merseyside would have real authority to commit 
the resources of his own and other Government Departments. This 
would place a premium upon the capacity of both sides to bargain and 
negotiate. There could be political benefits in that relationship. If the 
Government did not act fairly or local leaders were not smart enough to 
get a good deal for their city, people would know, more clearly than they 
do in Liverpool today, who to blame. 
